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{{Short description|Islamist militant organization in Kashmir}} {{Use Indian English|date=November 2021}}{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2018}}

factoids

| war = Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir| image = Hizbul Mujahideen logo.png| caption = Official logo| ideology = Islamism Jihadism

• {{harvp|Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide|2012|loc=p. 27: “As the JKLF slipped from armed prominence in 1992 and 1993, the arena of combat shifted to pro-Pakistan, Islamist organizations. The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party.“}}
• {{harvp|Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism|2016|loc=p. 271: “The Hizbul Mujahideen is an Islamist separatist group that is bent on liberating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The group wants Kashmir to be independent and integrated with Pakistan.“}}
• {{harvp|Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants|2013|loc=p. 265: “HM has historically called for the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control, but it takes a somewhat subtler line in its public communications.“}}

Pakistan}}| foundation = September 1989 (notional){{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 281, note 40: “Interestingly, Jamat-i-Islami considers September 1989, the day the Hizbul Mujahideen was founded, as the beginning of the insurgency.“}}| dates = 1989–presentKashmir Valley>Kashmir from India and its merger with PakistanBOOK, Jaffrelot, Christophe, Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation, 2002, Zed Books, 9781842771174, 180,books.google.com/books?id=I2avL3aZzSEC&pg=PA180, | partof = United Jihad Council| status = Active| founders = Muhammad Ahsan DarHilal Ahmed MirMasood Sarfraz| leader1_title = Patron and Supreme CommanderSyed SalahuddinWHO IS SYED SALAHUDDIN, AND WHY IS HE DESIGNATED AS A ‘GLOBAL TERRORIST’? DATE=27 JUNE 2017 ACCESS-DATE=27 MAY 2020 ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20200609154728/HTTPS://WWW.THEHINDU.COM/NEWS/NATIONAL/WHO-IS-SYED-SALAHUDDIN-AND-WHAT-IS-A-GLOBAL-TERRORIST/ARTICLE19154173.ECE, live, | leader2_title = Operational Commander| leader2_name = Farooq Ahmed Nali ({{a.k.a.}} Abu Ubaida) (chief operational commander in the Kashmir Valley, India)| headquarters = Muzaffarabad, Azad KashmirDukhtaran-e-MillatHTTP://WWW.GREATERKASHMIR.COM/NEWS/KASHMIR/STORY/224631.HTML WORK= GREATER KASHMIR ACCESS-DATE= 9 AUGUST 2016 ARCHIVE-URL= HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20181224181641/HTTPS://WWW.GREATERKASHMIR.COM/NEWS/KASHMIR/STORY/224631.HTML FIRST= KHALID WORK= GREATER KASHMIR ACCESS-DATE= 9 AUGUST 2016 ARCHIVE-URL= HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20160808152845/HTTP://WWW.GREATERKASHMIR.COM/NEWS/KASHMIR/PRO-FREEDOM-RALLIES-IN-PAMPORE-BIJBEHARA/224875.HTML, live, Ansar Ghazwat-ul-HindHTTPS://THEWIRE.IN/135725/KASHMIR-HIZBUL-MUJAHIDEEN-HURRIYAT-ZAKIR-MUSA/AUTHOR=ZEE MEDIA BUREAUTHE WIRE (INDIAN WEB PUBLICATION)>DATE=15 MAY 2017ARCHIVE-DATE=17 SEPTEMBER 2017URL-STATUS=LIVE, The Resistance Front{{efnJammu and Kashmir (union territory)>Jammu and Kashmir Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen leaders form the core of the TRF in Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir and ULF is Group of Al Badr but also working with TRF against IndiaPAK LAUNCHES TERROR’S NEW FACE IN KASHMIR, IMRAN KHAN FOLLOWS UP ON TWITTER>URL=HTTPS://WWW.HINDUSTANTIMES.COM/INDIA-NEWS/PAK-LAUNCHES-TERROR-S-NEW-FACE-IN-KASHMIR-IMRAN-KHAN-FOLLOWS-UP-ON-TWITTER/STORY-VDMVBYZKEOWRW8OKRUHS3M.HTMLFIRST=SHISHIRWEBSITE=HINDUSTAN TIMESACCESS-DATE=2020-05-11ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20211105232348/HTTPS://WWW.HINDUSTANTIMES.COM/INDIA-NEWS/PAK-LAUNCHES-TERROR-S-NEW-FACE-IN-KASHMIR-IMRAN-KHAN-FOLLOWS-UP-ON-TWITTER/STORY-VDMVBYZKEOWRW8OKRUHS3M.HTMLDATE=2020-05-05LANGUAGE=EN-USARCHIVE-DATE=6 APRIL 2023URL-STATUS=LIVE, NEW J&K TERROR OUTFIT RUN BY LET BRASS: INTEL>URL=HTTPS://WWW.HINDUSTANTIMES.COM/INDIA-NEWS/NEW-J-K-TERROR-OUTFIT-RUN-BY-LET-BRASS-INTEL/STORY-WLZ5ACFQJMHVA8KT7WETPO.HTMLFIRST=SHISHIRWEBSITE=HINDUSTAN TIMESACCESS-DATE=2020-05-11ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20231214053659/HTTPS://WWW.HINDUSTANTIMES.COM/INDIA-NEWS/NEW-J-K-TERROR-OUTFIT-RUN-BY-LET-BRASS-INTEL/STORY-WLZ5ACFQJMHVA8KT7WETPO.HTMLLAST2=CHAUDHURYDATE=2020-04-29WORK=THE ECONOMIC TIMESACCESS-DATE=2020-05-11ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20230405215811/HTTPS://ECONOMICTIMES.INDIATIMES.COM/NEWS/DEFENCE/THE-RESISTANCE-FRONT-NEW-NAME-OF-TERROR-GROUPS-IN-KASHMIR/ARTICLESHOW/75440416.CMSACCESS-DATE=8 JUNE 2020 DATE=8 JUNE 2020 ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20200608122222/HTTPS://WWW.NEWS18.COM/NEWS/INDIA/SECURITY-FORCES-HAVE-ELIMINATED-OVER-100-MILITANTS-IN-JAMMU-AND-KASHMIR-THIS-YEAR-SAY-OFFICIALS-2659491.HTML, live, }}| position = | flag = India}}{{flagCanada}}{{flag|United States}}al-QaedaLashkar-e-TaibaAl-Badr (Jammu and Kashmir)>Al-BadrPakistan {{Webarchiveweb.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/pak >date=19 March 2023 }}. Mapping Militants. Stanford University.}}Hizbul Mujahideen, also spelled Hizb-ul-Mujahidin (, {{Translation|’Party of Holy Fighters’}}),{{sfnp|Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan|2016|p=193}} is a Pakistan-affiliated Islamist militant organisation that has been engaged in the Kashmir insurgency since 1989. It aims to separate Kashmir{{efn|Throughout this article, “Kashmir” refers to the Kashmir Valley.}} from India and merge it with Pakistan,*{{harvp|Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide|2012|loc=p. 27: “As the JKLF slipped from armed prominence in 1992 and 1993, the arena of combat shifted to pro-Pakistan, Islamist organizations. The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party.“}}

• {{harvp|Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism|2016|loc=p. 271: “The Hizbul Mujahideen is an Islamist separatist group that is bent on liberating the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir. The group wants Kashmir to be independent and integrated back with Pakistan.“}}
• {{harvp|Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants|2013|loc=p. 265: “HM has historically called for the unification of Kashmir under Pakistani control, but it takes a somewhat subtler line in its public communications.“}}
• {{harvp|Staniland, Organizing Insurgency|2012|loc=“The Hizb, by contrast, represented a less popular Islamist ideology and did not embrace a mass mobilization strategy.“}}
• {{harvp|Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution|2013|loc=p. 423: “When many of the other jihadi groups began to leave the umbrella of JKLF, they consolidated under Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. With political leadership wrapping itself in the mantle of Islam, and Islamist groups gaining power and influence, the Kashmiri conflict became yet another ripe opportunity for foreign jihadists.“}}
• {{harvp|Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants|2013|loc=pp. 264–265: “HM has long-standing ties with the Pakistani Islamist political party Jamaat-e-Islami.“}}

WEB, 2019, Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Hizbul Mujahideen,www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/#HM, 2022-03-27, United States Department of State, en-US, 13 April 2022,web.archive.org/web/20220413141111/https://www.state.gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/#HM, live, and is thus one of the most important players in the region as it evolved the narrative of the Kashmir conflict by steering the struggle away from nationalism and towards jihadism.Founded in September 1989 as an umbrella group of Islamist militants, Hizbul Mujahideen quickly came under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir;*{{harvp|Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution|2013|loc=p. 423: “The Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HuM), active since the mid-1980s, and its parent political party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, were the two most important players in the evolution from nationalism to jihad.“}}

• {{harvp|Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants|2013|loc=pp. 264–265: “Some analysts believe that JI founded HM on behalf of the ISI while others contend that JI did so on its own initiative but with the assistance of the ISI.“}}
• {{harvp|Staniland, Insurgent Fratricide|2012|loc=p. 27: “The most powerful of these was the Hizbul Mujahideen, which combined Pakistani aid with the support of the Jamaat-e-Islami political party.“}}
• {{harvp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|loc=pp. 76–77: “While its rise to dominance occurred after 1990, its mobilization during 1989–1991 through the networks of the Jamaat-e-Islami laid the basis for an integrated organization that persisted...“}}
• {{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 281, note 40: “Interestingly, Jamat-i-Islami considers September 1989, the day the Hizbul Mujahideen was founded, as the beginning of the insurgency.“}}

{{harvp|Kiessling, The ISI of Pakistan|2016|p=180}} {{harvp|Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants|2013|p=265}}; {{harvp|Gunaratna & Yee Kam, Handbook of Terrorism|2016|p=271}} {{harvp|Sareen, The Jihad Factory|2005|loc=p 141: “Dar’s followers have been trying to seize HM offices in Muzaffarabad, Rawalpindi and Islamabad.“}}{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=80}}The organisation has claimed responsibility for multiple armed attacks in Kashmir.A sample:

• NEWS, Hizbul Mujahideen takes responsibility for attack on CRPF camp, NDTV.com,www.ndtv.com/india-news/hizbul-mujahideen-takes-responsibility-for-attack-on-crpf-camp-516091, live, 10 June 2020,web.archive.org/web/20200610194433/https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/hizbul-mujahideen-takes-responsibility-for-attack-on-crpf-camp-516091, 10 June 2020,
• WEB, US Department of State, Country Reports on Terrorism 2017 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Hizbul Mujahideen,www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f4413.html, live,web.archive.org/web/20200212140246/https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bcf1f4413.html, 12 February 2020, 10 June 2020, Refworld,
• WEB, US Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 - India,www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa7d8.html, live,web.archive.org/web/20200612213612/https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6aa7d8.html, 12 June 2020, 12 June 2020, Refworld,

{{sfnp|Joshi, The Lost Rebellion|1999}} It has been designated as a terrorist group by the European Union,WEB, 22 December 2015, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/2430 of 21 December 2015,eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015D2430, live,web.archive.org/web/20190110171412/https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015D2430, 10 January 2019, 15 May 2017, Official Journal of the European Union, WEB, 29 January 2013, Banned Organisations,mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?id_pk=292, dead,mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?id_pk=292," title="web.archive.org/web/20130129051543mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?id_pk=292,">web.archive.org/web/20130129051543mha.nic.in/uniquepage.asp?id_pk=292, 29 January 2013, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, NEWS, 30 April 2004, US adds 4 Indian outfits to terror list, Rediff News,www.rediff.com/news/2004/apr/30us1.htm, live, 13 May 2015,web.archive.org/web/20181225164836/https://www.rediff.com/news/2004/apr/30us1.htm, 25 December 2018,

See also

• {{citation |title=Patterns of Global Terrorism |date=30 April 2003 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/201908211151222009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19990.htm |chapter=Appendix A: Chronology of Significant Terrorist Incidents, 2002 |chapter-url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19990.htm |publisher=US Department of State |access-date=23 May 2019 |archive-date=21 August 2019 |url-status=live}}
• {{citation |title=Patterns of Global Terrorism |date=30 April 2003 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/201908211151312009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19992.htm |chapter=Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups |chapter-url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2002/html/19992.htm |publisher=US Department of State |access-date=23 May 2019 |archive-date=21 August 2019 |url-status=live}}
• {{citation |title=Patterns of Global Terrorism |date=29 April 2004 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/201908211151292009-2017.st/ate.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/31759.htm |chapter=Appendix C – Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups |chapter-url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2003/31759.htm |access-date=23 May 2019 |archive-date=21 August 2019 |url-status=live}}
• {{citation |title=Appendix C: Background Information on Other Terrorist Groups |url=https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/20120.pdf |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/201908211151262009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/20120.pdf |publisher=US Department of State |access-date=23 May 2019 |archive-date=21 August 2019 |url-status=live}}

Foundation

Origins

The efforts for the creation of the Hizbul Mujahideen go back to 1980, when Pakistani President Zia ul-Haq called the chief of Jamaat-e-Islami in Azad Kashmir, Maulana Abdul Bari,{{efn|It is generally supposed that the Jamaat-e-Islami in Azad Kashmir is a wing of Jamaat-e-Islami Pakistan. However Arif Jamal states that it is an independent organisation founded in 1974. {{harv|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=108}}}} and asked for assistance in raising an insurgency in Indian-administered Kashmir.{{harvp|Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016|p=157}}; {{harvp|Riedel, Deadly Embrace|2012|p=26}}; {{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=109}} {{harvp|Riedel, Deadly Embrace|2012|loc=p. 26: “Zia promised that he would use the war against the Soviet invaders to help build a support base for a Kashmiri insurgency. In other words, the Afghan war would also train cadres for another jihad, this time against India. Zia also promised that some of the American assistance earmarked for the Afghan jihad would be diverted to the Kashmiri project and that the ISI would help with both.“}}{{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 109: “According to Bari, the general stated his intentions plainly: he had decided to contribute to the American-sponsored war in Afghanistan in order to prepare the ground for a larger conflict in Kashmir, and he wanted to involve the Jamat-i-Islami of AJK. To the general, the war in Afghanistan would be a smokescreen behind which Pakistan could carefully prepare a more significant battle in Kashmir.“}}Bari travelled to the Kashmir Valley and met with the leaders of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir. Protracted negotiations continued for three years when finally, the founding amir of the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir, Maulana Saaduddin Tarabali, was invited for a meeting with Zia ul-Haq in May 1983. Saaduddin wanted complete operational control of the insurgency, with Pakistan’s role limited to military training and financial support. Pakistan agreed albeit reluctantly, and a deal was struck.{{harvp|Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016|loc=p. 157: “This prompted Zia to host their leaders in May 1983 and push the negotiations forward. During these talks, the JI for Indian Kashmir (JIK) wanted to impose certain conditions on the proposed partnership, including minimizing ISI’s role to that of training, weapons and money. The Kashmiris did not want ISI to exercise any operational control over any planned operations.“}}{{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp.113–115: (p. 113) “The strategy was jihad—a holy war waged against Indian oppression, a campaign for “freedom”. Members of Jamat were to return to IJK and begin the recruitment of young Kashmiris—who would, the plan went, be sent at first opportunity for military training.” (p. 114) “In exchange for his support, Din wanted to drastically limit the role of the Pakistani army in the conflict. In his mind, the army should provide only military training and financial support. Everything else must be left to Jamat.” (p. 115) “Zia and ISI were willing to agree to a limited role, but they wanted a firm commitment that Jamat-i-Islami would send its units for training.“}} However, the progress with Jamaat-e-Islami was sluggish. The ISI{{efn|Inter-Services Intelligence, Pakistan’s secret service.}} got frustrated with it and started looking for other options. It made contact with Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) in 1984 and struck a deal with it in 1986. According to scholars, JKLF was only a short-term expedient for ISI, a means to spur Jamaat-e-Islami into action.{{harvp|Riedel, Deadly Embrace|2012|pp=26, 39}}{{harvp|Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016|loc=pp. 157–158: (p. 157) “Some in Islamabad hoped that an ISI–JKLF cooperative relationship would force the JIK [Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir] to seek a similar arrangement.“}}Some 10,000 militants were trained by July 1988, operating in fifty units, when an insurgency was launched.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 129}} Operating under the JKLF banner were also a number of Islamist jihadi groups that owed loyalty to Jamaat-e-Islami: a group called “Zia Tigers” operating since 1987, “Al-Hamza” since 1988, “Hizbul Ansar” led by Muzaffar Shah, a largest and best organized group called “Ansarul Islam”, and a subsidiary of it called “Al-Badr”. According to Arif Jamal,{{efn|“Arif Jamal, a former contributing writer to the New York Times, is a visiting fellow at the Centre on International Cooperation at New York University. A leading Pakistani journalist, he has worked for the Muslim, the News, and the Pakistan Times, as well as for international media including Radio France International and the CBC.” {{harv|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=back cover}}}}“this vast network of jihadi groups worked within the JKLF for many months; they were among the most active members of the insurgency.“{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 138–139}}In August 1989, the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir sent a commander called Masood Sarfraz{{efn|Arif Jamal describes Masood Sarfraz as a “clandestine militant” initially associated with Hizbul Ansar. According to Imtiaz Gul, he was called the “Lion of Peer Panjal”, who “managed the [Hizbul Mujahideen] wing in Azad Kashmir before creating [Hizb-e Islami] in 2000 after he fell out with the [Jamaat-e-Islami] of Azad Kashmir”.Imtiaz Gul, Friday Times, 18–24 July 2003, quoted in {{harvp|Sareen, The Jihad Factory|2005|pp=140–141}}.}}to bring the various Islamist groups together and create a serious organisation parallel to the JKLF. “Hizbul Mujahideen” (“Party of holy warriors“) was his chosen name for the new umbrella group.{{efn|The name was derived from that of the Hizb-e Islami party of Afghanistan, which operated under the leadership of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, and with which Sarfraz had been previously involved.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 140–141}}}}While his efforts were under way, Ansarul Islam, which was under pressure from the Indian security forces, had also changed its name to “Hizbul Mujahideen”. The two organisations operated in parallel for a few weeks, but merged in October 1989. Muhammad Ahsan Dar was chosen as the leader of the united group in this meeting, but Hilal Ahmed Mir (alias Nasirul Islam) of the former Ansarul Islam is said to have been elected as its amir later.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 140–141}}{{efn|The precise sequence of the appointment of the two leaders and their relative positions is unclear, but the frictions between them came into open in June 1990.}}

Jamaat takeover

File:Syed.jpg|thumb|right|Syed Ali Shah GeelaniSyed Ali Shah GeelaniThe launch of insurgency by JKLF in July 1988 alerted the members of the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir to the fact that “a new game has started”.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=137}} Informal relationships with the militant groups were strengthened, with various Jamaat members taking direct roles.{{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 137–138: “Key Jamat-i-Islami members including Habib Ullah in Kupwara, Wali Mohammad Shah in Baramula, Riaz Rasool in Budgam, Mir Asad Ullah in Pulwama, and Abdur Rashid Islah in Doda started working with smaller jihadi cells.“}} {{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 141–142: “Among top leaders of the organization in 1989, only Syed Ali Shah Geelani was willing to publicly support armed jihad.“}}{{harvp|Biberman, Gambling with Violence|2019|loc=p. 82: “Dar tried to pursue a partnership with Jamaat, but he was told that Jamaat could not support the militancy because its constitution barred it from carrying out underground activities. Geelani was with Dar, but not as Jamaat.“}}The ISI and the Jamaat-e-Islami of Azad Kashmir were intent on bringing Hizbul Mujahideen under the control of Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 141–142}} A meeting was arranged in Kathmandu on 14 January 1990, with participants from the Jamaat organisations from Pakistan, Azad Kashmir and the Kashmir Valley. The Kashmiri Jamaat was resistant to direct involvement in the insurgency, saying that it would destroy the organisation and open it to Indian assault.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 142}}Anand K. Sathay, Fai goes back a long way with Jamaat in Kashmir {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231028004932archive.asianage.com/india/fai-goes-back-long-way-jamaat-kashmir-261 |date=28 October 2023 }}, Asian Age, 24 July 2011. But Syed Ali Shah Geelani dramatically appeared when the negotiations stalled and pushed the Jamaat into supporting the insurgency.{{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 143: “Geelani appeared suddenly, made an impassioned speech and, according to accounts of the meeting, succeeded in pushing the group toward openly supporting the jihad.“}}Having decided to participate in the militancy, states Arif Jamal, the Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir moved to “decisive action, activating a decade of planning”.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=143}}The constitution of Hizbul Mujahideen was finalised on 10 June 1990, under ISI direction. It allowed Jamaat-e-Islami Kashmir to nominate one of its members as the leader of the group, which, according to Arif Jamal, “virtually turned the organization into a subsidiary of Jamat-i-Islami”.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 143}} The Jamaat nominee was to be called the patron, who would nominate an amir, who would in turn nominate a chief commander. Jamaat appointed Mohammad Yusuf Shah, its district chief of Srinagar, as the patron of Hizb. He took the nom de guerre of “Syed Salahuddin”, and quickly consolidated total control over the organisation.{{harvp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 144: “Salahuddin acted ruthlessly in taking the reins of Hizbul Mujahideen. Though he initially kept Ahsan Dar on as chief commander, he soon decided to consolidate Jamat-i-Islami control over the new organization and demote him.“}}{{harvp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|loc=p. 77: “The Jamaat took over the Hizbul Mujahideen from within by placing loyal personnel in key positions, rapidly expanding the already Jamaat-heavy social composition of its organizers.“}}(File:Abdul Majeed Dar 02.jpg|thumb|right|300px|Abdul Majeed Dar, who merged his militant group into Hizbul Mujahideen)In a power play, Ahsan Dar announced at a press conference in July 1990 that Hizbul Mujahideen had formed an alliance with Jamaat. This only served to strengthen Yusuf Shah’s position and a weakening of his own. Hilal Ahmed Mir, who was Deobandi by persuasion, reacted against the announcement and ended up getting marginalised as well. He quit the group and set up a new one, which came to be called Jamiatul Mujahideen.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 144–145}} Masood Sarfraz came again in September 1990 to consolidate the grouping. Tehreek-i-Jihad-i-Islami, another umbrella group formed in 1989, also merged with Hizbul Mujahideen and its leader Abdul Majeed Dar was appointed as the secretary general.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=pp. 145–146}} After the completion of consolidation, Yusuf Shah alias Salahuddin left for Azad Kashmir, where he managed the group’s relationship with the ISI as well as the Jamaat of Azad Kashmir.{{sfnp|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|loc=p. 146}}By the time of its establishment, the organisation asserted a strength of over 10,000 armed cadres, the majority of whom were trained in Pakistan,NEWS, The birth of the Hizbul Mujahideen, Rediff,www.rediff.com/news/2000/jul/31hizb.htm, 20 March 2019, 3 September 2020,web.archive.org/web/20200903202021/https://www.rediff.com/news/2000/jul/31hizb.htm, live,

Early days

The organisation’s first major strike is deemed to be the assassination of Maulvi Farooq Shah, the then Mirwaiz of Kashmir and chairman of the All Jammu and Kashmir Awami Action Committee, a coalition of disparate political parties in Jammu and Kashmir, on 21 May 1990.NEWS, Strategic Kashmir is divided by conflicting loyalties, Christian Science Monitor, 10 June 1983,www.csmonitor.com/1983/0610/061054.html, 12 October 2017,web.archive.org/web/20171012042331/https://m.csmonitor.com/1983/0610/061054.html, live, NEWS, Mahapatra, Dhananjay, SC upholds life sentence for killer of Mirwaiz’s father, The Times of India, 22 July 2010,timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/SC-upholds-life-sentence-for-killer-of-Mirwaizs-father/articleshow/6197533.cms, 11 November 2019,web.archive.org/web/20191111083102/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/SC-upholds-life-sentence-for-killer-of-Mirwaizs-father/articleshow/6197533.cms, live, On 27 October 1990, the organisation adopted a resolution supporting the merger of Jammu and Kashmir with Pakistan.The group grew and units were set up at the Jammu province by February 1991. Field intelligence units were also set up across different places. Cadre was extensively mobilised in the name of Islam The establishment of the Supreme Advisory Council followed by a student wing took place in spring 1991. The latter though became a separate organisation in its entirety, in June 1991, under the leadership of Nasir-ul-Islam, after it organised the kidnapping of a high-profile bureaucrat. After a 1991 merger with Tehreek-e-Jihad-e-Islami (TJI), which was backed by Jamaat, Hizb-ul-Mujahideen gained significant military might and its strength reached about 10,000 fighters.WEB, Amin, Masoodi, Mohammad Ahsan Dar’s Arrest: End of the Road for Hizbul?, Institute of Peace & Conflict Studies,www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=2780, 18 January 2009, 19 March 2015,www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/mohammad-ahsan-dars-arrest-end-of-the-road-for-hizbul-2780.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20150319221418www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/mohammad-ahsan-dars-arrest-end-of-the-road-for-hizbul-2780.html,">web.archive.org/web/20150319221418www.ipcs.org/article/jammu-kashmir/mohammad-ahsan-dars-arrest-end-of-the-road-for-hizbul-2780.html, live, {{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=85}}By the end of March 1991, Hizbul Mujahideen demanded that the local government provides the list of all permanent residence certificates and that all non-residents leave the state within one month.

Insurgency decade

(File:Abdul Majeed Dar with jklf founder Amanullah Khan 1.jpg|thumb|right|Amanullah Khan and Abdul Majeed Dar)

Friction with JKLF and alliance with Jamaat

The first three years of the insurgency (1990–92) were dominated by the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF).{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=74}} Despite being supported by Pakistan, they under the renewed ideology of their new leaders shifted to a secular pro-independence stance and attracted huge support in the valley in their strategy to organise a mass-resistance, that would compel India to withdraw from Kashmir.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=74}}But, a lack of a social fabric among the new mass-recruits, (who often did not share a common ideology) coupled with an urban-centric focus led to the gradual weakening of JKLF.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=74–75}} Indian counter-insurgency operations removed much of its leadership, wiping out its central control.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|p=128}} Pakistan was also heavily incentivised by the popularisation of Jihadi sentiments in the Kashmiri youth; and utilised the situation to gain control over Kashmir.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|p=126}} By 1991, ISI had begun to cease providing of funds to JKLF, (which stood its ground for independence of the territory) and were instead advocating splinter factions to break off and form their own militant groups after receiving due training in their territory.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|p=126}} Subsequently, Hizbul Mujahideen came to be favoured by the ISI as a potentially valuable resource and finally, after JKLF rejected certain demands of nuancing their pro-independence stance; all of their erstwhile camps in Azad Kashmir were handed over to Hizbul Mujahideen.{{harvp|Sirrs, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate|2016 |p=177}} {{harvp|Garner, Chechnya and Kashmir: The Jihadist Evolution|2013}}Soon enough, arrests by Indian forces necessitated a re-organisation of the central command and in the reshuffle, Ahsan Dhar, a moderate leader with an independent mind was asked to step down and Syed Salahuddin, a radical Jamaat loyalist, was appointed instead.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=77}} Dar was soon expelled by Salahuddin loyalists in late 1991 and formed a splinter group-- “Muslim Mujahideen”, which quickly fell apart after his arrest in 1993.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=85}} An overall restructuring to enable a collective, hierarchical and institutionalised leadership along the lines of Jamaat{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=67–68}} soon followed which lend a much-needed organisational strength that lacked JKLF.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=78–79, 85}} Hizbul Mujahideen also managed to increase their penetration into the rural belt courtesy the utilisation of Jamaat’s socio-religious authority and homogeneity.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=67–68, 78–79}} An implementation of Sunni culture in the ground-roots helped their cause further.In the meanwhile, Hizb-ul Mujahideen rigidly opposed JKLF, all throughout and had rejected JKLF’s nationalist agenda in favour of an Islamist one. There were increasing clashes with one another and the differences reached their peak by 1991, as it publicly opposed JKLF’s agreement to a solution of the dispute without the aid of UN resolutions. Military clashes between JKLF and Hizbul Mujahideen became increasingly commonplace after the first such incident in April 1991 wherein a JKLF area commander was killed.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003}} It began to systematically target members of JKLF, killing them and intimidating others to defect.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=80, 83}}{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003}} JKLF leaders had alleged Hizbul Mujahideen militants to be informers for the Indian forces and Amanullah Khan even complained of his cadres in Pakistan being coerced to join the ranks of Hizbul Mujahideen.BOOK, Victoria, Schofield, Kashmir in conflict India, Pakistan and the unending war, 2010, I.B. Tauris, 9780857713988, 157, 929274072, BOOK, Jeffrey S., Dixon, Meredith Reid, Sarkees, A Guide to Intra-state Wars: An Examination of Civil, Regional, and Intercommunal Wars, 1816-2014, 2015, CQ Press, 9781506317984, 571–572,books.google.com/books?id=gu6ECgAAQBAJ, Hizbul Mujahideen also murdered several of the pro-independence intelligentsia with JKLF leanings. Some of these killings included Hriday Nath Wanchoo, a Kashmiri Pandit human rights advocate.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|pp=3–4, 128–132}} Hizbul Mujahideen militant Ashiq Hussain Faktoo was convicted for his killing.NEWS, J&K separatist leader completes 23 years in jail, Peerzada Ashiq, 6 February 2016, The Hindu,www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jk-separatist-leader-completes-23-years-in-jail/article8199339.ece, 10 October 2017, 5 February 2016,www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jk-separatist-leader-completes-23-years-in-jail/article8199339.ece," title="web.archive.org/web/20160205200753www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jk-separatist-leader-completes-23-years-in-jail/article8199339.ece,">web.archive.org/web/20160205200753www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/jk-separatist-leader-completes-23-years-in-jail/article8199339.ece, live, Other prominent killings included Dr. Abdul Ahad Guru who was a cardiologist and JKLF ideologue, Mirwaiz Qazi Nisar and Mirwaiz Maulvi Farooq, Mohammed Maqbool Malik, Prof. Abdul Ahad Wani,{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|pp=3–4, 128–132}}{{sfnp|Santhanam, Jihadis in Jammu and Kashmir|2003|p=128}} Muhammad Sultan Bhat, Abdul Ghani Lone, and Abdul Majeed Dar.{{citation needed |date=October 2017}}Hizbul Mujahideen was instrumental in preventing the return of Kashmiri Pandits after their ethnic cleansing from the valley, Salahuddin spoke of them being Hindu agents whilst threatening to auction their properties. Many of operations of the outfit during 1994-95 were designed to polarise the masses along religious lines.

Zenith

(File:Abdul Majeed Dar 03.jpg|thumb|right|Abdul Majeed Dar inspecting a cache of arms)By 1994, many JKLF members had denounced militancy and some even joined state politics, which led to further splintering amongst JKLF and a complete yield of its military dominance to Hizbul Mujahideen which grew up to be the major force in Kashmir despite facing a much widespread and effective counter insurgency response from the Indian forces.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|pp=3–4, 128–132}}{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=81}} This survival has been attributed to its widespread penetration across rural networks. By 1996, the arm-bearing factions of JKLF were entirely crushed{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=83}} and with other local insurgent factions having either disbanded or becoming defunct or having switched loyalties to the Indian cause; Hizbul Mujahideen was the sole militant group operating in the valley.{{sfnp|Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace|2003|pp=133, 136}}Analysts and academics though believe that Hizbul Mujahideen lacked popular support in the valley and that their aversion to pro-independence ideas and Sufi practices alienated many Kashmiris.

Retreat

But roughly beginning the same time, Hizbul Mujahideen actually started to lose their popular influence in the valley.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}} People from the fellow militant groups often aligned with the counter insurgency operations to avenge the Hizbul Mujahideen or protect themselves from the organisation, killing many Hizbul commanders in the process.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}} They also imparted ground intelligence to the Indian forces; thus systematically degrading Hizbul Mujahideen’s own networks.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}} A simultaneous targeting of Jamaat’s militants led to their revoking theirs open support for organisation, which destroyed the social fabric of Hizbul Mujahideen to a large extent.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}} By the end of the 1990s; Hizbul Mujahideen was forced to go for a retreat.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}} The Al-Badr faction split in 1998 due to a dislike of excessive interference by Jamaat.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=88}}

Ceasefire of 2000 and withdrawal

In the following years, the group started to fragment as ISI pushed foreign extremists into Hizbul Mujahideen. Rivalries developed often leading to violence, and one such incident culminated in the killing of 21 people in a Pakistan administered Kashmir village in 1998.WEB, Jaideep E., Menon, Narayanan M., Komerath,www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html, The Hizbul-Mujahideen Ceasefire Who Aborted It? BHARAT RAKSHAK MONITOR: Volume 3(2); September – October 2000, 9 January 2009,www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20090109055407www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html,">web.archive.org/web/20090109055407www.bharat-rakshak.com/MONITOR/ISSUE3-2/narayanan.html, 9 January 2009, dead, 15 May 2017, Starting April 2000, there were alleged parleys between Abdul Majid Dar, the Kashmir commander and other top leaders of Hizbul Mujahideen with Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and Intelligence Bureau (IB) officials in Delhi and other venues; that led to the build-up of a ceasefire offer.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=88}} Offensive counter-insurgency operations against the group were also reduced. On 24 July 2000, Dar, along with four other Hizb commander (some Hizb commanders didn’t agree with Dar) made an unconditional ceasefire declaration for a span of 3 months, from the outskirts of Srinagar and asserted it to be backed by the consent of the local populace, who were surveyed. Majeed Dar had also apparently visited Pakistan before the announcement for consultations with the Hizbul Mujahideen Central Command. The ceasefire was welcomed and approved in India, near unanimously and was immediately ratified by the Pakistan-based commander Syed Salahuddin who until then was against any diplomatic resolution.WEB,www.dawn.com/news/31262/hizb-expels-three-top-commanders, Hizb expels three top commanders, 17 July 2015, 5 May 2002, 20 July 2015,www.dawn.com/news/31262/hizb-expels-three-top-commanders," title="web.archive.org/web/20150720191851www.dawn.com/news/31262/hizb-expels-three-top-commanders,">web.archive.org/web/20150720191851www.dawn.com/news/31262/hizb-expels-three-top-commanders, live, JOURNAL, Bhatnagar, Gaurav, The Islamicization of Politics: Motivations for Violence in Kashmir, 2009, 20, 1, 1–20, 10.7916/D8WQ01S2, A unit-commander from Pakistan-administered Kashmir in the Pir-Panjal area disagreed with the ceasefire and was expelled along with his faction; leading to a violent clash with the Pakistan Jamaat.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=88}}On the next day, United Jihad Council (UJC), a coalition of 16 radical Islamist organisations (that comprised Hizbul Mujahideen and was incidentally chaired by Salahuddin himself), severely criticised the ceasefire declaration. Hizbul Mujahideen was soon revoked of its council membership and Salahuddin lost his chair. Jamaat leaders too vociferously criticised the ceasefire declaration and alleged it to be an act of sabotage. LeT launched multiple attacks killing and injuring numerous civilians as a form of protest against the ceasefire declaration with an aim to derail it.Two rounds of talks were smoothly held and a cricket match was played out between Indian armed forces and Hizbul Mujahideen. The Indian government did not agree to indulge with Pakistan and whilst Pakistani government initially maintained a neutral posture of abiding by the wishes of the Kashmiri populace, it later changed its stance and demanded a representation. Salahuddin then called off the talks on 8 August under flimsy pretexts; interpreting an address of Vajpayee to the Parliament as calling for a strict abidance of the Indian delegation to the Indian constitution. He also re-warned of more escalation and threatened to spill their activities over the rest of India; incidentally Hizbul Mujahideen’s earlier stance was to wage war against the Indian occupation but not against India. The US State Department as well as the British Foreign Office blamed Hizbul Mujahideen for the failure of the process.The ceasefire move, its immediate endorsement and subsequent withdrawal highlighted deep divisions between the more hawkish operatives in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and those based in India.NEWS,www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm, The Hizbul meltdown, Swami, Praveen, 25 May 2002, Frontline, 6 May 2015, 11 January 2016,www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm," title="web.archive.org/web/20160111080033www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm,">web.archive.org/web/20160111080033www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1911/19110190.htm, live, Dar was soon removed from his role of military commander and in May 2002, he was formally expelled from the Hizb along with a number of supporters and commanders whilst being.denounced as an agent of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW).WEB,www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20020509b.html, Dar & Co are RAW agents: Hizbul hawks, 17 July 2015, 4 March 2016,www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20020509b.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20160304112905www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20020509b.html,">web.archive.org/web/20160304112905www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2002/kashmir20020509b.html, live, {{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=89}} Dar and several other ex-leaders were assassinated by Hizbul Mujahideen between 2001 and 2003.WEB,www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/23jk.htm, Abdul Majid Dar shot dead, 17 July 2015, 20 July 2015,www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/23jk.htm," title="web.archive.org/web/20150720212653www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/23jk.htm,">web.archive.org/web/20150720212653www.rediff.com/news/2003/mar/23jk.htm, live, {{sfnp|Swami, India, Pakistan and the Secret Jihad|2007|p=202}} By 2003, most key leaders of Hizbul Mujahideen were in Azad Kashmir and they were quite inactive in Kashmir; a fragmented Hizbul Mujahideen survived a total collapse but had metamorphosed into a vanguard group.{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|pp=85–86}}Yet, in 2004 it was still “regarded as one of the most influential groups involved in the conflict over Kashmir.“{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=89}} As of 2009, it was supposedly “the brand name of the Kashmir militancy because of being the largest and the most important in terms of its effectiveness in perpetrating violence across Kashmir.“{{sfnp|Staniland, Networks of Rebellion|2014|p=89}}

Decline

{{Further |2016 Kashmir unrest}}Since mid-2010s, the organization has suffered multiple losses, and by 2023 it has become skeletal of its former self.NEWS,www.news18.com/amp/news/india/burhan-wanis-viral-group-photo-had-11-militants-the-last-of-them-was-killed-today-2126901.html, Burhan Wani’s Viral Group Photo Had 11 Militants. The Last of Them Was Killed Today, News18, 3 May 2023, 25 February 2023, 25 February 2023,web.archive.org/web/20230225025817/https://www.news18.com/amp/news/india/burhan-wanis-viral-group-photo-had-11-militants-the-last-of-them-was-killed-today-2126901.html, live, NEWS,www.firstpost.com/opinion/hizbul-mujahideen-decline-slain-cadres-busted-modules-arrested-members-take-toll-on-once-feared-group-in-kashmir-12120652.html/amp, Decline of Hizbul Mujahideen: Slain cadres, busted modules, arrested members take toll on once feared group in Kashmir, 8 February 2023, 25 February 2023, 25 February 2023,web.archive.org/web/20230225022305/https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/hizbul-mujahideen-decline-slain-cadres-busted-modules-arrested-members-take-toll-on-once-feared-group-in-kashmir-12120652.html/amp, live, The downfall of the organization started with the killing of one of its most powerful commanders - Burhan Wani.On 8 July 2016, he along with two other militants were killed by Indian security forces.NEWS,www.huffingtonpost.in/burhan-wani/who-was-burhan-wani-and-why-is-kashmir-mourning-him/, Who was Burhan Wani and why is Kashmir mourning him?, Huffington Post, 15 July 2016, 14 July 2016,www.huffingtonpost.in/burhan-wani/who-was-burhan-wani-and-why-is-kashmir-mourning-him/," title="web.archive.org/web/20160714222146www.huffingtonpost.in/burhan-wani/who-was-burhan-wani-and-why-is-kashmir-mourning-him/,">web.archive.org/web/20160714222146www.huffingtonpost.in/burhan-wani/who-was-burhan-wani-and-why-is-kashmir-mourning-him/, live, Widespread protests erupted in the Kashmir valley after Wani’s death, causing unrest in the valley for nearly half a year.NEWS,indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jammu-and-kashmir-burhan-wani-doctors-stage-protest-in-j-k-against-civilian-deaths-in-kashmir-unrest-2966015/, Doctors stage protest in J-K against civilian deaths in Kashmir unrest, The Indian Express, 17 August 2016, Kashmir Valley is on the boil since July 9, a day after Hizbul Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani was killed in an encounter with security forces in Anantnag district of south Kashmir. The widespread protests claimed the lives of 55 people and left over 6000 injured, with hundreds hit by pellets in their eyes as a result of which, doctors say, a number of youths have lost their eye sight., 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321135141/https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/jammu-and-kashmir-burhan-wani-doctors-stage-protest-in-j-k-against-civilian-deaths-in-kashmir-unrest-2966015/, live, More than 96 people diedNEWS,www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/story/235512.html, 2016 Unrest: Not even one probe into killings completed, 6 December 2016, Greater Kashmir, 27 January 2017, While 96 civilians were killed in security forces’ action post the killing of Hizb-ul-Mujahideen commander Burhan Wani, the Government ordered magisterial inquiries into only five such killings., 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321135142/https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/story/235512.html, live, NEWS,www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/day-85-toll-92-hit-by-pellets-on-sep-15-budgam-youth-succumbs-at-skims/229856.html, Day 85 Toll 92: Hit by pellets on Sep 15, Budgam youth succumbs at SKIMS, 1 October 2016, Greater Kashmir, 27 January 2017, 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321142151/https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/day-85-toll-92-hit-by-pellets-on-sep-15-budgam-youth-succumbs-at-skims/229856.html, live, NEWS,nation.com.pk/international/24-Jan-2017/indian-troops-kill-three-suspected-separatists-in-kashmir, Indian troops kill three suspected separatists in Kashmir, 24 January 2017, The Nation (Pakistan), The Nation, 27 January 2017, Agence France-Presse, The incident sparked months of anti-India unrest which left more than 90 civilians dead., 4 August 2017,nation.com.pk/international/24-Jan-2017/indian-troops-kill-three-suspected-separatists-in-kashmir," title="web.archive.org/web/20170804215250nation.com.pk/international/24-Jan-2017/indian-troops-kill-three-suspected-separatists-in-kashmir,">web.archive.org/web/20170804215250nation.com.pk/international/24-Jan-2017/indian-troops-kill-three-suspected-separatists-in-kashmir, live, NEWS,www.firstpost.com/india/kashmir-unrest-what-was-the-real-death-toll-in-the-state-in-2016-3183290.html, Kashmir unrest: What was the real death toll in the state in 2016?, Yasir, Sameer, 2 January 2017, 27 January 2017, Firstpost, 2 February 2017,www.firstpost.com/india/kashmir-unrest-what-was-the-real-death-toll-in-the-state-in-2016-3183290.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170202050228www.firstpost.com/india/kashmir-unrest-what-was-the-real-death-toll-in-the-state-in-2016-3183290.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170202050228www.firstpost.com/india/kashmir-unrest-what-was-the-real-death-toll-in-the-state-in-2016-3183290.html, live, NEWS,www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-militants.html, Kashmir Is Paralyzed by an ‘Adored’ Band of Militants, 14 November 2016, The New York Times, 4 January 2017, Seventy-six people have been killed in the violence, the police in Kashmir say, while local activists put the toll at closer to 100., 7 August 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190807004048/https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/world/asia/kashmir-india-pakistan-militants.html, live, while over 15,000 civilians and more than 4,000 security personnel were injured.NEWS,www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/after-15000-injuries-govt-to-train-forces-in-pellet-guns/239453.html, After 15000 injuries, Govt to train forces in pellet guns, Akmali, Mukeet, 23 January 2017, Greater Kashmir, 27 January 2017, 26 January 2017,www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/after-15000-injuries-govt-to-train-forces-in-pellet-guns/239453.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170126190856www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/after-15000-injuries-govt-to-train-forces-in-pellet-guns/239453.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170126190856www.greaterkashmir.com/news/front-page/after-15000-injuries-govt-to-train-forces-in-pellet-guns/239453.html, live, NEWS,timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-fomenting-trouble-but-Modi-will-solve-Kashmir-issue-Mehbooba-Mufti/articleshow/53886822.cms, Pakistan fomenting trouble, but Modi will solve Kashmir issue: Mehbooba Mufti, 29 August 2016, The Times of India, 30 August 2016, 24 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190324140530/https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Pakistan-fomenting-trouble-but-Modi-will-solve-Kashmir-issue-Mehbooba-Mufti/articleshow/53886822.cms, live, The violence which erupted after his death was described as the worst unrest in the region since the 2010 Kashmir unrest,NEWS,uk.reuters.com/article/uk-india-anniversary-idUKKCN10Q0FG, India’s Modi lashes out at Pakistan, Pakistan hits back, 15 August 2016, 17 August 2016, Reuters, Modi met national party leaders on Friday to seek ways to end the worst unrest in Kashmir since 2010., 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321135143/https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-india-anniversary-idUKKCN10Q0FG, live, NEWS,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/four-civilians-killed-in-firing-in-jammu-and-kashmir-s-budgam-district/story-N8ZhElghzojEGN94KNylCL.html, Five civilians killed, 31 injured in fresh firing in Kashmir; toll reaches 65, 17 August 2016, Hindustan Times, 17 August 2016, The worst violence since 2010 — when the Valley was rocked by similar protests leaving scores dead and injured — has sparked a verbal spat between India and Pakistan, both blaming each other for the flare-up., 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321135809/https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/four-civilians-killed-in-firing-in-jammu-and-kashmir-s-budgam-district/story-N8ZhElghzojEGN94KNylCL.html, live, with Kashmir being placed under 53 consecutive days of curfews imposed by authorities.NEWS,www.deccanherald.com/content/567874/curfew-lifted-valley-one-killed.html, Curfew lifted from Valley, one killed in clash in Sopore, 31 August 2016, 31 August 2016, Press Trust of India, 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321135151/https://www.deccanherald.com/content/567874/curfew-lifted-valley-one-killed.html, live, NEWS,www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/authorities-lift-curfew-in-kashmir-valley-as-clashes-erupt-in-some-places/article9054322.ece, One killed, 100 injured in Valley, Peerzada Ashiq, 31 August 2016, The Hindu, 31 August 2016, 31 August 2016,www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/authorities-lift-curfew-in-kashmir-valley-as-clashes-erupt-in-some-places/article9054322.ece," title="web.archive.org/web/20160831083023www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/authorities-lift-curfew-in-kashmir-valley-as-clashes-erupt-in-some-places/article9054322.ece,">web.archive.org/web/20160831083023www.thehindu.com/news/national/other-states/authorities-lift-curfew-in-kashmir-valley-as-clashes-erupt-in-some-places/article9054322.ece, live, NEWS,www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/story/227253.html, Curfew lifted from entire Kashmir valley, says Div Com, 31 August 2016, Greater Kashmir, 31 August 2016, 21 March 2019,web.archive.org/web/20190321142159/https://www.greaterkashmir.com/news/kashmir/story/227253.html, live, After his encounter in 2016, the group suffered severe losses with more than 200 of its fighters killed within the span of next 6 years.NEWS,www.firstpost.com/opinion/hizbul-mujahideen-decline-slain-cadres-busted-modules-arrested-members-take-toll-on-once-feared-group-in-kashmir-12120652.html/amp, Decline of Hizbul Mujahideen: Slain cadres, busted modules, arrested members take toll on once feared group in Kashmir, Firstpost, 8 February 2023, 25 February 2023, 25 February 2023,web.archive.org/web/20230225022305/https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/hizbul-mujahideen-decline-slain-cadres-busted-modules-arrested-members-take-toll-on-once-feared-group-in-kashmir-12120652.html/amp, live, Wani was succeeded by Sabzar Bhat, a close aide of his and member of group within the organization named Wani’s boysNEWS,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html, The killing of Wani’s successor, Sabzar Bhat, on May 27, 2017, threatens to further stoke the fire raging since the April 9, 2017 by-elections for a parliamentary seat. On May 27, 2017, separatists announced three days of strike and protests to mourn Bhat’s death while the police imposed curfew to prevent people from gathering. Yet, clashes took place between protesters and personnel of the state police and the Central Reserve Police Force resulting in the killing of a youth and injuries to 70 others., Since July 2016, Kashmir’s schools and colleges stayed shut on 60% of working days, Hindustan Times, Athr, Parvaiz, 30 May 2017, 3 June 2017, 2 June 2017,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170602110522www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170602110522www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html, live, Indian security forces considered Bhat effective at using social media to recruit youth towards militancy.NEWS,www.firstpost.com/india/hizbul-mujahideen-commander-sabzar-bhat-killed-how-security-forces-pulled-off-encounter-in-tral-3487151.html, The security forces pointed out that 26-year-old Ahmad, a resident of Ruthsana village in Tral, was the brain behind utilising social media as a tool to attract young boys towards militancy. He was marked as an ‘A-category’ militant., Hizbul Mujahideen commander Sabzar Bhat killed: How security forces pulled off encounter in Tral, Sameer, Yasir, 29 May 2017,www.firstpost.com/india/hizbul-mujahideen-commander-sabzar-bhat-killed-how-security-forces-pulled-off-encounter-in-tral-3487151.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170603012454www.firstpost.com/india/hizbul-mujahideen-commander-sabzar-bhat-killed-how-security-forces-pulled-off-encounter-in-tral-3487151.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170603012454www.firstpost.com/india/hizbul-mujahideen-commander-sabzar-bhat-killed-how-security-forces-pulled-off-encounter-in-tral-3487151.html, 3 June 2017, NEWS,www.oneindia.com/india/sabzar-bhat-the-terrorist-who-shot-more-selfies-than-bullets-2448925.html, Sabzar Bhat, the terrorist who shot more selfies than bullets, Vicky, Nanjappa, 30 May 2017, 3 June 2017, OneIndia, Intelligence Bureau officials tell OneIndia that like Wani, this person too was a social media tiger. The youth of Kashmir unnecessarily get carried away by such people who make a pomp and show on the social media. This is just a strategy on their part to attract the youth into their fold, the official also added., 30 May 2017,www.oneindia.com/india/sabzar-bhat-the-terrorist-who-shot-more-selfies-than-bullets-2448925.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170530070354www.oneindia.com/india/sabzar-bhat-the-terrorist-who-shot-more-selfies-than-bullets-2448925.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170530070354www.oneindia.com/india/sabzar-bhat-the-terrorist-who-shot-more-selfies-than-bullets-2448925.html, live, Sabzar was a close aide of Burhan and member of a group within the hizbul Mujahideen, dubbed Wani’s boys. It was a 11-member group, which had become famous when there photograph become viral in June 2015 as they posed boldly without masks in front of the camera and posted pictures online, in contrast to earlier times when they remained hidden and did not reveal much. The photo had become hugely popular among youth.NEWS,www.news18.com/amp/news/india/burhan-wanis-viral-group-photo-had-11-militants-the-last-of-them-was-killed-today-2126901.html, Burhan Wani’s Viral Group Photo Had 11 Militants. The Last of Them Was Killed Today, News18, 3 May 2019, 25 February 2023,web.archive.org/web/20230225025817/https://www.news18.com/amp/news/india/burhan-wanis-viral-group-photo-had-11-militants-the-last-of-them-was-killed-today-2126901.html, live, Bhat was killed in May 2017.NEWS,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/burhan-wani-s-father-attends-funeral-of-hizbul-militant-sabzar-bhat/story-Ek79Xexmo6OQL4pvRKRcnK.html, Hindustan Times, Hizbul Mujahideen militant Sabzar Ahmad Bhat was buried in his village in Pulwama on Sunday morning, a day after the 27-year-old was killed in a gun fight with security forces in south Kashmir., Burhan Wani’s father attends funeral of Hizbul militant Sabzar Bhat, Toufiq, Rashid, 28 May 2017, 5 June 2017, 31 May 2017,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/burhan-wani-s-father-attends-funeral-of-hizbul-militant-sabzar-bhat/story-Ek79Xexmo6OQL4pvRKRcnK.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170531155301www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/burhan-wani-s-father-attends-funeral-of-hizbul-militant-sabzar-bhat/story-Ek79Xexmo6OQL4pvRKRcnK.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170531155301www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/burhan-wani-s-father-attends-funeral-of-hizbul-militant-sabzar-bhat/story-Ek79Xexmo6OQL4pvRKRcnK.html, live, His death sparked clashes and a police-imposed curfew, during which a youth was killed in clashes with the Central Reserve Police Force.NEWS,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html, The killing of Wani’s successor, Sabzar Bhat, on May 27, 2017, threatens to further stoke the fire raging since the April 9, 2017 by-elections for a parliamentary seat. On May 27, 2017, separatists announced three days of strike and protests to mourn Bhat’s death while the police imposed curfew to prevent people from gathering. Yet, clashes took place between protesters and personnel of the state police and the Central Reserve Police Force resulting in the killing of a youth and injuries to 70 others., Since July 2016, Kashmir’s schools and colleges stayed shut on 60% of working days, Hindustan Times, Athr, Parvaiz, 30 May 2017, 3 June 2017, 2 June 2017,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170602110522www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170602110522www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/since-july-2016-kashmir-s-schools-and-colleges-stayed-shut-on-60-of-working-days/story-1FlfmjKN23a8osHATOIaFM.html, live, Internet and phone service across Kashmir was suspended in an attempt to calm the region.NEWS,www.ndtv.com/india-news/cctv-footage-helped-police-hunt-down-2-terrorists-in-kashmirs-sopore-1706529, NDTV, Internet services were suspended across Kashmir after Sabzar Ahmad Bhat, who has succeeded Burhan Wani, was killed in south Kashmir’s Tral on Saturday., CCTV Footage Helps Police Hunt Down Terrorists In Kashmir’s Sopore, 2 Killed, Nazir, Masoodi, 1 June 2017, 3 June 2017, 3 June 2017,www.ndtv.com/india-news/cctv-footage-helped-police-hunt-down-2-terrorists-in-kashmirs-sopore-1706529," title="web.archive.org/web/20170603060953www.ndtv.com/india-news/cctv-footage-helped-police-hunt-down-2-terrorists-in-kashmirs-sopore-1706529,">web.archive.org/web/20170603060953www.ndtv.com/india-news/cctv-footage-helped-police-hunt-down-2-terrorists-in-kashmirs-sopore-1706529, live, NEWS,www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/05/27/not-even-24-hours-since-it-was-restored-mobile-internet-service_a_22112325/, The Huffington Post, Not Even 24 Hours After It Was Restored, Mobile Internet Services In Kashmir Valley Snapped Again, 27 May 2017, 3 June 2017, The Government of Jammu and Kashmir snapped the mobile internet( 2G, 3G and 4G) services in Kashmir fearing law and order problems, especially after the killing of top Hizbul Mujahedeen commander Sabzar Bhat in Tral encounter on Saturday. It has not even been 24 hours since the social media sites and applications including Facebook, WhatsApp and Twitter were restored in Kashmir Valley., 30 May 2017,www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/05/27/not-even-24-hours-since-it-was-restored-mobile-internet-service_a_22112325/," title="web.archive.org/web/20170530194626www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/05/27/not-even-24-hours-since-it-was-restored-mobile-internet-service_a_22112325/,">web.archive.org/web/20170530194626www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/05/27/not-even-24-hours-since-it-was-restored-mobile-internet-service_a_22112325/, live, A previously unknown militant group, Mujahideen Taliban-e-Kashmir, claimed it had provided information on Bhat to security forces.NEWS,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/j-k-unknown-militant-group-claims-to-have-killed-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhat/story-Rr7cQC9vLq7d0cwoIromVN.html, The group – which identified itself as Mujahideen Taliban-e-Kashmir – said they provided information on Bhat to security forces because “he was coming in the way of Kashmir’s Islamic struggle”. A video that surfaced on the social media on Wednesday showed an armed masked man swearing allegiance to former HM commander Zakir Musa in his quest to “turn Kashmir into an Islamic state”. Another clip posted on Thursday showed three masked men telling both militants and Kashmiri citizens to follow Musa unless they wanted to face the same fate as Bhat. “We provided information on the militants in Arampora, and we will continue to do so if anybody comes in our way,” one of them said. “Sabzar got what he deserved, and we don’t care who becomes the new chief.”, J-K: Unknown militant group claims to have killed Hizb commander Sabzar Bhat, Toufiq, Rashid, Hindustan Times, 1 June 2017, 5 June 2017, 6 June 2017,www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/j-k-unknown-militant-group-claims-to-have-killed-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhat/story-Rr7cQC9vLq7d0cwoIromVN.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170606054847www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/j-k-unknown-militant-group-claims-to-have-killed-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhat/story-Rr7cQC9vLq7d0cwoIromVN.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170606054847www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/j-k-unknown-militant-group-claims-to-have-killed-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhat/story-Rr7cQC9vLq7d0cwoIromVN.html, live, The claim remains unverified, though some analysts suggested it reflected a growing schism between various militant groups in Kashmir, with members of Hizbul Mujahideen concerned that Zakir Musa may have betrayed Bhat.MAGAZINE,www.outlookindia.com/website/story/local-miliant-group-claims-it-informed-police-about-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhats-/299183, Outlook (Indian magazine), Outlook, Hizbul Mujahideen commander and slain militant Burhan Wani’s successor Sabzar Bhat’s killing in Tral encounter has only exposed the widening schism between the militant groups in the valley., Local Militant Group Claims It Informed Police About Hizb Commander Sabzar Bhat’s Whereabout, 2 June 2017, 5 June 2017, 6 June 2017,www.outlookindia.com/website/story/local-miliant-group-claims-it-informed-police-about-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhats-/299183," title="web.archive.org/web/20170606015424www.outlookindia.com/website/story/local-miliant-group-claims-it-informed-police-about-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhats-/299183,">web.archive.org/web/20170606015424www.outlookindia.com/website/story/local-miliant-group-claims-it-informed-police-about-hizb-commander-sabzar-bhats-/299183, live, NEWS,indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sabzar-bhatt-zakir-musa-hizbul-burhan-wani-kashmir-militants/1/966135.html, Radio and mobile chatter intercepted by India’s intelligence agencies reflect a high level of distrust between former Hizbul commander Zakir Musa and the terror outfit he had led till recently. In the aftermath of the encounter killing of Burhan Wani’s successor Sabzar Bhatt, Indian agencies have recorded multiple conversations where Hizbul Mujahideen cadre can be heard discussing whether Zakir Musa betrayed Sabzar Bhatt. Hizbul terrorists seem to suspect that a personal messenger close to Musa tipped off the Jammu and Kashmir police about the location of Sabzar’s hideout. Sabzar was killed last week in an encounter very close to his hometown of Tral., Was Sabzar Bhatt betrayed by boss Zakir Musa? Intel inputs suggest rift among Kashmiri terrorists, Rahul, Kanwal, 30 May 2017,indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sabzar-bhatt-zakir-musa-hizbul-burhan-wani-kashmir-militants/1/966135.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20170603014526indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sabzar-bhatt-zakir-musa-hizbul-burhan-wani-kashmir-militants/1/966135.html,">web.archive.org/web/20170603014526indiatoday.intoday.in/story/sabzar-bhatt-zakir-musa-hizbul-burhan-wani-kashmir-militants/1/966135.html, 3 June 2017, Within the next 3 years, this entire group was wiped in multiple operations by Indian security forces.Next major commander of the organization to be killed was Riyaz Naikoo, who was chief operations commander. He was killed on 6 May 2020. He was organization’s longest serving field commander.Riyaz Naikoo: Hizbul Mujahideen Kashmir militant killed by Indian forces {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200506104217www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-52556835 |date=6 May 2020 }}, BBC News, 6 May 2020.Snehesh Alex Philip, Kashmir’s most wanted terrorist Riyaz Naikoo killed in encounter in his Pulwama village {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200507174313theprint.in/defence/kashmirs-most-wanted-terrorist-riyaz-naikoo-killed-in-encounter-in-his-pulwama-village/415391/ |date=7 May 2020 }}, The Print, 6 May 2020.On 10 May 2020, Gazi Haider (aka Saifullah and Saif-ul-Islam Mir) was appointed the new chief operations commander. He was formerly the district commander of Hizbul Mujahideen in Pulwama.WEB, Hizbul Mujahideen appoints new terror commander in Kashmir,www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/hizbul-mujahideen-appoints-new-terror-commander-in-kashmir/1830208, IANS, 10 May 2020, Outlook India, 11 May 2020, 19 October 2021,web.archive.org/web/20211019125433/https://www.outlookindia.com/newsscroll/hizbul-mujahideen-appoints-new-terror-commander-in-kashmir/1830208, live, NEWS, Saifullah Mir Aka Ghazi Haider Is Hizbul Mujahideen’s New Face In Kashmir, 11 May 2020, Indian Defence News,www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/05/saifullah-mir-aka-ghazi-haider-is.html,www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/05/saifullah-mir-aka-ghazi-haider-is.html," title="web.archive.org/web/20201102020616www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/05/saifullah-mir-aka-ghazi-haider-is.html,">web.archive.org/web/20201102020616www.indiandefensenews.in/2020/05/saifullah-mir-aka-ghazi-haider-is.html, 2 November 2020, live, Soon after, on 19 May 2020, Ashraf Sehrai’s son, Junaid Sehrai, a commander in the organization, was killed by Indian security forces.WEB, Junaid Sehrai, son of Hurriyat chairman, killed in Srinagar encounter,indianexpress.com/article/india/junaid-sehrai-killed-hurriyat-ashraf-sehrai-srinagar-kashmir/, 19 May 2020, The Indian Express, en-US, 19 May 2020, 20 May 2020,web.archive.org/web/20200520031059/https://indianexpress.com/article/india/junaid-sehrai-killed-hurriyat-ashraf-sehrai-srinagar-kashmir/, live, WEB, Jammu and Kashmir: Separatist leader’s son among two Hizbul militants killed in Srinagar encounter,scroll.in/latest/962389/jammu-and-kashmir-separatist-leaders-son-among-two-hizbul-militants-killed-in-srinagar-encounter, Scroll Staff, Scroll.in, en-US, 19 May 2020, 26 May 2020,web.archive.org/web/20200526052718/https://scroll.in/latest/962389/jammu-and-kashmir-separatist-leaders-son-among-two-hizbul-militants-killed-in-srinagar-encounter, live, WEB, Junaid Sehrai — Hizbul commander killed today only militant with Hurriyat ties in last decade,theprint.in/india/junaid-sehrai-hizbul-commander-killed-today-only-militant-with-hurriyat-ties-in-last-decade/425175/, Javaid, Azaan, 19 May 2020, ThePrint, en-US, 20 May 2020, 19 May 2020,web.archive.org/web/20200519203512/https://theprint.in/india/junaid-sehrai-hizbul-commander-killed-today-only-militant-with-hurriyat-ties-in-last-decade/425175/, live, On 1 November 2020, Ghazi Haider was killed in an operation, in Srinagar by Indian security forces, thus wiping out all the major and important commanders of hizbul Mujahideen. After his death, the organization has been mount any attack and has fell into redundancy.NEWS, Jameel, Yusuf, Hizbul Mujahideen ‘operational chief’ Saif-ul-Islam Mir killed in encounter, 1 November 2020, The Deccan Chronicle,www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/011120/hizbul-mujahideen-operational-chief-saif-ul-islam-mir-killed-in-enco.html,web.archive.org/web/20201102020742/https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/011120/hizbul-mujahideen-operational-chief-saif-ul-islam-mir-killed-in-enco.html, 2 November 2020, live, On 20 February 2023, Bashir Ahmad Peer was shot dead outside a shop in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, by two bike-borne assailants. Peer was one of the founder of Hizbul Mujahideen and 2nd-in-command of the organization, after Syed Salahuddin. He had also been designated as a terrorist by India in October, 2022. He was killed by Gunmen working on behalf of R&AW.NEWS,www.thenews.com.pk/amp/1093570-ib-is-not-what-it-appears-to-be, IB is not what it appears to be, The News, 24 July 2023, 27 July 2023, 27 July 2023,web.archive.org/web/20230727101245/https://www.thenews.com.pk/amp/1093570-ib-is-not-what-it-appears-to-be, live, NEWS,www.ndtv.com/india-news/wanted-in-india-top-hizbul-commander-killed-in-pakistan-3802474/amp/1, Wanted In India, Top Hizbul Commander Killed In Pakistan, NDTV, 21 February 2023, 25 February 2023, 5 January 2024,web.archive.org/web/20240105150936/https://www.ndtv.com/india-news/wanted-in-india-top-hizbul-commander-killed-in-pakistan-3802474, live,

See also

• Syed Ali Shah Geelani
• Kashmir conflict
• Insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir
• Lashkar-e-Taiba
• U.S. Department of State list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Explanatory notes

{{notelist}}

Citations

{{reflist|30em}}

General bibliography

• {{citation |last=Bhatnagar |first=Gaurav |title=The Islamicization of Politics: Motivations for Violence in Kashmir |journal=The Journal of Politics and Society |volume=20 |number=1 |year=2009 |url=http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/download/fedora_content/download/ac:170240/CONTENT/2009_Bhatnagar.pdf |pages=13–14 |ref={{sfnref|Bhatnagar, The Islamicization of Politics|2009}}}}
• {{citation |title=Gambling with Violence: State Outsourcing of War in Pakistan and India |first=Yelena |last=Biberman |publisher=Oxford University Press |year=2019 |isbn=9780190929961 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=eAuXDwAAQBAJ |ref={{sfnref|Biberman, Gambling with Violence|2019}}}}
• BOOK, Sumantra, Bose, Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, Harvard University Press, 2003, 978-0-674-01173-1,archive.org/details/00book939526581, archive.org, {{sfnref, Bose, Roots of Conflict, Paths to Peace, 2003, }}
• JOURNAL, Fair, C. Christine, C. Christine Fair, Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants, Journal of Strategic Studies, 37, 2, 2013, 259–290, 0140-2390, 10.1080/01402390.2013.811647, 154750998, {{sfnref, Fair, Insights from a Database of LeT and HM Militants, 2013, }}
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External links

• Top Hizbul Commander Riyaz Naikoo killed In An Encounter
• The birth of the Hizbul Mujahideen rediff.com
• Profile: Hizbul Mujahideen GlobalSecurity.org
• Official Journal of the European Union: Terrorism list
• Congressional Report: The New Islamist International(from FAS site) Bill McCollum, United States House of Representatives, Republican Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, 1 February 1993
• BBC Reports:Militants arrested in Bombay
• abclive.in/abclive_regional/blast_in_jammu_kashmir.html" title="web.archive.org/web/20081226142718abclive.in/abclive_regional/blast_in_jammu_kashmir.html">ABC Live Reports: Hizbul Mujahideen claimed Blast Left 1 Killed And 22 injured In Jammu Kashmir
• ISI using c
• Cross-border trade to fund Hizbul Mujahideen: NIA

{{War on Terrorism|state=collapsed}}{{Kashmir separatist movement}}{{Authority control}}