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Yogachara#Vijñapti-mÄtra
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Doctrine
{{Buddhist Philosophy sidebar}}YogÄcÄra philosophy is primarily meant to aid in the practice of yoga and meditation and thus it also sets forth a systematic analysis of the Mahayana path of mental training (see five paths pañcamÄrga).Jones, Lindsay (Ed. in Chief)(2005). Encyclopedia of Religion. (2nd Ed.) Volume 14; Masaaki, Hattori (Ed.)(1987 & 2005)"YogÄcÄra": p.9897. USA: Macmillan Reference. {{ISBN|0-02-865983-X}} (v.14) YogÄcÄrins made use of ideas from previous traditions, such as PrajñÄpÄramitÄ and the SarvÄstivÄda Abhidharma tradition, to develop a novel analysis of conscious experience and a corresponding schema for MahÄyÄna spiritual practice.Keenan, John P. (tr). The Scripture on the Explication of the Underlying Meaning. 2000. p. 1{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=1}}Peter Harvey, "An Introduction to Buddhism." Cambridge University Press, 1993, page 106. In its analysis, YogÄcÄra works like the Saá¹ dhinirmocana SÅ«tra, developing various core concepts such as vijñapti-mÄtra, the Älaya-vijñÄna (store consciousness), the turning of the basis (ÄÅraya-parÄvá¹tti), the three natures (trisvabhÄva), and emptiness. They form a complex system, and each can be taken as a point of departure for understanding YogÄcÄra.Muller, A. Charles (2005; 2007). Wonhyo's Reliance on Huiyuan in his Exposition of the Two Hindrances. (Published in Reflecting Mirrors: Perspectives on Huayan Buddhism. Imre Hamar, ed., Harrassowitz Verlag, 2007, p. 281-295.) Source: weblink (accessed: April 7, 2010)The doctrine of vijñapti-mÄtra
One of the main features of YogÄcÄra philosophy is the concept of vijñapti-mÄtra. It is often used interchangeably with the term citta-mÄtra in modern and ancient Yogacara sources.Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),weblink Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 597. The standard translation of both terms is "consciousness-only" or "mind-only." Several modern researchers object to this translation in favor of alternative like representation-only.{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=1}} The meaning of this term is at the heart of the modern scholarly disagreement about whether Yogacara Buddhism can be said to be a form of idealism (as supported by Garfield, Hopkins, and others) or whether it is definitely not idealist (Anacker, Lusthaus, Wayman).JOURNAL, Trivedi, Saam, November 2005, Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism, Asian Philosophy, 15, 3, 231â246, 10.1080/09552360500285219, 144090250,Origins
According to Lambert Schmithausen, the earliest surviving appearance of this term is in chapter 8 of the Saá¹ dhinirmocana SÅ«tra, which has only survived in Tibetan and Chinese translations that differ in syntax and meaning.Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 387. The passage is depicted as a response by the Buddha to a question which asks "whether the images or replicas (*pratibimba) which are the object (*gocara) of meditative concentration (*samadhi), are different/separate (*bhinna) from the contemplating mind (*citta) or not." The Buddha says they are not different, "Because these images are vijñapti-mÄtra." The text goes on to affirm that the same is true for objects of ordinary perception.Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 391.The term is sometimes used as a synonym with citta-mÄtra (mere citta), which is also used as a name for the school that suggests Idealism. Schmithausen writes that the first appearance of this term is in the Pratyupanna samadhi sutra, which states "this (or: whatever belongs to this) triple world is nothing but mind (or thought: *cittamatra). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear."Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 598. Regarding existing Sanskrit sources, the term appears in the first verse of Vasubandhu's VimÅatikÄ (Twenty Verses), which states:Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 149.This [world] is vijñaptimÄtra, since it manifests itself as an unreal object (artha), just like the case of those with cataracts seeing unreal hairs in the moon and the like (vijñaptimÄtram evaitad asad arthÄvabhÄsanÄt yathÄ taimirikasyÄsat keÅa candrÄdi darÅanam).According to Mark Siderits, what Vasubandhu means here is that we are only ever aware of mental images or impressions which manifest themselves as external objects, but "there is actually no such thing outside the mind."The term also appears in Asaá¹ ga's classic work, the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha (no Sanskrit original, trans. from Tibetan):These representations (vijñapti) are mere representations (vijñapti-mÄtra), because there is no [corresponding] thing/object (artha)...Just as in a dream there appear, even without a thing/object (artha), just in the mind alone, forms/images of all kinds of things/objects like visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, houses, forests, land, and mountains, and yet there are no [such] things/objects at all in that [place]. MSg II.6Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 389.Another classic statement of the doctrine appears in DharmakÄ«rti's PramÄnaṿÄrttika (Commentary on Epistemology) which states: "cognition experiences itself, and nothing else whatsoever. Even the particular objects of perception, are by nature just consciousness itself."JOURNAL, Kapstein, Matthew T., July 2014, Buddhist Idealists and Their Jain Critics On Our Knowledge of External Objects, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 74, 123â147, 10.1017/S1358246114000083, 170689422,Interpretations of vijñapti-mÄtra
Idealism
According to Bruce Cameron Hall, the interpretation of this doctrine as a form of subjective or absolute idealism has been "the most common "outside" interpretation of VijñÄnavÄda, not only by modern writers, but by its ancient opponents, both Hindu and Buddhist."Cameron Hall, Bruce, The Meaning of Vijnapti in Vasubandhu's Concept of Mind, JIABS Vol 9, 1986, Number 1, p. 7. Scholars such as Jay Garfield, Saam Trivedi, Nobuyoshi Yamabe, Paul Williams, and Sean Butler argue that YogÄcÄra is similar to Idealism (and they compare it to the idealisms of Kant and Berkeley), though they note that it is its own unique form and that it might be confusing to categorize it as such.Saam Trivedi, Idealism and Yogacara Buddhism, Asian Philosophy Volume 15, 2005 - Issue 3 Pages 231-246.Butler, Sean, Idealism in YogÄcÄra Buddhism, The Hilltop Review Volume 4 Issue 1 Spring 2010,Garfield, Jay L. Vasubandhu's treatise on the three natures translated from the Tibetan edition with a commentary, Asian Philosophy, Volume 7, 1997, Issue 2, pp. 133-154.Williams 2008, p. 94.Yamabe, Nobuyoshi (2004), "Consciousness, Theories of", in Buswell, Jr., Robert E., Macmillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism, USA: Macmillan Reference USA, pp. 177, {{ISBN|0-02-865910-4}} The German scholar and philologist Lambert Schmithausen affirms that Yogacara sources teach a type of idealism which is supposed to be a middle way between Abhidharma realism and what it often considered a nihilistic position which only affirms emptiness as the ultimate.Schmithausen, Lambert, The Genesis of YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda: Responses and Reflections, Tokyo, The International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 2014, p. 625. Schmithausen notes that philological study of Yogacara texts shows that they clearly reject the independent existence of mind and the external world.Schmithausen, Lambert (2005). On the Problem of the External World in the Châeng wei shih lun. TÅkyÅ: The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. The International Institute for Buddhist Studies. He also notes that the current trend in rejecting the idealistic interpretation might be related to the unpopularity of idealism among Western academics. Florin Delenau likewise affirms the idealist nature of YogÄcÄra texts, while also underscoring how YogÄcÄra retains a strong orientation to a soteriology which aims at contemplative realization of an ultimate reality that is an âinexpressible essenceâ (nirabhilÄpyasvabhÄva) beyond any subject-object duality. Similarly, Jonathan Gold writes that the YogÄcÄra thinker Vasubandhu can be said to be an idealist (similar to Kant), in the sense that for him, everything in experience as well as its causal support is mental, and thus he gives causal priority to the mental. At the same time however, this is only in the conventional realm, since "mind" is just another concept and true reality for Vasubandhu is ineffable, "an inconceivable 'thusness' (tathatÄ)." Indeed, the VimÅatikÄ states that the very idea of vijñapti-mÄtra must also be understood to be itself a self-less construction and thus vijñapti-mÄtra is not the ultimate truth (paramÄrtha-satya) in YogÄcÄra. Thus according to Gold, while Vasubandhu's vijñapti-mÄtra can be said to be a âconventionalist idealismâ, it is to be seen as unique and different from Western forms, especially Hegelian Absolute Idealism.Mere representation
The interpretation of YogÄcÄra as a type of idealism was standard until recently, when it began to be challenged by scholars such as Kochumuttom, Anacker, Kalupahana,{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992}} Dunne, Lusthaus,Dan Lusthaus, What is and isn't Yogacara. weblink. {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080612084656weblink|date=June 12, 2008}} Powers, and Wayman.Garfield, Jay L. (2002). Empty words : Buddhist philosophy and cross-cultural interpretation ([Online-Ausg.]. ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|9780195145519}}.{{refn|group=lower-alpha|Alex Wayman, A Defense of Yogacara Buddhism. Philosophy East and West, Volume 46, Number 4, October 1996, pages 447-476: "Of course, the Yogacara put its trust in the subjective search for truth by way of a samadhi. This rendered the external world not less real, but less valuable as the way of finding truth. The tide of misinformation on this, or on any other topic of Indian lore comes about because authors frequently read just a few verses or paragraphs of a text, then go to secondary sources, or to treatises by rivals, and presume to speak authoritatively. Only after doing genuine research on such a topic can one begin to answer the question: why were those texts and why do the moderns write the way they do?"}} Some scholars like David Kalupahana argue that it is a mistake to conflate the terms citta-mÄtra (which is sometimes seen as a different, more metaphysical position) with vijñapti-mÄtra (which need not be idealist).{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=1}}Kalupahana 1992, pp. 122-126, 135-136. However, Delenau points out that Vasubandhu clearly states in his Twenty Verses and Abhidharmakosha that vijñapti and citta are synonymous.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, p. 162. 2010, Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). Vasubandhu: cittaá¹ mano vijñÄnaá¹ vijñaptiÅ ceti paryÄyaḥ (Viá¹Å 3.3); âmind, thinking, consciousness, and representation are synonymous termsâ. Cf. AKBh II.34 (p. 61, l. 20): cittaá¹ mano ʼtha vijñÄnam ekÄrthaá¹; ânow, the mind, thinking, and consciousness have the same meaningâ. Nevertheless, different alternative translations for vijñapti-mÄtra have been proposed, such as representation-only, ideation-only, impressions-only and perception-only.{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=5}}Wayman, Alex, A Defense of YogÄcÄra Buddhism, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 4 (Oct., 1996), pp. 447-476. Alex Wayman notes that one's interpretation of YogÄcÄra will depend on how the qualifier mÄtra is to be understood in this context, and he objects to interpretations which claim that YogÄcÄra rejects the external world altogether, preferring translations such as "amounting to mind" or "mirroring mind" for citta-mÄtra. For Wayman, what this doctrine means is that "the mind has only a report or representation of what the sense organ had sensed." The representationalist interpretation is also supported by Stefan Anacker.Vasubandhu (author), Stefan Anacker (translator, annotator) (1984). Seven works of Vasubandhu, the Buddhist psychological doctor. Issue 4 of Religions of Asia series. Motilal Banarsidass Publ. {{ISBN|978-81-208-0203-2}}. Source: [1] (accessed: Wednesday April 21, 2010), p.159 According to Thomas Kochumuttom, YogÄcÄra is a realistic pluralism which does not deny the existence of individual beings.{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=1}} Kochumuttom argues that YogÄcÄra is not idealism since it denies that absolute reality is a consciousness, that individual beings are transformations or illusory appearances of an absolute consciousness.{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=1-2}} Thus, for Kochumuttom, vijñapti-mÄtra means "mere representation of consciousness," a view which states "that the world as it appears to the unenlightened ones is mere representation of consciousness".{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=5}} Furthermore, according to Kochumuttom, in YogÄcÄra "the absolute state is defined simply as emptiness, namely the emptiness of subject-object distinction. Once thus defined as emptiness (sunyata), it receives a number of synonyms, none of which betray idealism."{{sfn|Kochumuttom|1999|p=6}}Soterological phenomenology
According to Dan Lusthaus, the vijñapti-mÄtra theory is closer in some ways to Western Phenomenological theories and Epistemological Idealism. However, it is not a form of metaphysical idealism because YogÄcÄra rejects the construction of any type of metaphysical or ontological theories.Lusthaus, Dan (2018). What is and isn't Yogacara, YogÄcÄra Buddhism Research Association. Moreover, Western idealism lacks any counterpart to karma, samsara or awakening, all of which are central for YogÄcÄra. Regarding vijñapti-mÄtra, Lusthaus translates it as "nothing but conscious construction" and states it is a kind of trick built into consciousness which "projects and constructs a cognitive object in such a way that it disowns its own creation - pretending the object is "out there" - in order to render that object capable of being appropriated." This reification of cognition aids in constructing the notion of a permanent and independent self, which is believed to appropriate and possess external 'things'. YogÄcÄra offers an analysis and meditative means to negate this reification, thereby also negating the notion of a solid self. According to Lusthaus, this analysis is not a rejection of external phenomena, and it does not grant foundational or transcendent status to consciousness. In this interpretation, instead of offering an ontological theory, YogÄcÄra focuses on understanding and eliminating the underlying tendencies (anuÅaya) that lead to clinging concepts and theories, which are just cognitive projections (pratibimba, parikalpita). Thus, for Lusthaus, the orientation of the YogÄcÄra school is largely consistent with the thinking of the PÄli nikÄyas and seeks to realign Mahayana with early Buddhist theory.BOOK, Dan Lusthaus,weblink Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, 4 February 2014, Taylor & Francis, 978-1-317-97342-3, 43,Arguments for consciousness-only
According to the contemporary philosopher Jan Westerhoff, YogÄcÄra philosophers came up with various arguments in defense of the consciousness-only view. He outlines three main arguments: the explanatory equivalence argument, the causation-resemblance argument, and the constant co-cognition argument.{{Citation |last=Westerhoff |first=Jan |title="For your eyes only: the Problem on Solipsism in Ancient Indian Philosophy", BSHP Annual Lecture 2020 |date=November 2020 |url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oBVXCc8N5zE |access-date=2024-02-21 |publisher=British Society for the History of Philosophy |language=en}}Explanatory equivalence argument
This argument is found in Vasubandhu's VimÅatikÄ (Twenty Verses) and is an inference to the best explanation. It argues that consciousness-only can provide an account of the various features of experience which are explained by the existence of mind-independent material objects. This is coupled with a principle of ontological parsimony to argue in favor of idealism.Vasubandhu mentions three key features of experience which are supposed to be explained by matter and refutes them:Williams, 2008, pp. 94-95.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: YogÄcÄra Philosophy of Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2004, p xxiv.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, pp. 150-151.- According to critics, the problem of spatio-temporal determination (or non-arbitrariness in regard to place and time) indicates that there must be some external basis for our experiences, since experiences of any particular object do not occur everywhere and at every time. Vasubandhu responds with the dream argument, which shows how a world created by mind can still seem to have spatio-temporal localization.
- The problem of inter-subjective experience (multiple minds experiencing the same world). Vasubandhu counters that mass hallucinations (such as those said to occur to hungry ghosts) caused by the fact they share similar karma (which is here understood as traces or seeds in the mind-stream), show that inter-subjective agreement is possible without positing real external objects.
- Another criticism states that hallucinations have no pragmatic results, efficacy or causal function and thus can be determined to be unreal, but entities we generally accept as being "real" have actual causal results (such as the 'resistance' of external objects) that cannot be of the same class as hallucinations. Against this claim, Vasubandhu argues that waking life is the same as in a dream, where objects have pragmatic results within the very rules of the dream. He also uses the example of a wet dream to show that mental content can have causal efficacy even outside of a dream.
Causation-resemblance argument
This argument was famously defended in DignÄga's ÄlambanaparÄ«ká¹£Ä (Examination of the Object of Consciousness) and its main target is Indian atomism, which was the main theory of matter in the 5th century.Finnigan, Bronwyn (2017). "Buddhist Idealism." In Tyron Goldschmidt & Kenneth Pearce (eds.), Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 178-199. The argument is based on the premise that a perception must resemble the perceived object (Älambana) and have been caused by the object. According to this argument, since atoms are not extended, they do not resemble the object of perception (which appears as spatially extended). Furthermore, collections of atoms might resemble the object of perception, but they cannot have caused it. This is because collections of things are unreal in classic Buddhist thought (thus it is a mereological nihilism), since they are composites and composites made of parts do not have any causal efficacy (only individual atoms do).In disproving the possibility of external objects, Vasubandhu's VimÅatikÄ similarly attacks Indian theories of atomism and property particulars as incoherent on mereological grounds.Gold, Jonathan C., "Vasubandhu", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),weblinkConstant co-cognition argument
This argument was defended by DharmakÄ«rti in his Ascertainment of Epistemology (PramÄá¹aviniÅcaya), which calls it "the necessity of things only ever being experienced together with experience" (Sanskrit: sahopalambhaniyama). According to DharmakÄ«rti:Because [something blue] is not apprehended without the additional qualification of consciousness, [and] because [blue] is apprehended when this [qualification of consciousness] is apprehended, consciousness [itself] has the appearance of blue. There is no external object by itself. (PV 3.335)'According this argument, any object of consciousness, like blue, cannot be differentiated from the conscious awareness of blue since both are always experienced as one thing. Since we never experience blue without the experience of blue, they cannot be differentiated empirically. Furthermore, we cannot differentiate them through an inference either, since this would need to be based on a pattern of past experiences which included the absence or presence of the two elements. Thus, this is a type of epistemological argument for idealism which attempts to show there is no good reason to accept the existence of mind-independent objects.'Soteriological importance of mind-only
Vasubandhu also explains why it is soteriologically important to get rid of the idea of really existing external objects. According to Siderits, this is because:When we wrongly imagine there to be external objects we are led to think in terms of the duality of 'grasped and grasper', of what is 'out there' and what is ' in here' - in short, of external world and self. Coming to see that there is no external world is a means, Vasubandhu thinks, of overcoming a very subtle way of believing in an 'I'... once we see why physical objects can't exist we will lose all temptation to think there is a true ' me' within. There are really just impressions, but we superimpose on these the false constructions of object and subject. Seeing this will free us from the false conception of an 'I'.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 175.Siderits notes how Kant had a similar notion, that is, without the idea of an objective mind independent world, one cannot derive the concept of a subjective "I". But Kant drew the opposite conclusion to Vasubandhu, since he held that we must believe in an enduring subject, and thus, also believe in external objects.Analysis of Consciousness
YogÄcÄra gives a detailed explanation of the workings of the mind and the way it constructs the reality we experience. The central YogÄcÄra theory of mind is that of the eight consciousnesses.Eight consciousnesses
A key innovation of the YogÄcÄra school was the doctrine of eight consciousnesses. These "eight bodies of consciousnesses" (aá¹£á¹a vijñÄnakÄyÄḥ) are: the five sense-consciousnesses (of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and bodily sense), mentation (mano or citta), the defiled self-consciousness (kliá¹£á¹amanovijñÄna),{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=138-140}} and the storehouse or substratum consciousness ((Sanskrit|Skt:) ÄlayavijñÄna).{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=137-139}}Williams, Paul (2008). Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, Routledge, p. 97. Traditional Buddhist descriptions of consciousness taught just the first six vijñÄnas, each corresponding to a sense base (ayatana) and having their own sense objects (sounds etc). Five are based on the five senses, while the sixth (mano-vijñÄna), was seen as the surveyor of the content of the five senses as well as of mental content like thoughts and ideas. Standard Buddhist doctrine held that these eighteen "elements" (dhatus), i.e. six external sense bases (smells, sounds etc.), six internal bases (sense organs like the eye, ear, etc.), and six consciousnesses "exhaust the full extent of everything in the universe, or more accurately, the sensorium." The six consciousnesses are also not substantial entities, but a series or stream of events (dharmas), which arise and vanish very rapidly moment by moment. This is the Abhidharma doctrine of "momentariness" (ká¹£aá¹avada), which YogÄcÄra also accepts.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti, Being as Consciousness: YogÄcÄra Philosophy of Buddhism, Motilal Banarsidass Publ., 2004, p xxv.YogÄcÄra expanded the six vijñÄna schema into a new system which with two new categories. The seventh consciousness developed from the early Buddhist concept of manas, and was seen as the defiled mentation (kliá¹£á¹a-manas) which is obsessed with notions of "self". According to Paul Williams, this consciousness "takes the substratum consciousness as its object and mistakenly considers the substratum consciousness to be a true Self."Älaya-vijñÄna
The eighth consciousness, Älaya-vijñÄna (storehouse or repository consciousness), was defined as the storehouse of all karmic seeds (bÄ«ja), where they gradually matured until ripe, at which point they manifested as karmic consequences. Because of this, it is also called the "mind which has all the seeds" (sarvabÄ«jakam cittam), as well as the "basis consciousness" (mÅ«la-vijñÄna) and the "appropriating consciousness" (ÄdÄnavijñÄna). According to the Saá¹ dhinirmocana SÅ«tra, this kind of consciousness underlies and supports the six types of manifest awareness, all of which occur simultaneously with the Älaya.Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, pp 94-95. William S. Waldron sees this "simultaneity of all the modes of cognitive awareness" as the most significant departure of YogÄcÄra theory from traditional Buddhist models of vijñÄna, which were "thought to occur solely in conjunction with their respective sense bases and epistemic objects".Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, p 97.As noted by Schmithausen, the Älaya-vijñÄna, being a kind of vijñÄna, has an object as well (as all vijñÄna has intentionality). That object is the sentient being's surrounding world, that is to say, the "receptable" or "container" (bhÄjana) world. This is stated in the 8th chapter of the Saá¹ dhinirmocana SÅ«tra, which states that the ÄdÄnavijñÄna is characterized by "an unconscious (or not fully conscious?) steady perception (or "representation") of the Receptacle (*asaá¹vidita-sthira-bhÄjana-vijñapti)."Schmithausen, Lambert (1987). ÄlayavijñÄna: on the origin and the early development of a central concept of YogÄcÄra philosophy, Part I: Text, page 89. Tokyo, International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Studia Philologica Buddhica Monograph Series IVa.The Älaya-vijñÄna is also what experiences rebirth into future lives and what descents into the womb to appropriate the fetal material. Therefore, the Älaya-vijñÄna's holding on to the body's sense faculties and "profuse imaginings" (prapañca) are the two appropriations which make up the "kindling" or "fuel" (lit. upÄdÄna) that samsaric existence depends upon. YogÄcÄra thought thus holds that being unaware of the processes going on in the Älaya-vijñÄna is an important element of ignorance (avidya). The Älaya is also individual, so that each person has their own Älaya-vijñÄna, which is an ever changing process and therefore not a permanent self.According to Williams, this consciousness "seen as a defiled form of consciousness (or perhaps sub- or unconsciousness), is personal, individual, continually changing and yet serving to give a degree of personal identity and to explain why it is that certain karmic results pertain to this particular individual. The seeds are momentary, but they give rise to a perfumed series which eventually culminates in the result including, from seeds of a particular type, the whole âinter-subjectiveâ phenomenal world."Williams, 2008, pp. 97-98. Also, Asanga and Vasubandhu write that the Älaya-vijñÄna âceasesâ at awakening, becoming transformed into a pure consciousness.Williams, 2008, pp. 98-99.According to Waldron, while there were various similar concepts in other Buddhist Abhidharma schools which sought to explain karmic continuity, the Älaya-vijñÄna is the most comprehensive and systematic.Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, page 131. Waldron notes that the Älaya-vijñÄna concept was probably influenced by these theories, particularly the Sautrantika theory of seeds and Vasumitra's theory of a subtle form of mind (suksma-citta).Waldron, William S. The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the context of Indian Buddhist Thought. Routledge Critical Studies in Buddhism, 2003, page 93.Transformations of consciousness
YogÄcÄra sources do not necessarily describe the eight consciousnesses as absolutely separate or substantial phenomena. For example, Kalupahana notes that the Triá¹Åika describes the various forms of consciousness as transformations and functions of a being's stream of consciousness.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=137}}{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=139}}{{refn|group=lower-alpha|Kalupahana: "The above explanation of alaya-vijnana makes it very different from that found in the Lankavatara. The latter assumes alaya to be the eight consciousness, giving the impression that it represents a totally distinct category. Vasubandhu does not refer to it as the eight, even though his later disciples like Sthiramati and Hsuan Tsang constantly refer to it as such".{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=139}}}} These transformations are threefold according to Kalupahana. The first is the Älaya and its seeds, which is the flow or stream of consciousness, without any of the usual projections on top of it.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=139}} The second transformation is manana, self-consciousness or "Self-view, self-confusion, self-esteem and self-love".{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=138}} It is "thinking" about the various perceptions occurring in the stream of consciousness".{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=140}} The Älaya is defiled by this self-interest.{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=138}} The third transformation is visaya-vijñapti, the "concept of the object".{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=141}} In this transformation the concept of objects is created. By creating these concepts human beings become "susceptible to grasping after the object" as if it were a real object (sad artha) even though it is just a conception (vijñapti).{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=141}}A similar perspective which emphasizes YogÄcÄra's continuity with early Buddhism is given by Walpola Rahula. According to Rahula, all the elements of this theory of consciousness with its three layers of vijñÄna are already found in the PÄli Canon, corresponding to the terms viññÄna (sense cognition), manas (mental function, thinking, reasoning, conception) and citta (the deepest layer of the aggregate of consciousness which retains karmic impressions and the defilements).Padmasiri De Silva, Robert Henry Thouless, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Third revised edition published by NUS Press, 1992 page 66.Walpola Rahula, quoted in Padmasiri De Silva, Robert Henry Thouless, Buddhist and Freudian Psychology. Third revised edition published by NUS Press, 1992 page 66, weblink.The Three Natures
YogÄcÄra works often define three basic modes or "natures" (svabhÄva) of experience. Jonathan Gold explains that "the three natures are all one reality viewed from three distinct angles. They are the appearance, the process, and the emptiness of that same apparent entity." According to Paul Williams, "all things which can be known can be subsumed under these Three Natures." Since this schema is YogÄcÄra's systematic explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of emptiness (ÅÅ«nyatÄ), each of the three natures are also explained as having a lack of own-nature (niḥsvabhÄvatÄ).Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, p. 176.King, Richard, Early YogÄcÄra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 PP.659-683. The TrisvabhÄva-nirdeÅa (Exposition of the Three Natures) gives a brief definition of these three natures: What appears is the dependent. How it appears is the fabricated. Because of being dependent on conditions. Because of being only fabrication. The eternal non-existence of the appearance as it is appears: That is known to be the perfected nature, because of being always the same. What appears there? The unreal fabrication. How does it appear? As a dual self. What is its nonexistence? That by which the nondual reality is there. In detail, three natures (trisvabhÄva) are:Williams (2008), p. 90.Peter Lunde Johnson, Xuanzang, On There Only Being the Virtual Nature of Consciousness, 2019, p. 470.Siderits, Mark, Buddhism as philosophy, 2017, pp. 177-178.- Parikalpita-svabhÄva (the "fully conceptualized" or "imagined" nature). This is the "imaginary" or "constructed" nature, wherein things are incorrectly comprehended based on conceptual construction, through the activity of language and through attachment and erroneous discrimination which attributes intrinsic existence to things. According to the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha, it also refers to the appearance of things in terms of subject-object dualism (literally "grasper" and "grasped"). The conceptualized nature is the world of everyday unenlightened people, i.e. samsara. It is false and empty, and does not really exist (Triá¹ÅikÄ v. 20). According to Xuanzang's Cheng Weishi Lun, this nature is an "absence of an existential nature by its very defining characteristic" (laká¹£ana-niḥsvabhÄvatÄ). Because these conceptualized natures and distinct characteristics (laká¹£ana) are wrongly imputed and not truly real, "they are like mirages and blossoms in the sky."
- Paratantra-svabhÄva (literally, "other dependent"), which is the dependently originated nature of dharmas, or the causal flow of phenomena which is erroneously confused into the conceptualized nature. According to Williams, it is "the basis for the erroneous partition into supposedly intrinsically existing subjects and objects which marks the conceptualized nature." Jonathan Gold writes that it is "the causal process of the thing's fabrication, the causal story that brings about the thing's apparent nature." This basis is considered to be an ultimately existing (paramÄrtha) basis in classical YogÄcÄra (see MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha, 2:25).Williams (2008), pp. 90-91. However, as Xuanzang notes, this nature is also empty in that there is an "absence of an existential nature in conditions that arise and perish" (utpatti-niḥsvabhÄvatÄ). That is, the events in this causal flow, while "seeming to have real existence of their own" are actually like magical illusions since "they are said to only be hypothetical and not really exist on their own." As Siderits writes "to the extent that we are thinking of it at all - even if only as the non-dual flow of impressions-only - we are still conceptualizing it."
- Pariniá¹£panna-svabhÄva (literally, "fully accomplished", "perfected", "consummated"): This is the true nature of things, the experience of Suchness or Thatness (TathÄtÄ) discovered in meditation unaffected by conceptualization, causality, or duality. It is defined as "the complete absence, in the dependent nature, of objects â that is, the objects of the conceptualized nature" (see MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha, 2:4). What this refers to is that empty non-dual experience which has been stripped of the duality of the constructed nature through yogic praxis. According to Williams, this is "what has to be known for enlightenment" and Siderits defines it as "just pure seeing without any attempt at conceptualization or interpretation. Now this is also empty, but only of itself as an interpretation. That is, this mode of cognition is devoid of all concepts, and so is empty of being of the nature of the perfected. About it nothing can be said or thought, it is just pure immediacy." According to Xuanzang, this nature has the "absence of any existential nature of ultimate meaning" (paramÄrtha-niḥsvabhÄvatÄ) since it is "completely free from any clinging to entirely imagined speculations about its identity or purpose. Because of this, it is conventionally said that it does not exist. However, it is also not entirely without a real existence."
Emptiness
The central meaning of emptiness (ÅÅ«nyatÄ) in YogÄcÄra is a twofold "absence of duality." The first element of this is the unreality of any conceptual duality such as "physical" and "non-physical", "self" and "other". To define something conceptually is to divide the world into what it is and what it is not, but the world is a causal flux that does not accord with conceptual constructs. The second element of this is a perceptual duality between the sensorium and its objects, between what is "external" and "internal", between subject (grÄhaka, literally "grasper") and object (grÄhya, "grasped").Skilton, Andrew (1994). A Concise History of Buddhism. Windhorse Publications, London:. pg 124 This is also an unreal superimposition, since there is really no such separation of inner and outer, but an interconnected causal stream of mentality which is falsely divided up.An important difference between the YogÄcÄra conception of emptiness and the Madhyamaka conception is that in classical YogÄcÄra, emptiness does exist (as a real absence) and so does consciousness (which is that which is empty, the referent of emptiness), while Madhyamaka refuses to endorse such existential statements. The MadhyÄntavibhÄga for example, states "the imagination of the nonexistent [abhÅ«ta-parikalpa] exists. In it duality does not exist. Emptiness, however, exists in it," which indicates that even though that which is dualistically imagined (subjects and objects), is unreal and empty, their basis does exist (i.e. the dependently arisen conscious manifestation).King, Richard, Early YogÄcÄra and its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School, Philosophy East & West Volume 44, Number 4 October 1994 pp. 659-683. The YogÄcÄra school also gave special significance to the Ägama sutra called Lesser Discourse on Emptiness (parallel to the Pali Cūḷasuññatasutta, MN 121) and relies on this sutra in its explanations of emptiness. According to Gadjin Nagao, this sutra affirms that "emptiness includes both being and non-being. both negation and affirmation."Gadjin M. Nagao, Madhyamika and Yogachara. Leslie S. Kawamura, translator, SUNY Press, Albany 1991, pp. 53-57, 200.{{refn|group=lower-alpha|Majhima Nikaya 121: Cula-suññata Sutta Cula-suññata Sutta: The Lesser Discourse on Emptiness}}Disagreement with Madhyamaka
Indian sources indicate that YogÄcÄra thinkers sometimes debated with the defenders of the Madhyamaka tradition.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 3. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} However, there is disagreement among contemporary Western and traditional Buddhist scholars about the degree to which they were opposed, if at all.BOOK, Conze, Edward, Edward Conze, A Short History of Buddhism, Oneworld, 1993, 1-85168-066-7, 2nd, :50f. The main difference between these schools was related to issues of existence and the nature of emptiness. The Chinese pilgrim Yijing (635â713) concisely summarized the differences thus: âFor YogÄcÄra the real exists, but the conventional does not exist; and [YogÄcÄra] takes the three natures as foundational. For Madhyamaka the real does not exist, but the conventional does exist; and actually the two truths are primary".Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 133. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} Garfield and Westerhoff write that "YogÄcÄra is both ontologically and epistemologically foundationalist; Madhyamaka is antifoundationalist in both senses." Another way to state this key difference is that Madhyamaka defends a "global antirealism" while YogÄcÄra "restrict[s] the scope of their antirealism to the external and the conventional". While Madhyamaka generally states that asserting the ultimate existence or non-existence of anything (including emptiness) was inappropriate, YogÄcÄra treatises (like the MadhyÄntavibhÄga) often assert that the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhÄva) really exists and that emptiness is an actual absence that also exists ultimatelly.Williams (2008), p. 93. In a similar fashion, Asaá¹ ga states "that of which it is empty does not truly exist; that which is empty truly exists: emptiness makes sense in this way".Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 68. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}}. He also describes emptiness as "the non-existence of the self, and the existence of the no-self." Classical YogÄcÄras like Vasubandhu and Sthiramati also affirm the reality of conscious appearance, i.e. that truly existent stream of dependent arisen and constantly changing consciousness which projects false and illusory subjective minds and their cognitive objects. It is this real flow of conscious transformation (vijñÄnapariá¹Äma) which is said to be empty (of duality and conceptuality).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? pp. 41-52. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} Against the radically anti-foundationalist interpretation of Madhyamaka, the classic YogÄcÄra position is that there is something (the dependent nature which is mere-consciousness) that "exists" (sat) independently of conceptual designation (prajñapti), and that it is this real thing (vÄstu) which is said to be empty of duality and yet is a basis for all dualistic conceptions.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 59. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} Furthermore, YogÄcÄra thinkers like Asaá¹ ga and Vasubandhu critiqued those who "adhere to non-existence" (nÄstikas, vainÄÅkas, likely referring to certain Madhyamikas) because they saw them as straying into metaphysical nihilism (abhÄvÄnta, see VimÅatikÄ v. 10). They held that there was really something which could be said to "exist", that is, vijñapti, and that was what is described as being "empty" in their system. For YogÄcÄra, all conventional existence must be based on something which is real (dravya).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 50. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} Sthiramati argues that we cannot say that everything exists conventionally (saá¹vá¹tisat) or nominally (prajñaptisat) and that nothing truly exists in an ultimate fashion (which would entail a global conventionalism and nominalism without any metaphysical ground). For Sthiramati, this view is false because "what would follow is non-existence even conventionally. That is because conventions are not possible without something to depend upon (or, âwithout taking up somethingââupÄdÄna)."Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 46. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} Thus, for Sthiramati, consciousness (vijñana) "since it is dependently arisen, exists as dravya (substance)." The BodhisattvabhÅ«mi likewise argues that it is only logical to speak of emptiness if there is something (i.e. dharmatÄ, an ultimate nature) that is empty. The BodhisattvabhÅ«mi's Chapter on Reality (TattvÄrthapaá¹ala) states that emptiness is "wrongly grasped" by those who "do not accept that of which something is empty, nor do they accept that which is empty".Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 76. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). This is because "emptiness holds good only as long as that of which something is [said to be] empty does not exist, but on the other hand, that which is empty exists. If, however, all [elements involved in this relation] were non-existent, in what respect, what would be empty, [and] of what?" For the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi, the "right" way to understand emptiness is "one regards that something is empty of that which does not exist in it and correctly comprehends that what remains there does actually exist here". That which "remains" and "actually exists" is the true reality, the thing itself (vastumÄtra), the foundation (ÄÅraya) which remains (avaÅiá¹£á¹a) after all conceptual constructs have been removed.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 77. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).YogÄcÄrins also criticized certain Madhyamaka accounts of conventional truth, that is, the view which says that conventional truth is merely erroneous cognitive processes (designations, expressions, and linguistic conventions) which project an inherent nature.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 86. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} The YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi's ViniÅcayasaá¹grahanÄ« states that either Madhyamakas see conventional reality as produced by linguistic expressions and also by causal forces, or they see it as produced merely by linguistic expressions and convention. If the former, then Madhyamikas must accept the reality of causal efficacy, which is a kind of existence (since things which are causally produced can be said to exist in some way). If the latter, then without any basis for linguistic expression and convention, it makes no sense to even use these terms (for YogÄcÄra these conventions must have some kind of referential basis).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? pp. 86-87. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}}YogÄcÄrins further held that if all phenomena are equally conventional and unreal in the same way this would lead to laxity in ethics and in following the path, in other words to moral relativism.Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 116. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} The basic idea behind this critique is that if only convention exists (as Madhyamaka claims) and there are no truths that are independent of convention and linguistic expression, there would be no epistemic foundations for critiquing worldly (non-buddhist) conventions and affirming other conventions as closer to the truth (like the conventions used by Buddhists to establish their ethics and their teachings). Madhyamaka thinkers like Bhaviveka, Candrakirti and Shantideva also critiqued YogÄcÄra views in their works for what they saw as an improper reification (samÄropa) of mind and for a nihilistic denial of conventional truth. The work of Xuanzang (7th century) also contains evidence for this Indian debate.Lusthaus, Dan (undated). Xuanzang (Hsüan-tsang). Source: WEB, Archived copy,weblink dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20131208153924weblink">weblink December 8, 2013, December 8, 2013, (accessed: December 12, 2007)Two interpretations of the three natures
Various Buddhist studies scholars such as Alan Spongberg, Mario D'amato, Daniel McNamara, and Matthew T. Kapstein have noted that there are two main interpretations of the three natures doctrine among the various texts of the Yogacara corpus. The two models have been named the "pivot" model and "progressive" model by these Western scholars.McNamara, Daniel (2011). âOn the Status of the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa in Contemporary Conceptions of YogÄcÄra Thought.â Matthew Kapstein. Who Wrote the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa? Reflections on an Enigmatic Text and Its Place in the History of Buddhist Philosophy. Journal of Indian Philosophy, 2017. â¨halshs-02503277â© The "pivot" model, found in texts like the Triá¹ÅikÄ and the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha, presents the dependent nature as a kind of "ontological pivot" since it is the basis for conceptual construction (the imagined nature) and for the perfected nature (which is nothing but absence of the imagined nature in the dependent nature). As such, the imagined nature is an incorrect way of experiencing the dependent, while the perfected nature is the correct way. The "progressive model" meanwhile can be found in the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa and in the MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄra and its bhÄá¹£ya. In this model, it is the perfected nature which is the primary element of the three natures schema. Here, the perfected nature is the pure basis of reality, while the other two natures are both impaired by ignorance.DâAMATO, M. âTHREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGÄCÄRA âTRISVABHÄVAâ-THEORY.â Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185â207. JSTOR,weblink Accessed 16 Feb. 2024. As the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa states: "The imputed and the other-dependent are to be known as having defiled characteristics. The perfected is asserted to have the characteristic of purity." In this text, the dependent nature is seen as something which must be abandoned since it has the "appearance of duality" (dvayÄkÄra). As such, in this "progressive" model, the dependent nature is the basis for the imagined nature, but not the basis for the perfected nature. The perfected nature on the other hand is a fundamentally pure true reality (which nevertheless is covered by adventitious defilements). As the MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄra states:Reality - which is always without duality, is the basis of error, and is entirely inexpressible - does not have the nature of discursivity. It is to be known, abandoned, and purified. It should properly be thought of as naturally immaculate, since it is purified from defilements, as are space, gold, and water. Furthermore, according to the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa (TSN 17-20), the three natures are inseparable (abhinna) and as such non-dual. This is a key difference between this model and the pivot model, where the dependent nature is ultimately devoid of the imagined nature. Another difference between these sources is that in the Triá¹ÅikÄ, the main model of liberation is a radical transformation of the basis (ÄÅrayaparÄvá¹tti). The TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa meanwhile claims that liberation occurs through knowledge of the three natures as they are (in their non-duality). Some scholars, like McNamara, argue that these two models are incompatible, ontologically and soteriologically. Kapstein thinks that it is possible that the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa is attempting to reconcile them. These differences have also led some scholars (Kapstein and Thomas Wood) to question the attribution of the TrisvabhÄvanirdeÅa to Vasubandhu.Karma
An explanation of the Buddhist doctrine of karma (action) is central to YogÄcÄra, and the school sought to explain important questions such as how moral actions can have effects on individuals long after that action was done, that is, how karmic causality works across temporal distances. Previous Abhidharma schools like the Sautrantika had developed theories of karma based on the notion of "seeds" (bÄ«jÄ) in the mind stream, which are unseen karmic habits (good and bad) which remain until they meet with the necessary conditions to manifest. YogÄcÄra adopts and expanded this theory. YogÄcÄra then posited the "storehouse consciousness" as the container of the seeds, as the storage place for karmic latencies and as a fertile matrix of predispositions that bring karma to a state of fruition. In the YogÄcÄra system, all experience without exception is said to result from karma or mental intention (cetana), either arising from one's own subliminal seeds or from other minds.BOOK,weblink An Introduction to Buddhist ethics: Foundations, Values, and Issues, Harvey, Brian Peter, Cambridge University Press, 2000, 0-521-55640-6, 297, For YogÄcÄra, the seemingly external or dualistic world is merely a "by-product" (adhipati-phala) of karma. The term vÄsanÄ ("perfuming") is also used when explaining karma. YogÄcÄrins were divided on the issue of whether vÄsÄna and bija were essentially the same, whether the seeds were the effect of the perfuming, or whether the perfuming simply affected the seeds.BOOK,weblink Buddhist Phenomenology: A philosophical Investigation of YogÄcÄra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun, Lusthaus, Dan, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 0-415-40610-2, 194, The type, quantity, quality and strength of the seeds determine where and how a sentient being will be reborn: one's race, sex, social status, proclivities, bodily appearance and so forth. The conditioning of the mind resulting from karma is called saá¹skÄra.BOOK, Buddhist Phenomenology: A philosophical Investigation of YogÄcÄra Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih lun, Lusthaus, Dan, RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, 0-415-40610-2, 48, Vasubandhu's Treatise on Action (Karmasiddhiprakaraá¹a), treats the subject of karma in detail from the YogÄcÄra perspective.Karmasiddhiprakarana: The Treatise on Action by Vasubandhu. translated by Etienne Lamotte and Leo M. Pruden. Asian Humanities Press: 2001 {{ISBN|0-89581-908-2}}. pg 13, 35Meditation and awakening
As the name of the school suggests, meditation practice is central to the YogÄcÄra tradition. YogÄcÄra texts prescribe various yogic practices such as mindfulness and the four investigations, out of which a revolutionary and radically transformative understanding of the non-duality of self and other is said to arise. This process is referred to as ÄÅraya-parÄvá¹tti ("overturning the cognitive basis", or "revolution of the basis"), which refers to "overturning the conceptual projections and imaginings which act as the base of our cognitive actions." This event is seen as the transformation of the basic mode of cognition into jñÄna (knowledge, direct knowing), which is seen as a non-dual knowledge that is non-conceptual (nirvikalpa), i.e., "devoid of interpretive overlay".Williams, 2008, p. 95. Roger R. Jackson describes this as a "'fundamental unconstructed awareness' (mÅ«la-nirvikalpa-jñÄna)"."How Mystical is Buddhism?" by Roger R. Jackson Asian Philosophy, Vol. 6, No.2, 1996 pg 150 When this knowledge arises, the eight consciousnesses come to an end and are replaced by direct knowings. According to Lusthaus:Overturning the Basis turns the five sense consciousnesses into immediate cognitions that accomplish what needs to be done (ká¹tyÄnuá¹£á¹hÄna-jñÄna). The sixth consciousness becomes immediate cognitive mastery (pratyaveká¹£aá¹a-jñÄna), in which the general and particular characteristics of things are discerned just as they are. This discernment is considered nonconceptual (nirvikalpa-jñÄna). Manas becomes the immediate cognition of equality (samatÄ-jñÄna), equalizing self and other. When the Warehouse Consciousness finally ceases it is replaced by the Great Mirror Cognition (MahÄdarÅa-jñÄna) that sees and reflects things just as they are, impartially, without exclusion, prejudice, anticipation, attachment, or distortion. The grasper-grasped relation has ceased. ..."purified" cognitions all engage the world in immediate and effective ways by removing the self-bias, prejudice, and obstructions that had prevented one previously from perceiving beyond one's own narcissistic consciousness. When consciousness ends, true knowledge begins. Since enlightened cognition is nonconceptual its objects cannot be described.Five Categories of Beings
One of the more controversial YogÄcÄra teachings was the "five categories of beings", which was an extension of the teachings on the seeds of the storehouse consciousness. This teacing states that sentient beings have certain innate seeds that determine their capability of achieving a particular state of enlightenment and no other. Thus, beings were placed into five categories:BOOK, Groner, Paul, The Establishment of the Tendai School, 2000, University of Hawaii Press, 0824823710, 97â100,- Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to practice the bodhisattva path and achieve full Buddhahood
- Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of a pratyekabuddha (private Buddha)
- Beings whose innate seeds gave them the capacity to achieve the state of an arhat
- Beings whose innate seeds had an indeterminate nature, and could potentially be any of the above
- Beings whose innate seeds were incapable of achieving enlightenment ever because they lacked any wholesome seeds
Mental images: true vs false
An important debate about the reality of mental appearances within YogÄcÄra led to its later subdivision into two systems of AlikÄkÄravÄda (Tib. rnam rdzun pa, False Aspectarians, also known as NirÄkÄravÄda) and SatyÄkÄravÄda (rnam bden pa, True Aspectarians, also known as SÄkÄravÄda). They are also termed "Aspectarians" (ÄkÄra) and "Non-Aspectarians" (anÄkÄra). The core issue is whether appearances or âaspectsâ (rnam pa, ÄkÄra) of objects in the mind are treated as true (bden pa, satya) or false (rdzun pa, alika).Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 8. While this division did not exist in the works of the early YogÄcÄra philosophers, tendencies similar to these views can be discerned in the works of Yogacara thinkers like Dharmapala (c. 530â561?) and Sthiramati (c. 510â570?).Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 73.Zhihua Yao. The Buddhist Theory of Self-Cognition, pp. 149-150. Routledge, 2012.Kajiyama, Yuichi. âControversy between the sakara- and nirakara-vadins of the Yogacara school-some materials.â Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies 14 (1965): n. pag.weblink to Yaroslav Komarovski the distinction is as follows:Although YogÄcÄras in general do not accept the existence of an external material world, according to SatyÄkÄravÄda its appearances or âaspectsâ (rnam pa, ÄkÄra) reflected in consciousness have a real existence, because they are of one nature with the really existent consciousness, their creator. According to AlikÄkÄravÄda, neither external phenomena nor their appearances and/in the minds that reflect them really exist. What exists in reality is only primordial mind (ye shes, jñÄna), described as self-cognition (rang rig, svasamvedana/ svasamvitti) or individually self-cognizing primordial mind (so so(r) rang gis rig paâi ye shes).Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 73-74.Davey K. Tomlinson describes the difference (with reference to later Yogacara scholars from Vikramashila) as follows:On one hand is the NirÄkÄravÄda, typified by RatnÄkaraÅÄnti (ca. 970â1045); on the other, the SÄkÄravÄda, articulated by his colleague and critic JñÄnaÅrÄ«mitra (ca. 980â1040). The NirÄkÄravÄdin argues that all appearances do not really exist. They are ersatz or false (alÄ«ka). Ephemeral forms appear to us but are the erroneous construction of ignorance, which fundamentally characterizes our existence as suffering beings in saá¹sÄra. In the ultimately real experience of an awakened buddha, no appearances show up at all. Pure experience, unstained by false appearance (which is nirÄkÄra, âwithout appearanceâ), is possible. The SÄkÄravÄdin, on the other hand, defends the view that all conscious experience is necessarily the experience of a manifest appearance (consciousness is sÄkÄra, or constitutively âhas appearanceâ). Manifest appearances, properly understood, are really real. A buddha's experience has appearances, and there is nothing about this fact that makes a buddha's experience mistaken.JOURNAL, Tomlinson, Davey, 2022, Limiting the Scope of the Neither-One-Nor-Many Argument: The NirÄkÄravÄdin's Defense of Consciousness and Pleasure,weblink Philosophy East and West, 73, 2, 392â419, 10.1353/pew.0.0235, 1529-1898,Practice
FILE:Maitreya, 2nd century CE, Loriyan Tangai, Gandhara Gallery, Indian Museum, Kolkata.-4956-A23194.jpg|thumb|Maitreya meditating, 2nd century CE, Loriyan Tangai, Indian Museum, KolkataKolkataA key early source for the yogic practices of Indian YogÄcÄra is the encyclopedic YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi-ÅÄstra (YBh, Treatise on the Foundation for Yoga Practitioners). The YBh presents a structured exposition of the MahÄyÄna Buddhist path of yoga (here referring to spiritual practice in general) from a YogÄcÄra perspective and relies in both Ägama/NikÄya texts and MahÄyÄna sÅ«tras while also being influenced by VaibhÄá¹£ika Abhidharma.Timme Kragh 2013, pp. 16, 25-26, 30, 46. According to some scholars, this text can be traced to communities of yogÄcÄras, which initially referred not to a philosophical school, but to groups of meditation specialists whose main focus was Buddhist yoga.Timme Kragh 2013, p. 31. Other YogÄcÄra texts which also discuss meditation and spiritual practice (and show some relationship with the YBh) include the Saá¹dhinirmocanasÅ«tra, the MadhyÄntavibhÄga, MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄra, DharmadharmatÄvibhÄga and Asanga's MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha.Timme Kragh 2013, p. 34.The YBh discusses various topics relevant to the bodhisattva practice, including: the eight different forms of dhyÄna (meditative absorptions), the three samÄdhis, different types of liberation (vimoká¹£a), meditative attainments (samÄpatti) such as nirodhasamÄpatti, the five hindrances (nivaraá¹a), the various types of foci (Älambana) or 'images' (nimitta) used in meditation, the various types contemplative antidotes (pratipaká¹£a) against the afflictions (like contemplating death, unattractiveness, impermanence, and suffering), the practice of Åamatha through "the nine aspects of resting the mind" (navÄkÄrÄ cittasthitiḥ), the practice of insight (vipaÅyanÄ), mindfulness of breathing (ÄnÄpÄnasmá¹ti), how to understand the four noble truths, the thirty-seven factors of Awakening (saptatriá¹Åad bodhipaká¹£yÄ dharmÄḥ), the four immeasurables (apramÄá¹a), and how to practice the six perfections (pÄramitÄ).Timme Kragh 2013 pp. 51, 60â230Bodhisattva path
YogÄcÄra sources like the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Chéng Wéishì Lùn and the commentaries to the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha and the MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlamkÄra also contain various descriptions of the main stages of the bodhisattva path.Brunnholzl, Karl (trans.), Asanga. (2019) A Compendium of the Mahayana: Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha and Its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, Appendix 10. Shambhala Publications. These YogÄcÄra sources integrate the Mahayana teaching of the ten bodhisattva stages (bhÅ«mis) with the earlier Abhidharma outline of the path called the "five paths" (pañcamÄrga), to produce a Mahayanist version of "five stages" (pañcÄvasthÄ).Muller, Charles. Five stages of cultivating the YogâcÄra path å¯èä¿®éäºä½, Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, 2006 In classic YogÄcÄra, this bodhisattva path is said to last for three incaculable eons (asaá¹khyeya kalpas), i.e. millions upon millions of years.Watanabe, Chikafumi, A Study of Mahayanasamgraha III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories, p. 66. University of Calgary, 2000. The five paths or stages are outlined in YogÄcÄra sources as follows:Watanabe, Chikafumi, A Study of Mahayanasamgraha III: The Relation of Practical Theories and Philosophical Theories, pp. 40-65. University of Calgary, 2000.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 97-107, 119-125. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).- Path of accumulation (sambhÄra-mÄrga, è³ç³§ä½), in which a bodhisattva gives rise to bodhicitta, and works on the two accumulations of merit (puá¹ya) and wisdom (jñana). These are linked with the practice of the six perfections. In this first stage of the path, one attains merit by doing good deeds like giving (dana) and one also accumulates wisdom by listening to the Mahayana teachings many times, contemplating them and meditating on them. One also associates with good spiritual friends. According to the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha, at this stage the bodhisattva focuses on accumulating wholesome roots (kuÅalamÅ«la) and on permeating one's mind with learning (bahuÅrutaprabhÄvita).Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 107. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). This leads to the accumulation of great faith and conviction in the Mahayana and in the principle of consciousness-only.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 119. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).
- Path of engagement (prayoga-mÄrga, å è¡ä½), also termed "the stage of the practice of faith and convinction" (adhimukticaryÄbhÅ«mi). Here, a bodhisattva practices morality, meditation, and wisdom in order to quell the manifest activities of the two types of obscurations: emotionally afflictive and cognitive. While their active elements are quelled, they remain as seeds in the foundation consciousness. Furthermore, one also cultivates the "factors conducive to penetration", which consists of the "four investigations" and the "four correct cognitions". These are ways of contemplating the truth of mind-only and lead to the "entrance into the principle of cognizance-only" (vijñaptimÄtrapraveÅa) as well as to "the certainty as to the non-existence of the object" (arthÄbhÄvaniÅcaya).Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 109. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). At this stage one relies on the fourth dhyana and also attains various samadhis (meditative concentrations). The final stage of this path which is just before the path of seeing is called "the elimination of the ideation of cognizance-only" (vijñaptimÄtrasaá¹jñÄvibhÄvana). As the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha states, at this point, the realization of the absolute nature (pariniá¹£pannasvabhÄvabuddhi) eliminates the very "perception of mind-only" (vijñaptimÄtratÄbuddhi).Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 111. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). The resulting wisdom is described by Asanga as "the non-conceptual cognition (nirvikalpakajñÄna) in which the object (Älambana) and the subject (Älambaka) are completely identical (samasama)."Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 111. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).
- Path of seeing (darÅana-mÄrga, è¦éä½), at this stage (which lasts for only a few moments), a bodhisattva attains an untainted knowledge (Skt. anÄsrava-jñÄna, ç¡æ¼æº) into emptiness, the non-duality of self and other, and consciousness-only. The Cheng wei shi lun describes this knowledge which realises Suchness (tathatÄ) as being "entirely undifferentiated (samasama) from Suchness since both are free from the characteristics (laká¹£aá¹a) of subject (grÄhaka) and object (grÄhya)."Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 122. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). This stage is equated with the first bodhisattva stage, the stage of joy. At this point, one is a proper noble (arya) bodhisattva instead of just a beginner.
- Path of cultivation (bhÄvanÄ-mÄrga, ä¿®éä½), at this stage, a bodhisattva continues to train themselves in two main cognitions in order to fully eliminate all the seeds of the two types of obscurations. They train in the non-conceptual gnosis (nirvikalpakajñÄna) of ultimate reality, and the wordly or subsequent knowledge (pá¹á¹£á¹htalabdhajñÄna) which knows conventional reality as illusory, and is yet able to conceptually understand it and use it for guiding sentient beings according to their needs. Part of this path requires effort, as the bodhisattva is said to "repeatedly (abhÄ«ká¹£á¹am) cultivate the non-conceptual cognition" (Cheng wei shi lun). However, after a certain point one advances effortlessly. This path corresponds to the second to ninth stages of the bodhisattva path. The MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha states that at this stage the yogin "dwells in intense cultivation for hundreds of thousands of koá¹is of niyutas [an astronomical number] of aeons and consequently attains the transformation of the basis (ÄÅrayaparavá¹tti)".Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 114. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).
- Path of fulfillment (niá¹£á¹hÄ-mÄrga), also known as the path of no more learning (aÅaiká¹£a-mÄrga, ç¡å¸ä½) in other sources. This is equivalent to complete Buddhahood. It also entails attaining the three bodies (trikÄya) of the Buddha (a doctrine which was also invented by the YogÄcÄra school).
Bodhisattva practice
The BodhisattvabhÅ«mi discusses the YogÄcÄra school's specifically MahÄyÄna forms of practice which are tailored to bodhisattvas.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 884-885. The aim of the bodhisattva's practice in the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi is the wisdom (prajñÄ) which realizes of the inexpressible Ultimate Reality (tathata) or the 'thing-in-itself (vastumatra), which is essenceless and beyond the duality (advaya) of existence (bhÄva) and non-existence (abhÄva).Kragh 2013, p. 157.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 889-891. The BodhisattvabhÅ«mi outlines several practices of bodhisattvas, including the six perfections (pÄramitÄ), the thirty-seven factors of Awakening, and the four immeasurables. Two key practices which are unique to bodhisattvas in this text are the four investigations and the four correct cognitions or "the four kinds of understanding in accordance with true reality".Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 893-894.Brunnholzl, Karl (trans.), Asanga. (2019) A Compendium of the Mahayana: Asanga's Mahayanasamgraha and Its Indian and Tibetan Commentaries, Appendix 8. Shambhala Publications. These two sets of four practices and cognitions are also taught in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and its commentaries.The four investigations and four correct cognitions
The four investigations (catasraḥ paryeá¹£aá¹Äḥ) and the corresponding four correct cognitions (catvÄri yathÄbhÅ«taparijñÄnÄni) are a set of original contemplations found in YogÄcÄra works. These were seen as very important contemplative methods by the authors of the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi. They were considered to lead to awakening, and were linked with the thirty-seven factors leading to Awakening.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 78. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). The four investigations and the corresponding four correct cognitions (which are said to arise out of the investiations) are:Kragh 2013, p. 160.Deleanu, Florin. "Meditative Practices in the BodhisattvabhÅ«mi: Quest for and Liberation through the Thing-In-Itself," in Kragh 2013 pp. 894-896.- The investigation of the names [of things] (nÄmaparyeá¹£aá¹Ä), leads to correct cognition resulting from the investigation of names just for what they are, which is "just names" (nÄmamÄtra), i.e. arbitrary linguistic signs.
- The investigation of things (vastuparyeá¹£aá¹Ä), leads to correct cognition resulting from the investigation of things. One sees things just for what they are, namely a mere presence or a thing-in-itself (vastumÄtra). One understands that this is apart from all labels and is inexpressible (nirabhilÄpya).
- The investigation of verbal designations suggesting and portraying an intrinsic nature (svabhÄva-prajñapti-paryeá¹£aá¹Ä), leads to correct cognition resulting from the investigation of such designations. One sees the designations just for what they are, namely as mere designations (prajñaptimÄtratÄ). Thus, one sees the idea of intrinsic nature to be illusory like a hallucination or a dream.
- The investigation of verbal designations expressing individuation and differences (viÅeá¹£aprajñaptiparyeá¹£aá¹Ä), leads to correct cognition resulting from the investigation of such designations. One sees the designations just for what they are, namely as mere designations. For example, a thing may be designated as existing or non-existing, but such designations do not apply to true reality or the thing-in-itself.
Four prayogas
Various YogÄcÄra sources provide a four step process of realization leading to the path of seeing, these four are the four yogic practices (prayogas):Brunnholzl, Karl (2009). Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, pp. 21-22. Snow Lion Publications.- Yogic practice of observation (upalambha-prayoga) - Outer objects are observed to be nothing but mind.
- Yogic practice of non-observation (anupalambha-prayoga) - Outer objects are not observed as such
- Yogic practice of observation and non-observation (upalambhÄnupalambha-prayoga) - Outer objects being unobservable, a mind cognizing them is not observed either
- Yogic practice of double non-observation (nopalambhopalambha-prayoga) - Not observing both, nonduality is observed
Meditation
As the "school of yoga practitioners", meditative practice is discussed in various YogÄcÄra sources. The sixth chapter (the Maitreya Chapter) of the Saá¹dhinirmocanasÅ«tra focuses entirely on meditation. It extensively discusses the meditative aspects of âcalmâ (Åamatha) and âinsightâ (vipaÅyanÄ) from unique perspectives.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 90. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). Success in both of these is based on pure ethics and on pure views based on listening and reflecting (viÅuddhaá¹ ÅrutamayacintÄmayadarÅanam). Insight is paired with "objects consisting in images accompanied by reflection" (savikalpaá¹ pratibimbaá¹) while tranquility is seen as based on objects consisting in images unaccompanied by reflection (nirvikalpaá¹ pratibimbaá¹). Thus, insight meditation is based on the uninterrupted contemplation of mental images, while calming meditation is simply focusing on "the continuous flow of mind with uninterrupted attention".Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, p. 92. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). The Saá¹dhinirmocana also states that the teachings themselves are an important object of meditative contemplation. This includes the YogÄcÄra teaching of consciousness-only, the teachings on the twofold emptiness (of self and phenomena), and the schematic analysis of the subject and its objects of consciousness.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 94-95. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies).While insight meditation is initially based on conceptual reflection, these are gradually abandoned at later stages until the yogin lets go of all concepts, teachings, and mental images. Furthermore, at the higher stages of meditation, the calm and insight meditations must ultimately be blended or yoked together (yuganaddha) in a single state of one-pointedness of mind (cittaikÄgratÄ). This unified state is described as that state in which the yogin: "realises that these images (pratibimba) which are the domain of concentration (samÄdhigocara) are nothing but representation (vijñaptimÄtra), and having realised this, he contemplates (manasikaroti) Suchness (tathatÄ)."History
YogÄcÄra, along with Madhyamaka (Middle Way), is one of the two principal philosophical schools of Indian MahÄyÄna Buddhism,Jones, Lindsay (Ed. in Chief)(2005). Encyclopedia of Religion. (2nd Ed.) Volume 14; Masaaki, Hattori (Ed.)(1987 & 2005)"YogÄcÄra": p.9897. USA: Macmillan Reference. {{ISBN|0-02-865983-X}} (v.14) though the related movement of TathÄgatagarbha-thought was also influential.E. Frauwallner (2010 (1956)), Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, p.166{{refn|group=note|Frauwallner, Die Philosophie des Buddhismus,treats TathÄgatagarbha-thought as a separate school of Mahayana, providing an excerpt from the Uttaratantra, written by a certain SÄramati (å¨åæ«åº), c.q. Maitreya-nÄtha.}}Origin and early YogÄcÄra
file:Kushanmap.jpg|thumb|The Kushan Empire ruled much of north Indianorth IndiaThe term "yogÄcÄra" (yoga practitioner) was originally used to refer to the Buddhist meditation adepts of the first centuries of the common era which were associated with the SarvÄstivÄda and SautrÄntika traditions in north India (some of their key centers included Gandhara, Kashmir and Mathura). Modern scholars like Florin Delenau have suggested that some yogis in this north Indian Buddhist milieu gradually adopted MahÄyÄna ideas, eventually developing into a separate movement (a process which was complete by the 5th century).OâBrien-Kop, K. Dharmamegha in yoga and yogÄcÄra: the revision of a superlative metaphor. J Indian Philos 48, 605â635 (2020).weblink F. (Ed.). (2006). The Chapter on the Mundane Path (LaukikamÄrga): A Trilingual Edition(Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation and Introductory Study (2 vol), p. 162. Tokyo:International Institute for Buddhist Studies.Kragh, U.T. (editor), The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Volume 1, pp. 30-31. Harvard University, Department of South Asian studies, 2013. According to Delenau, the Chinese Dhyana Sutras indicate just such a gradual adoption of MahÄyÄna elements. File:TheFutureBuddhaGandhara3rdCentury.jpg|thumb|The bodhisattva Maitreya and disciples, a central figure in Yogacara origin myth. GandharaGandharaOne of the earliest texts of the MahÄyÄna YogÄcÄra tradition proper is the Saá¹dhinirmocana SÅ«tra (Unraveling the Profound Intent) which might be as early as the first or second century CE.BOOK, Powers, John, Hermeneutics and Tradition in the Saá¹dhinirmocana-sÅ«tra,weblink 2004, Motilal Banarsidass, 978-81-208-1926-9, 4â11, It includes new theories such as the basis-consciousness (Älaya-vijñÄna), the doctrine of vijñapti-mÄtra and the "three natures" (trisvabhÄva). However, these theories were not completely new, as they have predecessors in older theories held by previous Buddhist schools, such as the SautrÄntika theory of seeds (bÄ«ja) and the Sthavira theory of the bhavanga.BOOK, Waldron, William S, The Buddhist Unconscious: The Alaya-vijñana in the Context of Indian Buddhist Thought,weblink 2003, Routledge, 978-1-134-42886-1, Philosophically speaking, Richard King notes that SautrÄntikas defended a kind of representationalism, in which the mind only perceives an image (akara) or representation (vijñapti) of an external object (never the object itself). Mahayana YogÄcÄras adopted a similar model but removed the need for any external object which acts as a cause for the image.King, Richard; Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma context of early Yogacara As the doctrinal trailblazer of the YogÄcÄra, the Saá¹dhinirmocana also introduced the paradigm of the Three Turnings of the Wheel of Dharma, with its own teachings being placed into the final and definitive teaching (which supersedes those of the Prajñaparamita sutras). The early layers of the massive YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi-ÅÄstra (Treatise on the Stages of the YogÄcÄras) also contains very ancient YogÄcÄra material which is earlier than the Saá¹dhinirmocana. However, in its current form it is a "conglomeration of heterogenous materials" (Schmithausen) which was finally compiled (perhaps by Asanga) after the Saá¹dhinirmocana (hence, later layers quote the sutra directly). Modern scholars consider the YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi to contain the work of several authors (mainly of a MÅ«lasarvÄstivÄda milieu), though it has traditionally been attributed in full to the bodhisattva Maitreya or to Asanga.M. Delhey, âThe YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi Corpus: Sources, Editions, Translations, and Reference Worksâ. 2013.Kragh, U.T. (editor), The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Volume 1, p. 312. Harvard University, Department of South Asian studies, 2013. It is influenced by SarvÄstivÄda Abhidharma and SautrÄntika traditions, who also had similar texts called by the name "YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi", such as the YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi of Saá¹ gharaká¹£a.Deleanu, F. (Ed.). (2006). The Chapter on the Mundane Path (LaukikamÄrga): A Trilingual Edition(Sanskrit, Tibetan, Chinese), Annotated Translation and Introductory Study (2 vol), pp. 157-18. Tokyo:International Institute for Buddhist Studies.Classical YogÄcÄra - Asaá¹ ga and Vasubandhu
{{multiple image
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}}YogÄcÄra's systematic exposition owes much to the Gandharan Buddhist brothers Asaá¹
ga (4th c. CE) and Vasubandhu (c. 4th - 5th CE). Little is known of these figures, but traditional accounts (in authors like Xuanzang) state that Asaá¹
ga received YogÄcÄra teachings from the bodhisattva and future Buddha, Maitreya.BOOK,weblink The great Tang dynasty record of the western regions, Xuanzang, Bianji, Li, Jung-hsi, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation & Research, 1996, 978-1-886439-02-3, Xuanzang, Bianji, Li Rongxi, Wayman, Alex. Untying the Knots in Buddhism: Selected Essays. 1997. p. 213 However, there are various discrepancies between the Chinese and Tibetan traditions concerning these so called "five works of Maitreya". Modern scholars argue that the various works traditionally attributed to Maitreya are actually by other authors. According to Mario D'amato, the MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlamkÄra and the MadhyÄntavibhÄga are part of a second phase of YogÄcÄra scholarship which took place after the completion of the Bodhisattvabhumi, but before the composition of Asanga's MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha (which quotes the MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlamkÄra as an authoritative text).DâAMATO, M. âTHREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGÄCÄRA âTRISVABHÄVAâ-THEORY.â Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185â207. JSTOR,weblink Accessed 16 Feb. 2024. Regarding the Abhisamayalankara and the Ratnagotravibhaga, modern scholars generally see these as the works of different authors.Makransky, John J. Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet SUNY Press, 1997, p. 187.Williams, Paul, Mahayana Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations, Routledge, 1989, p. 103.Asaá¹
ga went on to write many of the key YogÄcÄra treatises such as the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha and the Abhidharma-samuccaya.BOOK, Tucci, Giuseppe, Giuseppe Tucci, On Some Aspects of the Doctrines of the Maitreya (Natha) and Asanga: Being a Course of Five Lectures Delivered at the University of Calcutta,weblink 1975, Chinese Materials Center, Asaá¹
ga also went on to convert his brother Vasubandhu to YogÄcÄra. Vasubandhu was a top scholar of VaibhÄá¹£ika and SautrÄntika Abhidharma thought, and the AbhidharmakoÅakÄrikÄ is his main work which discusses the doctrines of these traditions.Gold, Jonathan, Paving the Great Way: Vasubandhu's Unifying Buddhist Philosophy, Columbia University Press, 2014, p. 2. Vasubandhu also went on to write important YogÄcÄra works like the Twenty Verses and the Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only.| image1 = Muchaku Hokuendo Kofukuji 2.jpg
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The middle period and the epistemological turn
The YogÄcÄra school held a prominent position in Indian Buddhism for centuries after the time of the two brothers. According to Lusthaus and Delenau, after Asaá¹ ga and Vasubandhu, two distinct "wings" of the school developed during the "Middle Period" of YogÄcÄra, the epistemological school and the scholastic school. Another important third movement developed a synthesis of YogÄcÄra with buddha-nature thought.Delenau, Florin. Mind Only and Beyond: History of Yogacara Meditation, 2010, pp. 17-20. Lectures Series (Oxford Centre for Buddhist Studies). Thus, the three main branches of the YogÄcÄra movement which developed during the so called middle period are:- A logico-epistemic tradition (pramÄá¹avÄda) focusing on issues of epistemology (Sanskrit: pramÄá¹a) and logic (hetuvidyÄ), exemplified by such thinkers as DignÄga, DharmakÄ«rti, Dharmottara, Devendrabuddhi, Prajñakaragupta, Jinendrabuddhi, ÅÄkyabuddhi
- A scholastic and exegetical tradition which refined and elaborated YogÄcÄra Abhidharma and wrote various commentaries, exemplified by such thinkers as Gunamati, AsvabhÄva, Sthiramati, Jinaputra, DharmapÄla, ÅÄ«labhadra, Xuanzang, and VinÄ«tadeva (710-770).
- The YogÄcÄra-tathÄgatagarbha synthesis, found in the Laá¹ kÄvatÄra SÅ«tra, and GhanavyÅ«ha sÅ«tra, two treatises attributed to an author named SÄramati: the RatnagotravibhÄga, and DharmadhÄtvaviÅeá¹£aÅÄstra (Dasheng fajie wuchabie lun 大ä¹æ³çç¡å·®å¥è«), as well as in the works of ParamÄrtha (499-569 CE), including his translations: BuddhagotraÅÄstra (Fó xìng lùn, ä½æ§è«), and AnuttarâÅrayasÅ«tra.Takasaki, Jikido (1966). A Study on the RatnagotravibhÄga (Uttaratantra) Being a Treatise on the TathÄgatagarbha Theory of MahÄyÄna Buddhism (Rome Oriental Series 33). Rome: Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente, pp. 45â52.
YogÄcÄra-tathÄgatagarbha synthesis
File:Vikramashila_University.jpg|thumb|Panorama of the site of VikramaÅÄ«la university (Bhagalpur district, BiharBiharAccording to Lusthaus, the synthetic YogÄcÄra-tathÄgatagarbha school accepted the definition of tathÄgatagarbha (the buddha-womb, buddha-source, or "buddha-within") as "permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure" (nitya, sukha, Ätman, Åuddha) which is found in various tathÄgatagarbha sutras. This hybrid school eventually went on to link the tathÄgatagarbha with the Älaya-vijñÄna doctrine. Some key sources of this tendency are the Laá¹ kÄvatÄra SÅ«tra, RatnagotravibhÄga (Uttaratantra), and in China the Awakening of Faith.The synthesis of YogÄcÄra and TathÄgatagarbha thought became extremely influential in both East Asia and Tibet. During the sixth and seventh centuries, various forms of competing YogÄcÄra systems were popular in Chinese Buddhism. The translator Bodhiruci (6th century CE) for example, took a more "classical" approach while Ratnamati was attracted to TathÄgatagarbha thought and sought to translate texts like the Dasabhumika commentary accordingly. Their disagreement on this issue led to the end of their collaboration as co-translators.Brunnholzl, Karl, When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, Shambhala Publications, 2015, p. 117. The translator ParamÄrtha is another example of a hybrid thinker. He promoted the theory of a "stainless consciousness" (amala-vijñÄna, a pure wisdom within all beings, i.e. the tathÄgatagarbha), which is revealed once the Älaya-vijñÄna is purified.Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Routledge, 2014, p. 274.According to Lusthaus, Xuanzang's travels to India and his translation work was an attempt to return to a more "orthodox" and "authentic" Indian YogÄcÄra, and thus put to rest the debates and confusions in the Chinese YogÄcÄra of his time. The Cheng Weishi Lun returns to the use of the theory of seeds instead of the tathÄgatagarbha to explain how some beings can reach Buddhahood.Lusthaus, Dan, Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogacara Buddhism and the Ch'eng Wei-shih Lun, Routledge, 2014, pp. 8-10. However, by the eighth century, the YogÄcÄra-tathÄgatagarbha synthesis became the dominant interpretation of YogÄcÄra in East Asian Buddhism. Later Chinese thinkers like Fa-Tsang would thus criticize Xuanzang for failing to teach the tathÄgatagarbha.Karl Brunnhölzl notes that this syncretic tendency also existed in Indian YogÄcÄra scholasticism, but that it only became widespread during the later tantric era (when Vajrayana became prominent) with the work of thinkers like JñÄnaÅrÄ«mitra, RatnÄkaraÅÄnti, and Maitripa.Brunnholzl, Karl, When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, Shambhala Publications, 2015, p. 118. Kashmir also became an important center for this tradition, as can be seen in the works of Kashmiri Yogacarins Sajjana and MahÄjana.Kano, Kazuo. "Sajjana and MahÄjana: YogÄcÄra Exegeses in the Eleventh Century Kashmir." Indogaku Bukkyogaku Kenkyu (Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies) 69, no. 2 (2021): 118â124YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka
YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka philosophers demonstrated two opposing tendencies throughout the history of Buddhist philosophy in India, an antagonistic stance which saw both systems as rival and incompatible views and another inclusive tendency which worked towards harmonizing their views.Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 74. Some authors like the Madhyamikas Bhaviveka, CandrakÄ«rti, and ÅÄntideva, and the YogÄcÄras Asanga, Dharmapala, Sthiramati criticized the philosophical theories of the other tradition. While Indian YogÄcÄras criticized certain interpretations of Madhyamaka (which they term âthose who misunderstand emptinessâ), they never criticize the founders of Madhyamaka themselves (NÄgÄrjuna and Äryadeva), and saw their work as implicitly in agreement with YogÄcÄra. This inclusivism saw NÄgÄrjuna's teachings as needing further expansion and explication (since it was part of the "second turning" of the wheel of Dharma). Thus, YogÄcÄra thinkers affirmed the importance NÄgÄrjuna's work and some even wrote commentaries on NÄgÄrjuna's MÅ«lamadhyamakakÄrika as a way to draw out the implicit meaning of Madhyamaka and show it was compatible with YogÄcÄra. These include Asanga's Treatise on Comforming to the Middle Way (Shun zhonglun é ä¸è«) and Sthiramati's Mahayana Middle Way Commentary (Dasheng zhongguanshi lun 大ä¹ä¸è§éè« T.30.1567).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 142. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}}. Similarly, Vasubandhu and DharmapÄla both wrote commentaries on Äryadeva's CatuḥÅÄtaka (Four Hundred Verses).Garfield, Jay L.; Westerhoff, Jan (2015). Madhyamaka and Yogacara: Allies Or Rivals? p. 6. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-023129-3}} The harmonizing tendency can be seen in the work of philosophers like Kambala (5-6th century, author of the ÄlokamÄlÄ), JñÄnagarbha (8th century), his student ÅÄntaraká¹£ita (8th century) and RatnÄkaraÅÄnti (c. 1000). ÅÄntaraká¹£ita (8th century), whose view was later called "YogÄcÄra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka" by the Tibetan tradition, saw the MÄdhyamika position as ultimately true and at the same time saw the YogÄcÄra view as a useful way to relate to conventional truth (which leads one to the ultimate).Shantarakshita & Ju Mipham (2005) pp.117-122 RatnÄkaraÅÄnti on the other hand saw Nagarjuna as agreeing with the intent of YogÄcÄra texts, while criticizing the interpretations of later Madhyamikas like Bhaviveka. Later Tibetan Buddhist thinkers like Shakya Chokden would also work to show the compatibility of the alikÄkÄravÄda sub-school with Madhyamaka, arguing that it is in fact a form of Madhyamaka.Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 10. Likewise, the Seventh Karmapa Chödrak Gyamtso has a similar view which holds that the "profound important points and intents" of the two systems are one.Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 81. Ju Mipham is also another Tibetan philosopher whose project is aimed as showing the harmony between Yogacara and Madhyamaka, arguing that there is only a very subtle difference between them, being a subtle clinging by Yogacaras to the existence of an "inexpressible, naturally luminous cognition" (rig pa rang bzhin gyis âod gsal ba).Komarovski, Yaroslav, Visions of Unity: The Golden Paá¹á¸ita Shakya Chokden's New Interpretation of YogÄcÄra and Madhyamaka. Albany, New York: State University of New York Press, 2011, p. 80.YogÄcÄra in East Asia
File:Xuan Zang Statue.jpg|thumb|Statue of a traveling Xuanzang at Longmen Grottoes, LuoyangLuoyangFile:Jion Daishi.jpg|thumb|KuÄ«jÄ« (632â682), a student of XuanzangXuanzangTranslations of Indian YogÄcÄra texts were first introduced to China in the early 5th century CE.Paul, Diana. Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China: Paramartha's Evolution of Consciousness. 1984. p. 6 Among these was Guá¹abhadra's translation of the Laá¹ kÄvatÄra SÅ«tra in four fascicles, which would also become important in the early history of Chan Buddhism. Influential 5th century figures include the translators Bodhiruci, Ratnamati, and ParamÄrtha.Paul, Diana. Philosophy of Mind in Sixth-Century China: Paramartha's Evolution of Consciousness. 1984. pp. 32-33 Their followers founded the Dilun (DaÅabhÅ«mikÄ Commentary) and Shelun (MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha) schools, both of which included YogÄcÄra and tathÄgatagarbha elements.WEB, Muller, A.C., Quick Overview of the Faxiang School æ³ç¸å®,weblink 2023-04-24, www.acmuller.net, Modern scholars also hold that the Awakening of Faith, a very influential work in East Asian Buddhism, was written by a member of the Dilun tradition.Jorgensen, John; Lusthaus, Dan; Makeham, John; Strange, Mark, trans. (2019), Treatise on Awakening MahÄyÄna Faith, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, in Introduction (pp. 1â10). Xuanzang (fl. c. 602 â 664) is famous for having made a dangerous journey to India in order to study Buddhism, obtain more indic YogÄcÄra sources.Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. 2006. p. 220 Xuanzang spent over ten years in India traveling and studying under various Buddhist masters and drew on a variety of Indian sources in his studies. Wei Tat. Cheng Weishi Lun. 1973. p. li Upon his return to China, Xuanzang brought with him 657 Buddhist texts, including the YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi and began the work of translating them.BOOK, Tagawa, Shun'ei, Charles Muller, Living Yogacara: An Introduction to Consciousness-Only Buddhism, Wisdom Publications, 2009, 978-0-86171-589-3, xx-xxi (forward), Xuanzang composed the Cheng Weishi Lun (Discourse on the Establishment of Consciousness Only) which drew on many Indian sources and commentaries and became a central work of East Asian YogÄcÄra.Liu, JeeLoo. An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy: From Ancient Philosophy to Chinese Buddhism. 2006. p. 221 Xuanzang's student Kuiji continued this tradition, writing several important commentaries. However, another student of Xuanzang, the Korean monk WÅnchâÅk, defended some of the doctrines of the Shelun school of ParamÄrtha, for which he was criticized by the followers of Kuiji. WÅnchâÅk's teachings were influential on the YogÄcÄra (Beopsang) of Silla Korea. Both of these competing YogÄcÄra sub-sects were then imported to Japan where they became the two sub-sects (the northern and southern temple lineages) of the HossÅ school.Green, Ronald S. (2020). Early Japanese Hosso in Relation to Silla YogaÂcaÂra in Disputes between Nara'ÂÂs Northern and Southern Temple Traditions. Journal of Korean Religions, 11(1), 97â121. doi:10.1353/jkr.2020.0003 Xuanzang's school later came under criticism from later Chinese masters like Fazang and it became less influential as the fortunes of other native Chinese schools rose. Nevertheless, YogÄcÄra studies continued to be important at different times throughout Chinese history, including during the modern revival of YogÄcÄra in the 20th century.Makeham, John. Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China, pp. 13-14. Oxford University Press, 2014YogÄcÄra in Tibet
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Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama (1284â1339)
{{see also|Rangtong-Shentong}}YogÄcÄra is studied in all schools of Tibetan Buddhism, though it receives different emphasis in each of these. YogÄcÄra thought is an integral part of the history of Tibetan Buddhism. It was first transmitted to Tibet by figures like ÅÄntaraká¹£ita, KamalaÅÄ«la and AtiÅa.BOOK,weblink Introduction to the Middle Way: Chandrakirti's Madhyamakavatara with Commentary, Khyentse Rinpoche, Dzongsar Jamyang, Khyentse Foundation, 2003, Alex Trisoglio, 1st, Dordogne, France, 8, Introduction, PDF, In the 8th century, Shantarakshita went to Tibet and founded the monastery at Samyé. He was not a direct disciple of Bhavaviveka, but the disciple of one of his disciples. He combined the Madhyamika-Svatantrika and Cittamatra schools, and created a new school of Madhyamika called Svatantrika-Yogachara-Madhyamika. His disciple Kamalashila, who wrote The Stages of Meditation upon Madhyamika (umaâi sgom rim), developed his ideas further, and together they were very influential in Tibet., Dzongsar Jamyang Khyentse Rinpoche, 7 January 2013, The Tibetan Nyingma school and its Dzogchen teachings draw on both Madhyamaka and YogÄcÄra-TathÄgatagarbha thought.Germano, David F.; Waldron, William S. (2006), "A Comparison of Alaya-vijñÄna in Yogacara and Dzogchen" (PDF), in Nauriyal, D. K.; Drummond, Michael S.; Lal, Y. B. (eds.), Buddhist Thought and Applied Psychological Research: Transcending the boundaries, Abingdon, Oxon.: Routledge, pp. 36â68, {{ISBN|978-0-415-37431-6}} Similarly, Kagyu school figures like the Third Karmapa also rely on the Madhyamaka and YogÄcÄra-TathÄgatagarbha systems in their presentation of the ultimate view (termed Mahamudra in Kagyu).Brunnholzl, Karl. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature, Introduction. Snow Lion Publications, The Nitartha Institute (2009). The Jonang school also developed its own synthetic philosophy which they termed shentong ("other-emptiness" {{bo|t=|w=gzhan-stong}}), which also included elements from YogÄcÄra, Madhyamaka and TathÄgatagarbha.WEB,weblink An Ascertainment of the Two Systems, Taranatha, Jonang Foundation,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20121213065516weblink">weblink December 13, 2012, dead, 19 December 2012, Accordingly, those who adhere to rangtong take the first wheel of the Buddha's teachings which is the Wheel of Dharma that teaches the Four Noble Truths to be provisional in meaning, the middle Wheel of Dharma that teaches the absence of characteristics as ultimately definitive in meaning, and the final excellently distinguished Wheel of Dharma as teaching the circumstantial definitive meaning, which is provisional in meaning. Those who uphold zhentong take the first Wheel of Dharma to be provisional, the middle Wheel of Dharma to teach the circumstantial definitive meaning, and the final Wheel of Dharma to teach to ultimate definitive meaning., In contrast, the Gelug and Sakya schools generally see YogÄcÄra as a lesser view than the Madhyamaka philosophy of Candrakirti, which is seen as the definitive view in these traditions.BOOK, Je Tsongkhapa, Sparham, Gareth, trans.; in collaboration with Shotaro Iida, Ocean of Eloquence: Tsong kha pa's Commentary on the Yogacara Doctrine of Mind, 1993, State University of New York, Albany, NY, 0791414795,weblink 1st., Kapstein, Matthew, 18 December 2012, bo, en, Today, YogÄcÄra topics remain important in Tibetan Buddhism and YogÄcÄra texts are widely studied. There are various debates and discussions among the Tibetan Buddhist schools regarding key YogÄcÄra ideas, like svasaá¹vedana (reflexive awareness) and the foundational consciousness. Furthermore, the debates between the other-emptiness and self-emptiness views are also similar in some ways to the historical debates between YogÄcÄra-TathÄgatagarbha and Madhyamaka, though the specific viewpoints have evolved further and changed in complex ways.WEB, Berzin, Alexander, Brief Survey of Self-voidness and Other-voidness Views,weblink 20 June 2016, Modern thinkers continue to discuss YogÄcÄra issues, and attempt to synthesize it with Madhyamaka. For example, Ju Mipham, the 19th-century Rimé commentator, wrote a commentary on ÅÄntaraká¹£ita's synthesis arguing that the ultimate intent of Madhyamaka and YogÄcÄra is the same.- Rangjung Dorje.jpg -
Rangjung Dorje, 3rd Karmapa Lama (1284â1339)
Influence
Virtually all contemporary schools of MahÄyÄna Buddhism are influenced by YogÄcÄra to some extent. This includes modern East Asian Buddhist traditions (like Zen and Pure Land) and Tibetan Buddhism.BOOK, Dumoulin, Heinrich, Zen Buddhism: A History, World Wisdom, 2005, 0-941532-89-5, 1 India and China, Bloomington, IN, 52, Zen was heavily influenced by YogÄcÄra sources, especially the Laá¹ kÄvatÄra SÅ«tra. In Tibetan Buddhism, YogÄcÄra sources are still widely studied and several are part of the monastic education curriculum in various traditions.Kapstein, Matthew T. Tibetan Buddhism: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 64. Some influential YogÄcÄra texts in Tibetan Buddhism include: Asanga's Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the "Five Treatises of Maitreya" including the Mahayanasutralankara, and the RatnagotravibhÄga.Hindu philosophers such as VÄcaspati MiÅra, Utpaladeva, Abhinavagupta, and ÅrÄ«hará¹£a were also influenced by Yogacara ideas and responded to their theories in their own works.Torella, Raffaele. "The PratyabhijÃ±Ä and the logical-epistemological school of Buddhism" in Goudriaan ed. (1992) Ritual and Speculation in Early Tantrism: Studies in Honor of Andre Padoux pp. 327-346. SUNY Press.Stcherbatsky, Fyodor Th. Buddhist Logic. Vol. I, p. 51. Dover Publications.Textual corpus
(File:Xuanzang_Memorial_Hall_%28Wall_Painting%29.JPG|thumb|A wall painting depicting Xuanzang's travels and his translation work, Xuanzang Memorial Hall, modern Nalanda)SÅ«tras
The Saá¹dhinirmocana SÅ«tra (SÅ«tra of the Explanation of the Profound Secrets; 2nd century CE), is a key early YogÄcÄra sutra which is considered to be the foundational sutra for the YogÄcÄra tradition.Keown, Damien (2004). A Dictionary of Buddhism, p. 302. Oxford University Press. {{ISBN|978-0-19-860560-7}}. There are two Indian commentaries to this, one by Asanga and one by Jñanagarbha.Powers, John. The YogÄcÄra School of Buddhism: A Bibliography, p. 18. American Theological Library Association, 1991. The Avataá¹saka SÅ«tra (which includes the DaÅabhÅ«mikasÅ«tra) also contains numerous teachings on mind-only and is very influential for East Asian Buddhism.Paul Williams; Anthony Tribe; Alexander Wynne. Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction to the Indian Tradition. p. 121. 2012. Vasubandhu's Commentary on the DaÅabhÅ«mikasÅ«tra is an important commentary to this.WEB, Muller, A.C., Quick Overview of the Faxiang School æ³ç¸å®,weblink 2023-04-24, www.acmuller.net, Makeham, John. Transforming Consciousness: Yogacara Thought in Modern China, p. 6. Oxford University Press, 2014 Another text, the MahÄyÄnÄbhidharmasÅ«tra is often quoted in YogÄcÄra works and is assumed to also be an early YogÄcÄra sutra.Kritzer (2005), p. xii.The Laá¹ kÄvatÄra SÅ«tra also later assumed considerable importance in East Asia, and portions of this text were considered by Ãtienne Lamotte as being contemporaneous with the Saá¹dhinirmocana.Fernando Tola, Carmen Dragonetti. Being as Consciousness: YogÄcÄra Philosophy of Buddhism, p. xiiFoundations of Buddhism, by Rupert Gethin. Oxford University Press: 1998. {{ISBN|0-19-289223-1}} This text equates the YogÄcÄra theory of ÄlayavijñÄna with the tathÄgatagarbha (buddha-nature) and thus seems to be part of the tradition which sought to merge YogÄcÄra with tathÄgatagarbha thought.Williams, 2008, p. 103. Another sutra which contains similar themes to the Laá¹ kÄvatÄra is the GhanavyÅ«ha SÅ«tra.Harris, Ian Charles (1991). The Continuity of Madhyamaka and YogÄcÄra in Indian MahÄyÄna Buddhism, p. 78. BRILL.WEB, GhanavyÅ«hasÅ«tra - Buddha-Nature,weblink 2023-08-07, buddhanature.tsadra.org, All these five sutras are listed by Kuiji as key sutras for the YogÄcÄra school in his Commentary on the Cheng weishi lun (æå¯è è«è¿°è¨; TaishÅ no. 1830).T1830 æå¯èè«è¿°è¨ [T43.229c29-230a1, CBETA]BOOK, Shih, Jen-Kuan,weblink Doctrinal Connection Between Panjiao Schemata and Human Capacity for Enlightenment in Jizang's and Kuiji's Thought, 2006, University of Wisconsin--Madison, en, Another lesser known sutra which was important in East Asian YogÄcÄra is the Buddha Land Sutra (BuddhabhÅ«mi-sÅ«tra; TaishÅ vol. 16, no. 680) which along with its commentary (BuddhabhÅ«myupadeÅa), teaches that the pure land is not a physical place, but a symbol for wisdom.Keenan, John P. The Interpretation of the Buddha Land, BDK English Tripitaka, Numata Center for Buddhist Translation & Research, 2006.There are also various Indian, Chinese and Tibetan commentaries to these various Mahayana sutras. Furthermore, the Prajñaparamita sutras are also important sources in YogÄcÄra, even though most do not cover specifically "YogÄcÄra" doctrines. This is shown by the fact that various YogÄcÄra commentaries were written on Prajñaparamita sutras, including commentaries by Asanga (VajracchedikÄkÄvyÄkhyÄ), Vasubandhu, DignÄga, Daá¹á¹£á¹rasena (Bá¹haá¹á¹Ä«kÄ), RatnÄkaraÅÄnti (various), and the AbhisamayÄlaá¹ kÄra.Makransky, John J. (1997). Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet, p. 10. SUNY. {{ISBN|0-7914-3431-1}}. â a study of interpretations of the Abhisamayalankara.Brunnhölzl, Karl (2014). "The Meditative Tradition of the Uttaratantra and Shentong". When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between SÅ«tra and Tantra. Boston: Snow Lion Publications. pp. 123â50.Treatises
File:Asanga.JPG|thumb|upright|Tibetan depiction of Asaá¹ ga receiving teachings from the bodhisattva MaitreyaMaitreyaYogÄcÄra authors wrote numerous scholastic and philosophical treatises (ÅÄstra) and commentaries (á¹Ä«kÄ, bhÄá¹£ya, vyÄkhyÄna, etc). The following is a list in historical order and only includes specifically YogÄcÄra-VijñÄnavÄda figures and works:Williams (2008), pp. 87-88.Brunnholzl, Karl. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature pp. 10-11. Snow Lion Publications, The Nitartha Institute (2009).- YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi-ÅÄstra, the earliest YogÄcÄra treatise, a massive encyclopedic work on YogÄcÄra theory and praxis which is a composite work reflecting various stages of historical development (compiled 3rd to 5th century CE).Kritzer (2005), p. xvii, xix.
- MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlamkÄra and its bhÄá¹£ya, traditionally attributed to the bodhisattva Maitreya or Asanga, modern scholars like D'amato place this text (together with the commentary) after the Bodhisattvabhumi, but before Asanga.DâAMATO, M. âTHREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGÄCÄRA âTRISVABHÄVAâ-THEORY.â Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185â207. JSTOR,weblink Accessed 16 Feb. 2024.
- MadhyÄntavibhÄga (Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes), another work of the "second phase" of post-YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi YogÄcÄra thought, traditionally attributed to the bodhisattva Maitreya who is said to have revealed it to Asanga.DâAMATO, M. âTHREE NATURES, THREE STAGES: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE YOGÄCÄRA âTRISVABHÄVAâ-THEORY.â Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2005, pp. 185â207. JSTOR,weblink Accessed 16 Feb. 2024.
- DharmadharmatÄvibhÄga (Distinguishing Dharmas and Dharmata), another work of the so called "Maitreya corpus"
- NÄgamitra's (3rd-4th century?) KÄyatrayÄvatÄramukha (a treatise on the trikaya and the three natures)
- The works of Asaá¹ ga (4th-5th century CE): the MahÄyÄnasaá¹graha and the Abhidharma-samuccaya.Lugli, Ligeia, Asaá¹ ga, oxfordbibliographies.com, LAST MODIFIED: 25 NOVEMBER 2014, DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195393521-0205.
- Vasubandhu's (4th-5th century CE) Viá¹Åaá¹ikÄ-kÄrikÄ (Treatise in Twenty Stanzas), Triá¹ÅikÄ-kÄrikÄ (Treatise in Thirty Stanzas), VyÄkhyÄyukti ("Proper Mode of Exposition"), Karmasiddhiprakarana ("A Treatise on Karma"), and Pañcaskandhaprakaraá¹a (Explanation of the Five Aggregates).{{sfn|Kalupahana|1992|p=126}}
- ÄlokamÄlÄprakaraá¹anÄma (An Explanation named 'Garland of Light') by Kambala (c. fifth to sixth century) which attempts to harmonize Madhyamaka and YogÄcÄra, mostly by assimilating Madhyamaka under YogÄcÄra.Brunnholzl, Karl. Luminous Heart: The Third Karmapa on Consciousness, Wisdom, and Buddha Nature p. 9. Snow Lion Publications, The Nitartha Institute (2009).
- The Saá¹dhinirmocanasÅ«travyÄkhyÄna is a commentary to the Saá¹dhinirmocanasÅ«tra attributed to Asanga, but this has been questioned by modern scholars.Lugli, Ligeia, Asaá¹ ga, oxfordbibliographies.com, LAST MODIFIED: 25 NOVEMBER 2014, DOI: 10.1093/OBO/9780195393521-0205.
- AbhisamayÄlaá¹ kÄra (Ornament of Realization), a commentary on the Prajñaparamita sutras. It is attributed to Maitreya-Asanga by Tibetan tradition, but it is unknown in Chinese sources. Modern scholars see this as a post-Asanga text. Makransky attributes it to Ärya Vimuktisena, the first commentator on this text.Makransky, John J. Buddhahood Embodied: Sources of Controversy in India and Tibet SUNY Press, 1997, p. 187.Brunnholzl, Karl, When the Clouds Part: The Uttaratantra and Its Meditative Tradition as a Bridge between Sutra and Tantra, Shambhala Publications, 2015, p. 81.
- DignÄga's ÄlambanaparÄ«ká¹£Ä and its vrtti (commentary) defend the view of consciousness-only using epistemological arguments
- The Indian ParamÄrtha (499â569) translated many works to Chinese, and also wrote some original treatises and commentaries, possibly including the BuddhagotraÅÄstra (Fo Xing Lun)
- Sthiramati (6th century), wrote numerous commentaries like PañcaskandhakavibhÄá¹£Ä and Triá¹ÅikÄvijñaptibhÄá¹£ya
- Mahayana Awakening of Faith (author unknown)
- Dharmapala of Nalanda (6th century), wrote commentaries to the ÄlambanaparÄ«ká¹£Ä and Äryadeva's CatuḥÅataka
- AsvabhÄva, wrote MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄra-á¹Ä«kÄ, MahÄyÄnasaá¹grahopanibandhana and a commentary on ÄlokamÄlÄ
- DharmakÄ«rti's (6th or 7th century) PramÄnaṿÄrttika (Commentary on Epistemology), is mostly a work on pramana, but it also argues for consciousness-only
- ÅÄ«labhadra (529â645) - BuddhabhÅ«mivyÄkhyÄna
- Xuanzang's (602-664) Cheng Wei Shi Lun is a large Chinese commentary on the Triá¹ÅikÄ which draws on numerous Indian sources
- Kuiji (632â682) - Various commentaries on texts like Cheng weishi lun, Heart-sutra, MadhyÄntavibhÄga etc.
- WÅnch'Åk (613â696) - Commentaries on the Samdhinirmocanasutra, Heart-sutra, and Benevolent King Sutra
- WÅnhyo (617â686) - wrote commentaries on various works such as the MadhyÄntavibhÄga
- Guá¹aprabha - BodhisattvabhÅ«miÅÄ«laparivarta-bhÄá¹£ya
- Jinaputra, wrote a commentary to the Abhidharmasamucchaya
- CandragomÄ« (sixth/seventh century) - Åiá¹£yalekha, Bodhisattvasaá¹varaviá¹saka
- VinÄ«tadeva (c. 645â715) - wrote commentaries on Viá¹ÅatikÄ, Triá¹Åika and ÄlambanaparÄ«kÅÄ
- JñÄnacandra (eighth century) - YogacaryÄbhÄvanÄtÄtparyÄrthanirdeÅa, a meditation manual
- SÄgaramegha (eighth century) - YogÄcÄrabhÅ«maubodhisattvabhÅ«mivyÄkhyÄ, a large YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi commentary
- SumatiÅÄ«la (late eighth century) wrote a commentary on Vasubandhu's Karmasiddhiprakaraá¹a
- Prajñakaragupta (8th-9th century) - PramÄá¹avÄrttikÄlaá¹kÄra and SahÄvalambanirá¹ayasiddhi, a proof of idealism
- Åaá¹ karanandana (fl. c. 9th or 10th century) - PrajñÄlaá¹ kÄra (Ornament of Wisdom), an exposition of vijñaptimÄtratÄ "Åaá¹ karanandana" in Silk, Jonathan A (editor in chief). Brill's Encyclopedia of Buddhism Volume II: Lives.
- DharmakÄ«rti of Sumatra - DurbodhÄlokÄ (Light on the Hard-to-Illuminate), a sub-commentary to the AbhisamayÄlaá¹kÄra-ÅÄstra-vá¹tti of Haribhadra.Sinclair, Iain. Dharmakirti of Kedah: His, life, work and troubled times. Temasek Working Paper No. 2: 2021. Temasek History Research Centre ISEAS â Yusof Ishak Institute
- JñÄnaÅrÄ«mitra (fl. 975-1025 C.E.) - SÄkarasiddhi, SÄkarasaá¹graha, and SarvajñÄsiddhi
- RatnakÄ«rti (11th century CE) - RatnakÄ«rtinibandhÄvalÄ« and SarvajñÄsiddhi
- RatnÄkÄraÅÄnti (10-11th century) - PrajñÄpÄramitopadeÅa, MadhyamakÄlaá¹kÄropadeÅa, VijñaptimÄtratÄsiddhi, TriyÄnavyavasthÄna, MadhyamakÄlaá¹kÄravá¹tti-MadhyamapratipadÄsiddhi
- JñÄnaÅrÄ«bhadra - commentaries on Laá¹ kÄvatÄrasÅ«tra, MahÄyÄnasÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄra, and PramÄá¹avÄrttika
- Sajjana (11th century) - Putralekha, MahÄyÄnottaratantraÅÄstropadeÅa and SÅ«trÄlaá¹kÄrapiá¹á¸Ärtha
- JÅkei (1155â1213) - Gumei hosshin shÅ« (Anthology of Awakenings from Delusion)
- RyÅhen (1194â1252) - Kanjin kakumushÅ (Précis on Contemplating the Mind and Awakening from the Dream)
See also
Notes
{{reflist|group=lower-alpha}}{{reflist|group=note}}References
{{Reflist|30em}}Sources
- Bayer, Achim (2012). weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20140714232918weblink">Addenda and Corrigenda to The Theory of Karman in the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 2012 Hamburg: Zentrum für Buddhismuskunde.
- {{Citation | last =Kalupahana | first =David J. | year =1992 | title =The Principles of Buddhist Psychology | place =Delhi | publisher =ri Satguru Publications }}
- Keenan, John P. (1993). YogÄcarÄ. pp. 203â212 published in Yoshinori, Takeuchi; with Van Bragt, Jan; Heisig, James W.; O'Leary, Joseph S.; Swanson, Paul L.(1993). Buddhist Spirituality: Indian, Southeast Asian, Tibetan, and Early Chinese. New York City: The Crossroad Publishing Company. {{ISBN|0-8245-1277-4}}
- JOURNAL, King, Richard, Vijnaptimatrata and the Abhidharma context of early Yogacara, Asian Philosophy, 1998, 8, 1, 5â18, 10.1080/09552369808575468,weblink
- {{Citation | last =Kochumuttom | first =Thomas A. | year =1999 | title =A buddhist Doctrine of Experience. A New Translation and Interpretation of the Works of Vasubandhu the Yogacarin | place =Delhi | publisher =Motilal Banarsidass}}
- Norbu, Namkhai (2001), The Precious Vase: Instructions on the Base of Santi Maha Sangha. Shang Shung Edizioni. Second revised edition. (Translated from the Tibetan, edited and annotated by Adriano Clemente with the help of the author. Translated from Italian into English by Andy Lukianowicz.)
- {{Citation | last =Park | first =Sung-bae | year =1983 | title =Buddhist Faith and Sudden Enlightenment | publisher =SUNY Press}}
- Shantarakshita & Ju Mipham (2005). The Adornment of the Middle Way Padmakara Translation of Ju Mipham's commentary on Shantarakshita's root versus on his synthesis.
- Sponberg, Alan (1979). Dynamic Liberation in Yogacara Buddhism, Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies 2(1), pp. 44â64.
- Stcherbatsky, Theodore (1936). weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20140130111607weblink">Mathyanta-Vibhanga, "Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes" ascribed to Bodhisattva Maiteya and commented by Vasubhandu and Sthiramathi, translated from the sanscrit, Academy of Sciences USSR Press, Moscow/Leningrad.
- Timme Kragh, Ulrich (editor) 2013, The Foundation for Yoga Practitioners: The Buddhist YogÄcÄrabhÅ«mi Treatise and Its Adaptation in India, East Asia, and Tibet, Volume 1 Harvard University, Department of South Asian studies.
- Zim, Robert (1995). Basic ideas of Yogacara Buddhism. San Francisco State University. Source: weblink (accessed: October 18, 2007).
External links
- Uncompromising Idealism or the School of VijñÄnavÄda Buddhism, Surendranath Dasgupta, 1940
- "Early Yogaacaara and Its Relationship with the Madhyamaka School", Richard King, Philosophy East & West, vol. 44 no. 4, October 1994, pp. 659â683
- "The mind-only teaching of Ching-ying Hui-Yuan" (subtitle) "An early interpretation of Yogaacaara thought in China", Ming-Wood Liu, Philosophy East & West, vol. 35 no. 4, October 1985, pp. 351â375
- Yogacara Buddhism Research Association; articles, bibliographies, and links to other relevant sites.
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