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{{short description|1965 war between India and Pakistan}}{{pp|small=yes}}{{More citations needed|date=January 2024}}{{Use British English|date=January 2012}}{{Use dmy dates|date=March 2022}}

factoids

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• Kashmir
• Punjab
• Rajasthan
• Bengal{{citation |last=Nordeen |first=Lon O. |title=Air Warfare in the Missile Age |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=1K5qBgAAQBAJ&pg=PT149 |year=1985 |publisher=Smithsonian Institution Press |isbn=978-0-87474-680-8 |pages=68–69|archive-date=7 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207172510weblink |url-status=live }}

}}Status quo ante bellum>No territorial changes per ceasefire terms#Aftermath>Aftermath section| combatant1 = {{IND}}| combatant2 = {{PAK}}Lal Bahadur ShastriJayanto Nath Chaudhuri>J. N. ChaudhuriArjan SinghJoginder Singh DhillonHarbaksh SinghHar Kishan SibalZorawar Chand Bakshi>Z. C. BakshiMuhammad Ayub KhanMuhammad Musa (general)>Muhammad MusaNur KhanAkhtar Hussain MalikYahya KhanAbrar Hussain (general)>Abrar HussainS. M. Anwar| strength1 = 700,000 infantry (whole army)700+ aircraft{{sfn|T. V. Paul|1994|p=107}}720 tanksWEB, Rakshak, Bharat, Page 15,weblink Official History, Times of India, 14 July 2011, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20110609073650weblink">weblink 9 June 2011,

• 186 Centurions
• 346 Shermans
• 90 AMX-13
• 90 PT-76

628 ArtilleryBOOK, SIngh, Lt.Gen Harbaksh, War Despatches, 1991, Lancer International, New Delhi, 978-81-7062-117-1, 7,

• 66x 3.7" How
• 450x 25pdr
• 96x 5.5"
• 16x 7.2"

Effective strength on the West Pakistan BorderWEB, Rakshak, Bharat, Page 14,weblink Official History, Times of India, 14 July 2011, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20110609073650weblink">weblink 9 June 2011,

• 9 Infantry divisions (4 under-strength)
• 3 Armored brigades| strength2 = 260,000 infantry (whole army)

280 aircraft{{sfn|T. V. Paul|1994|p=107}} 756 tanks

• 352 Pattons
• 308 Shermans
• 96 Chaffees

552 Artillery

• 72x 105mm How
• 234x 25pdr
• 126x 155mm How
• 48x 8" How
• 72x 3.7" How
• AK Lt Btys

Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border

• 6 Infantry divisions
• 2 Armored divisions

Neutral claimsTHOMAS M. LEONARDURL=HTTPS://BOOKS.GOOGLE.COM/BOOKS?ID=PWRJGZ9H7HYC&PG=PA806YEAR=2006ISBN=978-0-415-97663-3ARCHIVE-DATE=5 FEBRUARY 2023URL-STATUS=LIVE, INDO-PAKISTAN WARS >URL=HTTP://UK.ENCARTA.MSN.COM/ENCYCLOPEDIA_781531179/INDO-PAKISTAN_WARS.HTML ARCHIVE-DATE=8 MAY 2009, dead,

• 3,000 men
• 150BOOK, Tucker, Spencer, Tanks: An Illustrated History of Their Impact,weblink 2004, ABC-CLIO, 978-1-57607-995-9, 172, 15 November 2015, 5 February 2023,weblink live, –190 tanks
• 60–75 aircraft
• 540 km2 (210 mi2) of territory lost (primarily in Kashmir){{sfn|Praagh|2003|p=294}}{{sfn|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=86}}| casualties2 = Neutral claims
• 3,800 men
• 200-300 Tanks
• 20 aircraft
• Over 1,840 km2 (710 mi2) of territory lost (in Sindh, Lahore, Sialkot, and Kashmir sectors){{sfn|Praagh|2003|p=294}}{{sfn|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=86}}| campaignbox = {{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani War of 1965}}

{{Campaignbox Indo-Pakistani Wars}}}}The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, also known as the second India–Pakistan war, was an armed conflict between Pakistan and India that took place from August 1965 to September 1965. The conflict began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar,BOOK, Montgomery, Evan Braden,weblink In the Hegemon's Shadow: Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, 24 May 2016, Cornell University Press, 978-1-5017-0400-0, en, 22 September 2021,weblink 7 February 2023, live, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule.JOURNAL, Hali, S. M., 2011, Operation Gibraltar – an unmitigated disaster?, Defence Journal, 15, 1–2, 10–34, EBSCO, The seventeen-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.{{sfn|David R. Higgins|2016}}{{sfn|Rachna Bisht|2015}} Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.BOOK, Lyon, Peter, Conflict between India and Pakistan: an encyclopedia,weblink 30 October 2011, 2008, ABC-CLIO, 978-1-57607-712-2, 82, 7 February 2023,weblink live, Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations.India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared.BOOK, Dijink, Gertjan, National Identity and Geopolitical Visions: Maps of Pride and Pain, 2002, Routledge, 978-1-134-77129-5, The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts., {{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=331}}BOOK,weblink Pakistan :: The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America, April 1994, 2 October 2010, 7 January 2016,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20160107081241weblink">weblink live, "Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan."BOOK, Hagerty, Devin,weblink South Asia in world politics, Rowman & Littlefield, 2005, 978-0-7425-2587-0, 26, 12 November 2020,weblink 7 February 2023, live, Quote: The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time the United Nations intervened on 20 September, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.BOOK, Wolpert, Stanley, India, 2005, University of California Press, Berkeley, 978-0-520-24696-6, 235,weblink 3rd ed. with a new preface., 15 November 2015, 17 January 2023,weblink live, Quote: India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.BOOK, Dennis, Kux, India and the United States : Estranged democracies, 1941–1991, 1992, National Defense University Press, Washington, DC, 978-0-7881-0279-0, 238,weblink 15 November 2015, 17 January 2023,weblink live, Quote: India had the best of the war.NEWS, Asia: Silent Guns, Wary Combatants,weblink 30 August 2013, Time, 1 October 1965, 7 January 2016,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20160107081241weblink">weblink live, Quote: India, by contrast, is still the big gainer in the war. Alternate link content.time.com {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181102234444weblink |date=2 November 2018 }} Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,BOOK, Kux, Dennis, India-Pakistan Negotiations: Is Past Still Prologue?, 2006, US Institute of Peace Press, 978-1-929223-87-9, 30, The conflict was short, but nasty. After seventeen days, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. Although the two militaries fought to a standoff, India won by not losing., {{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=331}}BOOK, Small, Andrew, 2015, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press, 17, 978-0-19-021075-5, "… the war itself was a disaster for Pakistan, from the first failed attempts by Pakistani troops to precipitate an insurgency in Kashmir to the appearance of Indian artillery within range of Lahore International Airport."Profile of Pakistan {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180802172621weblink |date=2 August 2018 }} â€“ U.S. Department of State, Failure of U.S.'s Pakistan Policy {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100712135816weblink |date=12 July 2010 }} â€“ Interview with Steve CollSpeech of Bill McCollum {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304140925weblink |date=4 March 2016 }} in United States House of Representatives 12 September 1994South Asia in World Politics By Devin T. Hagerty, 2005 Rowman & Littlefield, {{ISBN|0-7425-2587-2}}, p. 26 as it had not succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=315}} However, in terms of aerial warfare, the PAF managed an upper hand over the combat zones despite being numerically inferior.BOOK, Behind the Scene:An Analysis of India's Military Operations, 1947-1971, 238, Jogindar Singh, 1993, In the final analysis Pakistan maintained air superiority over the combat zones from 6 September onwards, BOOK, Careful analysis available in the public domain tends to list IAF losses as sixty-five aircraft to all causes and PAF losses at twenty-five aircraft….Finally, there was agreement that the losses suffered by the IAF were not commensurate with the value gained in terms of the effect on the adversary and its combat efficiency., Routledge Handbook of Air Power, John Andreas Olsen, 2018, Routledge, BOOK, point that the PAF's superior strategy enabled it to win air superiority by 5 September bears serious consideration. The preemptive air strike over the Indian air fields and the subsequent provocation of the IAF to fight over the heavily defended Pakistani airfields did indeed result in heavy attrition of the IAF's aircraft., Conventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the present, Kaushik Roy, 2017, Routledge, BOOK,weblink Air Power:A Global History, Jeremy Black, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2016, 9781442250970, In the brief 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the two air forces were heavily engaged. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was able to inflict greater casualties despite being smaller. This owed much to the technical superiority of the PAF's F-86 Sabres over the IAF's Hunters and Mysteres., India failed to achieve its objective of military deterrence.JOURNAL, Tarapore, Arzan, 2023-01-02, Defence without deterrence: India's strategy in the 1965 war,weblink Journal of Strategic Studies, en, 46, 1, 150–179, 10.1080/01402390.2019.1668274, 211312207, 0140-2390, WEB, Awan, Ayesha Azmat, 2022-09-07, Looking back at India's failed strategy in 1965 War,weblink 2023-07-27, Global Village Space, en-GB, Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent.BOOK, Riedel, Bruce, 2013, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings Institution Press, 67–70, 978-0-8157-2408-7, Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=324-326}} As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=324-326}} The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. Despite improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers until now.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=350-353}}{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=360-363}}BOOK, Riedel, Bruce, 2013, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings Institution Press, 69–70, 978-0-8157-2408-7, "The legacy of the Johnson arms cut-off remains alive today. Indians simply do not believe that America will be there when India needs military help â€¦ the legacy of the U.S. “betrayal” still haunts U.S.-Pakistan relations today."

Background

Since the partition of British India in August 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956, which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area.BOOK, Brecher, Michael,weblink A study of crisis, Wilkenfeld, Jonathan, November 1997, University of Michigan Press, 978-0-472-10806-0, 170–172, 3 November 2011, In the 1960s Pakistan received 700 million dollars of military aid from the United States, by signing a defense agreement in 1954, which significantly modernized Pakistan's military equipment.BOOK, Thomas, Raju G. C.,weblink Indian Security Policy: Foreword by Joseph S. Nye, 14 July 2014, Princeton University Press, 978-1-4008-5819-4, 21, en, The transfer of American arms under these two pacts included… Patton… Star fighter…Sabre…Canberra…estimated about $700 million., 8 March 2022, 7 February 2023,weblink live, MAGAZINE, 8 May 2011, The Double Game,weblink 26 February 2022, The New Yorker, en-US, 20 March 2022,weblink live, "India and the United States estranged democracies", 1941–1991, {{ISBN|1-4289-8189-6}}, DIANE Publishing, pp 235, 238 After the defeat in 1962 Sino-Indian War, the Indian military was undergoing massive changes both in personnel and equipment. During this period, despite being numerically smaller than the Indian Military, Pakistan's armed forces had a qualitative edge in air power and armor over India, which Pakistan sought to utilize before India completed its defense build-up.JOURNAL, SCHOFIELD, JULIAN, 2000, Militarized Decision-Making for War in Pakistan: 1947-1971,weblink Armed Forces & Society, 27, 1, 140, 10.1177/0095327X0002700108, 45346403, 144532810, 0095-327X, …and the balance of military capabilities: India was in the early stages of a military buildup against China, which prompted Pakistani military decision-makers to exploit what they saw as a window of opportunity., 14 May 2022, 14 May 2022,weblink live, File:1965 Infiltrators.jpg|thumb|left|A declassified US State Department letter that confirms the existence of hundreds of “infiltrators” in the Indian-administered part of the disputed Kashmir region. Dated during the events running up to the 1965 war.]](File:Azad Kashmiri Irregular Militiamen, 1965 War.jpg|thumb|Azad Kashmiri Irregular Militiamen, 1965 War)(File:Colorized Image of a Pakistani Azad Kashmiri militiaman.jpg|thumb|Colorized Image of a Pakistani Azad Kashmiri militiaman)Pakistani soldiers began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each other's posts on 8 April 1965.NEWS, Pak's intrusions on borders triggered 1965 war: Durrani, Press Trust of India, Islamabad bureau,weblink Times of India, 14 September 2009, 3 November 2011, 22 September 2009,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20090922182534weblink">weblink live, Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. Pakistan launched Operation Desert Hawk and captured a few Indian posts near the Kanjarkot fort border area.BOOK, Hiro, Dilip,weblink The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan, 24 February 2015, Nation Books, Hiro, 9781568585031, OPERATION DESERT HAWK: A DRY RUN, en, 19 October 2016, 7 February 2023,weblink live, In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities. Both countries signed an agreement to settle the disputed border through international arbitration by the International Court of Justice on 30 June 1965.BOOK, Dutt, Sagarika,weblink South Asian Security: 21st Century Discourses, Bansal, Alok, 2013-06-17, Routledge, 978-1-136-61767-6, en, BOOK, Hiro, Dilip,weblink The Longest August: The Unflinching Rivalry Between India and Pakistan, 24 February 2015, Nation Books, Hiro, 9781568585031, OPERATION DESERT HAWK: A DRY RUN, en, 19 October 2016, A tribunal was set to resolve the dispute, the verdict which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded {{convert|301|mi2|km2|order=flip|abbr=off}} of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of {{convert|3500|sqmi|km2|sigfig=2|order=flip|abbr=on}}.Bhushan, Chodarat. “Tulbul, Sir Creek and Siachen: Competitive Methodologies” {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060421095412weblink |date=21 April 2006}}. South Asian Journal. March 2005, Encyclopædia Britannica and Open Forum â€“ UNIDIR {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060327071528weblink |date=27 March 2006}}WEB,weblink Pakistan Boundaries – Flags, Maps, Economy, History, Climate, Natural Resources, Current Issues, International Agreements, Population, Social Statistics, Political System, WEB, The Lahore Declaration and Beyond: Maritime Confidence-Building Measures in South Asia,weblink 11 September 2023, Stimson Center, WEB,weblink LAND AND GEOGRAPHY OF PAKISTAN: BIG MOUNTAINS, GLACIERS AND DISPUTED TERRITORY | Facts and Details, Pakistan's purpose of this operation was to assess the response of the Indian government and militaryBOOK, Hiranandani, G. M.,weblink Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975, 2000, Lancer Publishers, 978-1-897829-72-1, 21, en, and to draw Indian armor southward to Kutch, away from the Punjab and Kashmir region.BOOK, Hiranandani, G. M.,weblink Transition to Triumph: History of the Indian Navy, 1965-1975, 2000, Lancer Publishers, 978-1-897829-72-1, 21, en, After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of Muhammad Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} in the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule, and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs.

War

Operation Gibraltar

On 5 August 1965, Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. These infiltrators carried out intelligence collection with the help of locals in cities like Gulmarg and Rajouri.{{Sfn|Pradhan|2007|p=5}} Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, captured several Pakistani soldiers who revealed that Pakistan was attempting to ignite the resistance movement employing a covert infiltration, code-named Operation Gibraltar.Defence Journal. September 2000{{Full citation needed|date=January 2024}}The operation was eventually unsuccessful.BOOK, Mankekar, D. R.,weblink Twentytwo fateful days: Pakistan cut to size, Manaktalas, 1967, 62–63, 67, 8 November 2011, On 6 and 7 August, Indian forces engaged in skirmishes with several columns of Pakistani soldiers, who tried to cut communication lines and mix with the locals during celebrations.{{Sfn|Pradhan|2007|p=5}}Indian Army crossed the cease fire line on 15 August and captured several previously infiltrated peaks overlooking the Srinagar – Leh Highway.WEB, Battle of Hajipir Pass 1965,weblink 29 August 2020, Indian Defence Review, Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch.

Haji Pir passs

Wishing to stop the influx of Pakistani forces into the Uri-Poonch bulge, COAS Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri commanded the XV Corps under Lt Gen K. S. Katoch to advance and take over Haji Pir pass. Under the watch of Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh, led by Brig. ZC Bakshi of the 68 Infantry Brigade, Indian forces captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir by 28 August.WEB,weblink Giving Haji Pir back to Pak a mistake: Gen Dyal, 28 May 2015, 1 April 2020,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20200401052737weblink">weblink live,

Chhamb offensive

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that “Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place”WEB,weblink Underestimating India, Indian Express, 4 September 2009, 21 December 2011, 26 December 2018,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20181226142615weblink">weblink live, WEB,weblink Pakistan's Endgame in Kashmir – Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Carnegieendowment.org, 21 December 2011, 26 December 2018,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20181226142602weblink">weblink live, WEB,weblink Indian Air Force :: Flight of the Falcon, Bharat-rakshak.com, 28 August 2010, 21 December 2011, 26 December 2018,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20181226142618weblink">weblink live, although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass.Commander of the Western army, Lt Gen Harbaksh Singh had suggested after the capture of Haji Pir, that Pakistani forces would carry out a major offensive in the Chumb plain to advance and capture a strategically important location in Akhnoor to cut Indian supply lines but after a meeting with CAOS Chaudhari, the area was not reinforced. Instead, XV Corps under Lt Gen Katoch was tasked with securing Nowshera.{{sfn|Pradhan|2007|p=11}}At 03:30 on 1 September 1965, the entire Chumb area came under massive artillery bombardment as Pakistan had commenced the Operation Grand Slam. India's Army Headquarters was taken surprised.{{sfn |Pradhan|2007|p=12}} Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces under the command of Maj Gen A. H. Malik, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. Maj Gen Mailk was then replaced by Maj Gen Yahya Khan by C-in-C Gen Muhammad Musa who authorized Maj Gen Khan to advance deeper into Indian Territory.{{sfn|Pradhan|2007|p=10}}{{sfn|Pradhan|2007|p=30}} India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated with its air force and attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India then decided to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab and forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the Chumb operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war, when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of strategic importance was Kargil. Kargil town was in Indian hands, but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August.{{sfn |Pradhan|2007|p=10}}

Icchogil Canal

{{anchor|Battle of Ichhogil Canal}}India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September.NEWS,weblink 1965: Indian Army invades W Pakistan, 6 September 1965, 26 June 2018, 9 March 2020,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20200309023155weblink">weblink live, President Ayub Khan, on the same day, declared a state of emergency through radio broadcast proclaiming that Pakistan was in a state of war with India.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=140-141}} On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Niranjan Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Icchogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was an in fact border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed, and he was forced to flee his vehicle.

Battle of Burki

The 7th Infantry Division under the command of Maj Gen Har Kishan Sibal attempted an offensive on canal on 6th September. The forces advanced through Khalra-Barki- Lahore road and reached Barki by 7th September. The forces engaged heavily at the Battle of Burki. The battle involved the air forces, armored, infantry divisions and artillery brigades from both sides. The town fell by the 11 September. A great amount of Pakistani ammunition was captured from Barki which helped Indian forces after the battle.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=156-157}}{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=155-156}} The Indian artillery stood within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=150}}

Battle of Dograi

(File:Indo-Pakistani War of 1965.jpg|left|thumb|Pakistani Sherman medium tanks and infantry push forward while under fire.)The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. {{anchor|Battle of Dograi}}3rd Jat battalion was the first Indian unit to cross the Icchogil canal and capture it alongside Dograi.Brigadier Desmond E Hayde, "The Battle of Dograi and Batapore”, Natraj Publishers, New Delhi, 2006 The same day, a counteroffensive consisting of an armored division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jats suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and store vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jats' capture of Dograi and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointmentThe Tribune, Chandigarh, India – Opinions {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190810162805weblink |date=10 August 2019}}. Tribuneindia.com. Retrieved on 14 April 2011. to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of the 3 Jats. Dograi was eventually recaptured by the three Jats on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements, in the Battle of Dograi.WEB,weblink Indian Army's Continuity and Transformation Through the Prism of the Battle of Dograi, Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 7 December 2021, 7 March 2022,weblink live, {{anchor|Battle of Munnabao}}On 8 September 1965, a company of five Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao â€“ a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometers from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened â€“ the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of three Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.Army cries out for a second railway line between Barmer and Jaisalmer {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605102845weblink |date=5 June 2011}}. Hindustan Times (17 December 2009). Retrieved on 14 April 2011.

Sialkot offensive

Battle of Phillora

On the days following 9 September, India's 1st Armoured Division under Major General Rajinder Singh advanced towards Sialkot with the intention to capture the sector and was met with Pakistan's 6th Armoured Division under Maj Gen Abrar Hussain. They first engaged in the town of Phillora. Failure on the Pakistani side to cause damage to the Indian advance forced the 6th Armoured Division to retreat to the town of Chawinda on 11 September and the Battle of Phillora was an Indian success.Zaloga, Steve (1999) The M47 and M48 Patton tanks {{ISBN|1-85532-825-9}} pg.34-35. Pakistan lost 66 tanks in the battle while India only lost 6.BOOK, Prabhakar, Peter Wilson,weblink Wars, proxy-wars and terrorism: post independent India, Mittal Publications, 2003, 2003, 978-81-7099-890-7, 84, BOOK, James Rapson, Edward, The Cambridge History of India, Wolseley Haig, Sir Richard Burn, Richard Burn (Indologist), Henry Dodwell, Robert Eric Mortimer Wheeler, Vidya Dhar Mahajan, Vidya Dhar Mahajan, S. Chand, 6, 1013, Political Developments Since 1919 (India and Pakistan), BOOK, Singh, Lt.Gen Harbaksh, War Despatches, Lancer International, 1991, 81-7062-117-8, New Delhi, 147,

Battle of Chawinda

The Pakistani I Corps under the command of Lt Gen Bakhtiar Rana and the 6th Armoured under Maj Gen Hussain engaged with the Indian I Corps commanded by the newly appointed Lieutenant General Patrick Dunn and the 1st Armoured under Rajinder Singh from 14 to 19 September in the biggest tank battle since the Battle of Kursk during the World War II. It also involved the lowest ever air battle to be fought as the Pakistani Sabre engaged with the Indian Gnats. The Indian offensive was repulsed and stopped successfully.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=172}}{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=179-180}} Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda.BOOK, Zaloga, Steve, The M47 and M48 Patton tanks, Laurier, Jim, Bloomsbury USA, 1999, 978-1-85532-825-9, 35, compared to 44 of its ownBOOK, Steven J. Zaloga,weblink The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks, Osprey Publishing, 1999, 978-1-85532-825-9, 35, But later, Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda.BOOK, Singh, Lt. Gen.Harbaksh, War Despatches, Lancer International, 1991, 978-81-7062-117-1, New Delhi, 159, WEB, Rakshak, Bharat, Operations in Sialkot Sector pg32,weblink dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20110609073555weblink">weblink 9 June 2011, 12 July 2011, Official History, Times of India, Towards the end of the Sialkot offensive, the Pakistani Armoured arsenal was left heavily damaged with more than 200 tanks destroyed and 36 captured which was very heavy compared to the Indian damages.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=183}}

Battle of Asal Uttar

On 8 September, the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division and 11 Infantry Division under the command of Maj Gen Nasir Khan pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=158-159}} India then launched a counter-offensive. After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially. The Pakistani forces engaged with an outnumbered Indian force comprising only the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade commanded by Brig Thomas K. Theogaraj, who formed a defensive horseshoe formation to counter the advancing Pakistani force.NEWS, Dandapani, Vijay, 18 January 2015, Unsung hero,weblink The Hindu, WEB, Brigadier Thomas Theograj,weblink 2023-07-13, WEB, Saga of Strategy & Courage,weblink 2023-07-13, The Pakistani tanks were larger in quantity and superior in quality and gave them a huge advantage. At the Battle of Asal Uttar, the Pakistani force fell into the Indian formation which was well positioned and well camouflaged which led to around a 97 Pakistani tanks being destroyed against only 32 tanks from the Indian side. The battle was a tremendous success for India which completely halted the Pakistani advance on the Punjab front.WEB, Saxena, sangeeta, 2021-08-14, Fifty five years since India won the Battle of Asal Uttar in 1965,weblink 2024-05-15, ADU - Aviation Defence Universe, en-US, The town where the battle was fought came to be known as Patton Nagar, named after the thoroughly destroyed US-made M48 Patton tanks in the battle. During the battle, Pakistani rail bound reinforcements were attacked and destroyed by IAF Gnats.{{sfn|Gupta|1967|p=161}}File:Pakistani Army Position, 1965 War Footage 2.png|thumb|Pakistani Army Position, MG1A3MG1A3The hostilities in the Rajasthan Front commenced on 8 September. Initially, the Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) were placed in a defensive role, a role for which they were well suited as it turned out. The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not. Fighting as mainly light infantry, the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh. The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers, harassing the Indians in the Line of Control, a task they often undertook on camels. As the battle wore on, the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside Rajasthan.History of Indo-Pak War of 1965. Lt Gen Mahmud Ahmed (Retd.). {{ISBN|969-8693-01-7}}

Stalemate

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of {{convert|1920|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held {{convert|550|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of Indian territory.WEB,weblink Delhi plans carnival on Pakistan war - Focus on 1965 conflict and outcome, 3 June 2015, 2 June 2015,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20150602092054weblink">weblink dead, The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors,The Story of My Struggle By Tajammal Hussain Malik 1991, Jang Publishers, p. 78BOOK, Arif, General K. M., Khalid Mahmud Arif, 2001, Khaki Shadows: Pakistan 1947–1997, Oxford University Press, 88, 978-0-19-579396-3, while Pakistani ground gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in the Chumb sector near Kashmir. Pakistan claims that it held {{convert|1600|km2|sqmi|abbr=on}} of Indian territory, while losing {{convert|450|sqmi|km2|order=flip|abbr=on}} of its territory.BOOK,weblink Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding, Husain, Haqqani, 5 November 2013, PublicAffairs, 9781610393171, Google Books, 18 May 2022, 7 February 2023,weblink live, BOOK, Nordeen, Lon O., Air warfare in the missile age, 2002, Smithsonian Institution Press, 978-1-58834-083-2, 2,weblink 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live, NEWS, Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan,weblink Illustrated Weekly of Pakistan, 1966, 17 June 2018, 7 February 2023,weblink live, BOOK, Grover, Verinder, Arora, Ranjana, 50 Years of Indo-Pak Relations: Chronology of events, important documents, 1947–1997, 1998, Deep and Deep Publications, 9788176290593, 43,weblink 17 June 2018, 7 February 2023,weblink live,

Aerial warfare

{{Further|Indian Air Force#Second Kashmir War 1965|Pakistan Air Force#Indo-Pakistani War of 1965}}(File:PAF Sabre being shot down in combat by an IAF Gnat in September 1965.jpg|thumb|Pakistani Sabre being shot down in combat by an Indian Gnat in September 1965 as seen from the Indian aircraft.)The war saw the aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Although the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict.{{citation needed|date=October 2019}}The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-numbered by around 5:1.John Fricker, “Pakistan's Air Power” {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120114183912weblink |date=14 January 2012}}, Flight International issue published 1969, p. 89, retrieved: 3 November 2009The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet airplanes. However, the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF's.WEB, Joshi, Sameer, 6 September 2019, 1965 India-Pakistan war: How IAF's heroes slayed PAF's superior Sabre fighter jets,weblink 24 June 2020, ThePrint, en-US, 27 June 2020,weblink live, BOOK,weblink Conventional Warfare in South Asia, 1947 to the Present, Routledge, 2017, 978-1-351-94867-8, 12 November 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live, (File:1965 War, Syed Masood Akhtar Hussaini.jpg|thumb|222x222px|Artist's depiction of Pakistani Fighter Jet)The F-86 Sabre was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed “Sabre Slayer”.See the main article Sabre Slayer for the complete list on this issue, including sources. The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres{{Efn | License-built North American F-86 Sabres with Canadian engines.}} in the 1965 war.Rakshak, Bharat. “Indian Air Force Combat Kills, Indo Pakistan War 1965.” {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061105015854weblink |date=5 November 2006}} History. Retrieved 4 November 2010.Spick 2002, p. 161. while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-104 Starfighter was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as “the pride of the PAF”. However, according to Air Commodore Sajad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being “a high-level interceptor designed to neutralize Soviet strategic bombers at altitudes above 40,000 feet (12.19 km),” rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was “unsuited to the tactical environment of the region”.Ahmad Faruqui, “The right stuff” {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100329102521weblink |date=29 March 2010 }}, Dawn News, 14 September 2009, Retrieved: 1 November 2009. Also published as “The Debt Owed” {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110612060721weblink |date=12 June 2011 }} on 16 September 2009 by [outlookindia.com] In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter.BOOK, Edward V. Coggins, Ed Coggins, Wings That Stay on,weblink 14 April 2011, 15 May 2000, Turner Publishing Company, 978-1-56311-568-4, 164–, 5 February 2023,weblink live, BOOK, Mike Spick, The Illustrated Directory of Fighters,weblink 14 April 2011, 5 August 2002, Zenith Imprint, 978-0-7603-1343-5, 161–, Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he lacked the fuel to return to his base, and was captured by the Pakistan Army. According to the pilot, he got separated from his formation due to a malfunctioning compass and radio.“1965 War, Chapter 3.” {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130706030406weblink |date=6 July 2013 }} bharat-rakshak.com. Retrieved: 4 November 2010.NEWS, Run â€¦ It's a 104.,weblink Jang News, Air Commodore M. Kaiser Tufail, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20070319114802weblink">weblink 19 March 2007, This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, presumed that Gnat was no “Sabre Slayer” when it came to dog fighting. Three Indian civilian aircraft were shot down by PAF, one of which shot down at Bhuj, Gujarat was carrying Balwantrai Mehta, chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat, total eight killed in the incident along with Balwantrai Mehta and his wife. The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much larger Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces.BOOK, Dr. Shah Alam, Pakistan Army: Modernisation, Arms Procurement and Capacity Building,weblink 11 April 2012, Vij Books India Pvt Ltd, 978-93-81411-79-7, 41, File:PAF gallery.jpg|thumb|Captured Indian Folland Gnat on display at the PAF Museum, KarachiKarachiThe two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war, and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59.WEB,weblink www.bharat-rakshak.com,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20061105001826weblink">weblink 5 November 2006, According to PAF, It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Star fighters and 20 B-57 Canberra's in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force.John Fricker, “Pakistan's Air Power”, Flight International issue published 1969, pp. 89–90. weblink {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120114183912weblink|date=14 January 2012}}, weblink {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112084257weblink|date=12 January 2012}}. Retrieved: 3 November 2009Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey, and China within 10 days of the beginning of the war.BOOK, Encyclopaedia Indica: Independent India and wars – III, 15, SS Sashi, Anmol Publications, 2008, Pakistan had been seeking urgent help from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China, for additional aircraft within 10 days of the war., The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war.The Encyclopedia of 20th Century Air Warfare Edited by Chris Bishop (amber publishing 1997, republished 2004 pages 384–387 {{ISBN|1-904687-26-1}})According to the independent sources, the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60–75. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front-line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three weeks' fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totaling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and they were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberra's from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus, 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority.BOOK, Martin W. Bowman, 30 January 2016, Cold War Jet Combat: Air-to-Air Jet Fighter Operations, 1950–1972,weblink 3. Indo-Pak wars, Pen and Sword Books, Pen and Sword, 978-1-4738-7462-6, 18 August 2021, 7 February 2023,weblink live, After the war, India's Chief of Air Staff Marshal Arjan Singh claimed that IAF was able to achieve air superiority within 3 days of the Pakistani air strikes.WEB, Desk, India TV News, 2015-10-04, We achieved air superiority in three days in 1965 war: AF Marshal Arjan Singh,weblink 2024-05-16, www.indiatvnews.com, en, However, according to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge”. When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a “decade's experience with the Sabre” and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War.BOOK, Werrell, Kenneth, Sabres Over MiG Alley: The F-86 and the Battle for Air Superiority in Korea, 2013, Naval Institute Press, 978-1-61251-344-7, 188, However, his claims were never confirmed by the PAF and is disputed by Indian sources30 Seconds Over Sargodha – The Making of a Myth: 1965 Indo-Pak Air War, Chapter 5 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20100207194926weblink |date=7 February 2010 }}, Bharat RakshakPakistan's Sabre Ace by Jon Guttman, Aviation History, Sept 1998.BOOK, Singh, Pushpindar, Fiza Ya, Psyche of the Pakistan Air Force, Himalayan Books, 1991, 978-81-7002-038-7, 30, and some PAF officials.WEB,weblink War of attrition, 14 September 2015, 26 March 2016, 14 October 2017,weblink live, WEB,weblink Flight of the Falcon, S. Sajad, Haider, www.bharat-rakshak.com, 26 March 2016, 27 March 2016,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20160327024555weblink">weblink live, BOOK, Haider, Sayed Sajad, Flight of the Falcon, 2009, Vanguard Books, 978-969-402-526-1,

Usage of tanks in battle

File:M48 Patton.jpg|left|thumb|A Pakistani M48A1 Patton tank advances in Chamb sector of Kashmir during Operation Grand SlamOperation Grand SlamThe 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, and better equipment overall.A history of the Pakistan Army {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060907070325weblink |date=7 September 2006 }} â€“ Defence Journal, Pakistan Pakistani armor was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns.90 mm M36 GUN MOTOR CARRIAGE "Jackson" {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071202082142weblink |date=2 December 2007 }} Post W.W.II, the M36 was employed by the US Army in Korea and was distributed to friendly nations including France, where it was used in Indo-China (Vietnam), Pakistan. The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a more significant number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.The Battle for Ravi-Sutlej Corridor 1965 A Strategic and Operational Analysis {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071007171816weblink |date=7 October 2007 }} Major A.H. Amin, 30 December 2001 OrbatAt the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armored cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Patton, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armored divisions, the 1st and 6th Armored divisions â€“ the latter being in the process of formation.File:Indian Centurian tank being examined by journalists near Chawinda.jpg|thumb|246x246px|Indian Centurian tank being examined by journalists near ChawindaChawindaThe Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and some M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armored division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armored Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the 62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armored Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions.Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armor,BOOK, The Widening Gulf: Asian Nationalism and American Policy,weblink registration, Selig, Seidenman Harrison, 1978, Free Press, 269, 978-0-02-914090-1, Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar;BOOK, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, Devin T, Hagerty, 70, MIT Press, BOOK, India and Japan: The Emerging Balance of Power in Asia, Columbia University East Asian Institute, Stanley J, Heginbotham, William Howard, Wriggins, 1971, 254, they were sometimes employed faultily, such as charging prepared defenses during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar.File:Destroyed Patton Tank (1965 Indo-Pak War).jpg|left|thumb|Destroyed Sherman Tank ]]Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armored formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armored Division at Asal Uttar (Battle of Asal Uttar) or the Indian 1st Armored Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role, such as India's 2nd Armored Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda.The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armor, performed better than the overly complex{{Request quotation|2 Oct|date=October 2015}} Patton.

Naval hostilities

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy commanded by Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal town of Dwarka, which was {{convert|200|mi|km|order=flip}} south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 warWEB,weblink Pakistan Navy: A Silent Force to Reckon with, Paknavy.gov.pk, 21 December 2011, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20111205154529weblink">weblink 5 December 2011, Pakistan Intelligence, Security Activities & Operations Handbook By IBP USAIndia's Quest for Security: defense policies, 1947–1965 By Lorne John Kavic, 1967, University of California Press, pp 190 contested as a nuisance raid by some.Working paper, Issue 192, Australian National University. Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University, 1989, {{ISBN|0-7315-0806-8}}, 9780-7315-0806-8India's Foreign Policy, Ghosh Anjali, Dorling Kindersley Pvt Ltd, {{ISBN|978-81-317-1025-8}} The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India's parliamentBOOK, Hiranandani, G. M., Transition to triumph: history of the Indian Navy, 1965–1975,weblink 3 November 2011, January 2000, Lancer Publishers, 978-1-897829-72-1, 33–39, and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China By Lowell Dittmer, pp 77{{citation |last1=Hobbs |first1=David |title=British Aircraft Carriers: Design, Development & Service Histories |year=2014 |publisher=Seaforth Publishing |isbn=978-1-4738-5369-0|page=203}} Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict.THE INDIAN END OF THE TELESCOPE India and Its Navy {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173024weblink |date=7 February 2023 }} by Vice Admiral Gulab Hiranandani, Indian Navy (Retired), Naval War College Review, Spring 2002, Vol. LV, No. 2

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched numerous covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases.WEB,weblink SSG in the 1965 War, Defence Journal, 27 July 2012, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20110927035816weblink">weblink 27 September 2011, On 7 September 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Muhammad Musa, about 135 commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt turned out to be an "unmitigated disaster". Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police, or civilians.{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}} The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.The Fighter Gap {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061009102534weblink|date=9 October 2006}} by Shoab Alam Khan in Defence JournalDespite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.Defence Journal: The Way it was {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061215073052weblink |date=15 December 2006 }} Extracts from Pakistan Army Brigadier (Retd.) ZA Khan's bookIndia responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers.weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20071221214009weblink">Ending the Suspense 17 September 1965, TIME magazine Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory, but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.Remembering Our Warriors Brig (Retd) Shamim Yasin Manto S.I.(M), S.Bt, Q&A session: (“How would you assess the failures and successes of the SSG in the 1965 War?”) {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130503043659weblink |date=3 May 2013 }} February 2002, Defence Journal

Assessment of losses

India and Pakistan make widely divergent claims about the damage they inflicted on each other and the amount of damage suffered by them. The following summarizes each nation's claims.{|class="wikitable" style="font-size: 0.90em; margin-right: 0;"!!Indian claimsWEB,weblink Ceasefire & After, Bharat-rakshak.com, 27 July 2012, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20120716212425weblink">weblink 16 July 2012, !Pakistani claimsWEB,weblink Grand Slam – A Battle of Lost Opportunities, Defencejournal.com, 27 July 2012, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20120805182043weblink">weblink 5 August 2012, !Independent SourcesWEB,weblink onwar, onwar, 27 July 2012, dead,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20120728080126weblink">weblink 28 July 2012, |Casualties| 

• Army: 169 commissioned officers (1 brigadier, 9 lieutenant-colonels, 30 majors, 39 captains, 11 lieutenants, 79 second lieutenants), 80 junior commissioned officers (JCO), 1,820 other ranksNEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 520–522, 9 October 1965, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 538–540, 16 October 1965, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 571–573, 6 November 1965, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 587–588, 13 November 1965, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 624–626, 27 November 1965, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 4–6, 1 January 1966, The Gazette of India, NEWS, Part I-Section 4: Ministry of Defence (Army Branch), 59–61, 29 January 1966, The Gazette of India,
• Air force: 19 officers, 21 other ranks| â€“|3,000 Indian soldiers, 3,800 Pakistani soldiers|Combat flying effort| 4,073+ combat sorties| 2,279 combat sorties|Aircraft lostIndian Air Force>IAF (official), 43 [hide]Pakistan Air Force

ACCESS-DATE=27 JULY 2012 ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20120929074854/HTTP://WWW.BHARAT-RAKSHAK.COM/LAND-FORCES/ARMY/HISTORY/1965WAR/PDF/1965CHAPTER09.PDF ACCESS-DATE=11 FEBRUARY 2014 ARCHIVE-URL=HTTPS://WEB.ARCHIVE.ORG/WEB/20130927185738/HTTP://WWW.BHARAT-RAKSHAK.COM/IAF/HISTORY/MISC/LOSS1965.HTML, 27 September 2013, |19 PAF, 104 IAFGroup Captain Cecil Chaudhry, SJ – Chowk: India Pakistan Ideas Identities.com {{Webarchive>url=https://web.archive.org/web/20050511105610weblink |date=11 May 2005 }}. Chowk (9 December 2007). Retrieved on 14 April 2011.BOOK |Aerial victories|17 + 3 (post-war)|30| â€“|Tanks destroyed|128 Indian tanks, 152 Pakistani tanks captured, 150 Pakistani tanks destroyed. Officially, 471 Pakistani tanks destroyed and 38 capturedWEB , date=November 2011}}{{Citation needed|date=August 2013}}|Land area won1,500km2order=flip}} of Pakistani territory250km2order=flip}} of Indian territory1840abbr=on}} of Pakistani territory and Pakistan held {{convertmi2abbr=on|order=flip}} of Indian territory

Neutral assessments

{{over-quotation|date=February 2022}}There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared. Some neutral assessments are mentioned below â€”

• According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United States –

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by “Hindu India” and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

• Former New York Times reporter Arif Jamal wrote in his book Shadow War{{sfn|Jamal, Shadow War|2009|p=86}} â€”

This time, India's victory was nearly total: India accepted a cease-fire only after it had occupied {{convert|740|sqmi|km2|disp=sqbr}}, though Pakistan had made marginal gains of {{convert|210|sqmi|km2|disp=sqbr}} of territory. Despite the obvious strength of the Indian win, both countries claim to have been victorious.

• Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book South Asia in world politicsBOOK

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time the United Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

• In his book National identity and geopolitical visions,BOOK

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

• An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's Indiaweblink {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173037weblink |date=7 February 2023 }} India by Stanley Wolpert. Published: University of California Press, 1990 summarizing the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965,

In three weeks, the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced the cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

• In his book titled The greater game: India's race with destiny and China, David Van Praagh wrote{{sfn|Praagh|2003|p=294}} â€“

India won the war. It held on to the Vale of Kashmir, the prize Pakistan vainly sought. It gained {{convert|1840|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} of Pakistani territory: {{convert|640|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; {{convert|460|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} of the Sailkot sector; {{convert|380|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, {{convert|360|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} on the Lahore front. Pakistan took {{convert|540|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} of Indian territory: {{convert|490|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} in the Chhamb sector and {{convert|50|km2|abbr=on|disp=sqbr}} around Khem Karan.

• Dennis Kux's India and the United States estranged democracies also provides a summary of the war,”India and the United States estranged democracies”, 1941–1991, {{ISBN|1-4289-8189-6}}, DIANE Publishing, Pg 238

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the best of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

• A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947 by Robert Johnson mentionsBOOK

India's strategic aims were modest â€“ it aimed to deny the Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of {{convert|720|sqmi|km2|sigfig=2|disp=sqbr}} of Pakistani territory for the loss of just {{convert|220|sqmi|km2|sigfig=2|disp=sqbr}} of its own.

• An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environmentBOOK

,  â€“A brief, but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by the Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

• English historian John Keay's India: A History provides a summary of the 1965 warBOOK

,  â€“The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert, but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed, and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory, but India had most to celebrate.

• Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-PakistanBOOK

,  â€“Again, India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position, but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

• According to the Office of the Historian within the U.S. Department of State:WEB,weblink Milestones: 1961–1968 - Office of the Historian, history.state.gov, 26 August 2015, 8 July 2015,weblink live,

Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.

Ceasefire

On 20 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution, which noted that its previous two resolutions went “unheeded” and now demanded an unconditional ceasefire from both nations within 48 hours.{{citation |last=Fortna |first=Virginia Page |title=Peace Time: Cease-fire Agreements and the Durability of Peace |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=7MXPOz95A_IC |year=2004 |publisher=Princeton University Press |isbn=0-691-11512-5 |page=63 |access-date=11 February 2021 |archive-date=7 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173028weblink |url-status=live }}{{harvnb|Bajwa|2013|pp=303–304}}: "There was now a deadline for Pakistan, 0700 hours GMT, 22 September, to either accept or reject this resolution, barely 48 hours for Ayub to decide what to do…”India immediately accepted,{{sfn |Pradhan|2007|p=100}}{{efn|India accepted unconditional ceasefire in principle as early as 14 September.{{citation |last=Joshi |first=Manoj |title=Kashmir, 1947–1965: A Story Retold |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=uAT3oENcxDgC |year=2008 |publisher=India Research Press |isbn=978-81-87943-52-5 |page=215 |access-date=18 April 2021 |archive-date=7 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173044weblink |url-status=live }}: "After his meetings, [U Thant] made an appeal for an unconditional and immediate ceasefire to be effect as of September 14. India immediately accepted the proposal, but not Pakistan, which having gambled, now wanted to take something away from the table."}} while Pakistan accepted it on 23 September, with some notable dramatics.{{harvnb|Bajwa|2013|p=311}}: "In a dramatic and emotional speech, Bhutto declared that Pakistan was bound to prevail as justice was with it, but concluded the speech by confirming that Pakistan would give the UN a final chance to resolve the Kashmir issue and would observe the ceasefire call and would 'stop firing' on 0300 hours, 23 September."India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India.weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20071221214020weblink">A Cease-Fire of Sorts 5 November 1965 â€“ TIME In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On 10 October, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by three SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala.”The India-Pakistan Air War of 1965”, Jagan Mohan and Samir Chopra, Manohar Publications, New Delhi, 2005 A Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain; on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hawker Hunters.The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.

Tashkent Declaration

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted peace negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Muhammad Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Declaration on 10 January 1966,BOOK, Lieven, Anatol,weblink Pakistan: A Hard Country, PublicAffairs, 2012, 978-1610391627, en, 23 December 2016, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966. In India, the agreement was criticized because it did not contain a no-war pact or any renunciation of guerrilla warfare across Kashmir.India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the Tashkent Agreement on 11 January 1966. As a consequence, the public outcry in India against the peace declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.BOOK ,

Public perceptions

The ceasefire was criticized by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots.Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War By Victoria Schofield Published 2003, by I.B.Tauris {{ISBN|1-86064-898-3}} pp112 Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war â€“ which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India â€“ and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains.CONTROVERSY: Why Gohar Ayub is wrong about 1965 â€“ Khalid Hasan {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120723113615weblink |date=23 July 2012 }} quoting Pakistan author Husain Haqqani: "The Pakistani people were told by the state that they had been victims of aggression and that the aggression had been repelled thanks to God. â€¦ official propaganda convinced the people of Pakistan that their military had won the war.” Daily Times, 10 June 2005 Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed Durrani initially titled The Myth of 1965 Victory,Can⁣ the ISI change its spots? By Akhtar Payami, Dawn (newspaper) 7 October 2006 reportedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by the Pakistan Army to prevent circulation because the topic was “too sensitive”.Army attempts to prevent book sales by Amir Mir {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926234653weblink |date=26 September 2007 }} Gulf News 1 October 2006 Musharraf buys all copies of sensitive '65 war {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080220164122weblink |date=20 February 2008 }} Daily News & AnalysisInside Story of Musharraf-Mahmood Tussle, Hassan Abbas, Sep. 26, 2006 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180612142544weblink |date=12 June 2018 }} â€“ (Belfer Center for International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School of Government) The book was published with the revised title History of Indo Pak War 1965, published by Services Book Club, a part of the Pakistan military and printed by Oxford University Press, Karachi. A few copies of the book have survived.WEB,weblink NDU Library Islamabad Pakistan, 111.68.99.107, 14 May 2022, 7 February 2023,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20230207173047weblink">weblink live, A version was published in India as Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965 by Lexicon Publishers.BOOK,weblink Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965, Mahmud, Ahmed, 14 May 2002, Lexicon Publishers, 9789699063008, Google Books, 18 May 2022, 7 February 2023,weblink live, Recently a new Pakistani impression has been published in 2017.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate.

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.The “Official War History – 1965”, drafted by the Ministry of Defense of India in 1992, was a long-suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up, and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired, and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.Air Chief Marshal (retd.) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans, drafted by the Ministry of Defense and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the “Supremo Syndrome”, a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures began with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive victory. The Kashmiri people, on the other hand, remained calm and collected. The Indian Army was given enough information to understand Operation Gibraltar and that they were battling not insurgents, as they had initially thought, but Pakistani Army regulars.File:Mcconaughy20oct1965a.jpg|thumb|right|Telegram from the Embassy of the United States in (Karachi]]: “Continuing propaganda regarding achievements of PAK forces seems to have convinced most that only PAK forbearance saved the Indians from disaster.”)The Pakistani Army didn't know that Indian leaders wanted to attack the southern part of the country to start a new war. Pakistan had to send troops to the southern part of the country to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead of using them to help get to Kashmir.Pakistan's attempt to capture Ahnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was a failure. Many Pakistani commentators said that the Ayub Khan administration was indecisive during “Operation Grand Slam”. The critics contend that the mission was unsuccessful due to Ayub Khan's awareness of the significance of Akhnoor to India, referring to it as India's 'jugular vein', and his reluctance to invade it and initiate a conflict. Although progress was made in Akhnoor, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding officer, Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik, and replaced him with General Yahya Khan. During the replacement, a 24-hour pause was observed, enabling the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully repel a sluggish assault led by General Yahya Khan. The Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command said, “The enemy came to our rescue." Then, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticized Ayub Khan for inventing Operation Gibraltar, which ultimately failed, and for denying him command at a crucial point in the conflict. Malik said he would tell the truth about the war and how the army failed, but later decided not to because he was afraid of being banned.Musharraf, the 'poor man's Ataturk' By Khalid Hasan {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120904172647weblink |date=4 September 2012 }} 19 September 2004 Daily TimesSome authors have said that a war game â€“ that was held in March 1965 at the Institute for Defense Analyses in the United States might have encouraged Pakistan. The exercise concluded that Pakistan would prevail in the event of a conflict with India.The Crisis Game: Simulating International Conflict by Sidney F. GiffinWEB,weblink An Impending Nuclear War Between India and Pakistan Over Kashmir |, 28 May 2011, 14 May 2022, 17 May 2022,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20220517201528weblink">weblink live, Other authors like Stephen P. Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military â€¦ the 1965 war was a shock."BOOK, Stephen Philip Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan, Brookings Institution Press, 2004, 978-0-8157-1502-3,weblink Pages 103, 73–74During the war, the Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF, Nur Khan, later stated that it is the Pakistan Army that should be held accountable for initiating the conflict, rather than India.Noor Khan for early end to army rule â€“ Pakistan Daily The Nation {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071021003537weblink |date=21 October 2007 }}A word from Pak: 1965 was 'wrong' {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090112121938weblink |date=12 January 2009 }} The Times of India 6 September 2005 However, propaganda about the war continued in Pakistan,Editorial: The army and the people {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120723165034weblink |date=23 July 2012 }} Daily Times 1 June 2007The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Analysis and reappraisal after the 1965 War {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090307232548weblink |date=7 March 2009 }} by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin with most of the blame being placed on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures. This pattern persisted until the disastrous outcome of the Indo-Pakistani war in 1971.

Involvement of other nations

The United States and the United Kingdom have been the principal suppliers of military matériel to India and Pakistan since 1947. Both India and Pakistan were Commonwealth republics. While India had pursued a policy of nominal non-alignment, Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO and an ally of the West in its struggle against communism.BOOK, Riedel, Bruce, 2013, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings Institution Press, 55, 978-0-8157-2408-7, Well before the conflict began, however, Britain and the United States had suspected Pakistan of joining both alliances out of opportunism to acquire advanced weapons for a war against India. They had therefore limited their military aid to Pakistan to maintain the existing balance of power in the subcontinent.BOOK, Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, 2012, Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East, Tauris & Co., 39–44, 978-1-84885-974-6, "Defense aid was restricted to the extent that Pakistan would be able to present only a limited defense in the event of communist aggression â€¦ Western strategists sought to keep Pakistan â€¦ in a position where it did not feel itself powerful enough to initiate a confrontation with India." In 1959, however, Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation under which the United States agreed to take “appropriate action, including the use of armed forces” to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request.BOOK,weblink United States – Pakistan Alliance, Library of Congress Country Studies, United States of America, April 1994, 29 October 2010, 28 June 2010,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20100628051409weblink">weblink live, By 1965, American and British analysts had recognised the two international groupings, CENTO and SEATO, and Pakistan's continued alliance with the West as being largely meaningless.BOOK, Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, 2012, Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East, Tauris & Co., 53–55, 978-1-84885-974-6, Following the start of the 1965 war, both the United States and Britain took the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault, and suspended all arms shipments to both India and Pakistan. While the United States maintained a neutral stance, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, condemned India for aggression after its army advanced towards Lahore; his statement was met with a furious rebuttal from India.BOOK, Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, 2012, Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East, Tauris & Co., 55–58, 978-1-84885-974-6, Internationally, the level of support which Pakistan received was limited at best.BOOK, Small, Andrew, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press, 2015, 978-0-19-021075-5, 17–19, "Mao had decided that China would intervene under two conditions—that India attacked East Pakistan, and that Pakistan requested Chinese intervention. In the end, neither of them [were] obtained."{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=330}} Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué on 10 September which placed the blame on India, backed the United Nations' appeal for a cease-fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir.BOOK, Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, 2012, Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East, Tauris & Co., 58, 978-1-84885-974-6, Pakistan received support from Indonesia, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the form of six naval vessels, jet fuel, guns, and ammunition and financial support, respectively.Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, By Anas Malik page 84 Pakistan didn't gain meaningful support at an international level.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=325-327}}BOOK, Riedel, Bruce, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the Brink and Back, Brookings Institution Press, 2013, 978-0-8157-2408-7, 66–68, Since before the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India, with whom it had fought a brief war in 1962. China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan $60 million in development assistance in 1965.Political Survival in Pakistan: Beyond Ideology, By Anas Malik page 85 During the war, China openly supported the Pakistani position. It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its “aggression” in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China (China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year).{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=330}} Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan, the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint.BOOK, Dimitrakis, Panagiotis, 2012, Failed Alliances of the Cold War: Britain's Strategy and Ambitions in Asia and the Middle East, Tauris & Co., 57, 978-1-84885-974-6, This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India's improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962.BOOK, Butt; Schofield, Usama; Julian, 2012, Pakistan: the U.S., geopolitics and grand strategies, Pluto Press, 156, 978-0-7453-3206-2, China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=330}} In the face of this pressure, China backed down, extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking East Pakistan. Ultimately, Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid, recognizing that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=330}} International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict.{{sfn|McGarr|2013|p=330}}India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members.NEWS, M. J. Akbar, M. J. Akbar, 17 November 2014, High priest of modern India, [The Economic Times,weblink live, 17 November 2014,weblink 7 March 2020, Support given by Indonesia to Pakistan was seen as a major Indian diplomatic failure, as Indonesia had been among the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement along with India.BOOK, Shah, Amritlal B.,weblink India's Defence and Foreign Policies, Manaktalas, 1966, Bombay, 108, en, 13 February 2021, 7 February 2023,weblink live, Despite its close relations with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than other nations during the war, inviting both nations to peace talks under its aegis in Tashkent.BOOK, Varma, Shanta Nedungadi,weblink Foreign Policy Dynamics: Moscow and India's International Conflicts, Deep & Deep Publications, 1999, 978-81-7629-137-8, New Delhi, 105, en, 13 February 2021, 7 February 2023,weblink live,

Aftermath

India

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived by many as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir.BOOK , In its October 1965 issue, the Time magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the warweblink" title="archive.today/20130204135939weblink">Silent Guns, Wary Combatants, TIME magazine, 1 October 1965 â€”Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a “politico-strategic” victory for India. The Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.The 1965 war with Pakistan {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080417221123weblink |date=17 April 2008 }} â€“ Encyclopædia BritannicaWhile the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticized for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan.Sunday Times, London. 19 September 1965 In his book War in the modern world since 1815, noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan “lost heavily” during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaboratesBOOK ,  â€”India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out of ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.In 2015, Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, the last surviving armed force commander of the conflict, gave his assessment that the war ended in a stalemate, but only due to international pressure for a ceasefire, and that India would have achieved a decisive victory had hostilities continued for a few days more:NEWS, 1965 war: We achieved air superiority in three days, says Air Force Marshal Arjan Singh,weblink 28 October 2015, Economic Times, 4 October 2015, 7 October 2015,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20151007032733weblink">weblink live, For political reasons, Pakistan claims victory in the 1965 war. In my opinion, the war ended in a kind of stalemate. We were in a position of strength. Had the war continued for a few more days, we would have gained a decisive victory. I advised then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri not to agree to a ceasefire. But I think he was pressured by the United Nations and some countries.As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the tri-services of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict supporting Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons.BOOK , Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict, thus irking India.Title: India and the United States estranged democracies, 1941–1991, {{ISBN|1-4289-8189-6}}, DIANE Publishing At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India.BOOK , These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy â€“ India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India.BOOK , From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union.BOOK , After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far.BOOK , India's defense budget too would increase gradually after the war, in 1966–1967 it would rise to 17% and by 1970–1971 it would rise to 25% of its revenue.BOOK, J.N., Dixit, India-Pakistan in War and Peace, 2 September 2003, Routledge, 1-134-40757-2, One notes an almost geometrical progression in the defense expenditure in both countries between the years 1966 and 1971. In 1966–1967, Pakistan's budget was US $473 million, or about 19 percent of government revenue. India's defense expenditure was US$ 1171 million or 17 percent of its budget. By 1970–1971, Pakistan's military budget had grown to 32 percent of its revenue, that is US$625 million. India's defense budget had increased by 25 percent to US$1466 million., However, according to the World Bank data, India's defense expenditure by GDP decreased from 3.871% in 1965 to 3.141% in 1969, thereafter slightly increased to 3.652% in 1971.WEB, Military expenditure (% of GDP) – India {{!, Data|url=https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=IN|access-date=22 June 2020|website=data.worldbank.org|archive-date=22 June 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200622131759weblink|url-status=live}}

Pakistan

After the war, a significant number of Pakistanis regarded their military performance to be positive. In Pakistan, 6 September is celebrated as Defence Day to remember how Lahore was able to defend itself against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force was particularly praised.The Pakistani government was accused of spreading misinformation about the consequences of the war among its citizens.(:File:1965 Infiltrators.jpg|Declassified telegram sent to the US Department of State) In his book Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies, S.M. Burke writes â€”After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.Air Marshal (retired) Nur Khan, who headed the Pakistan Air Force in 1965, said in an interview with Dawn newspaperNEWS, Khan, M Ilyas, 2015-09-05, Operation Gibraltar: The Pakistani troops who infiltrated Kashmir to start a rebellion, en-GB, BBC News,weblink 2022-03-31,weblink 2021-12-27, —The army “misled the nation with a big lie” – that India rather than Pakistan provoked the war – and that Pakistan won a “great victory”.And since the “lie” was never rectified, the Pakistani “army came to believe its fiction, (and) has continued to fight unwanted wars,”Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz remarked:Haidar Imtiaz, 1965: How Pakistan won the war of propaganda {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201115102842weblink |date=15 November 2020 }}, The Nation, 12 September 2015.The myth of ‘victory’ was created after the war had ended, to counter Indian claims of victory on the one hand and to shield the Ayub regime and the army from criticism on the other.A book titled Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback,{{citation |author=Inter-Services Public Relations |title=Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback |publisher=Government of Pakistan, Department of Films and Publications |year=2015 |orig-year=first published 1966 |edition=Third |url=https://www.dispatchnewsdesk.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/Indo-Pakistan-War-1965-A-Flashback.pdf |access-date=27 January 2019 |archive-date=28 January 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190128030337weblink |url-status=live }} produced by the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan, is used as the official history of the war, which omits any mention of the operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and begins with the Indian counter-offensive on the Lahore front. The Pakistan Army is claimed to have put up a “valiant defense of the motherland” and forced the attack in its tracks.Most people agree that the idea of a mobile, hard-hitting Pakistan Army was badly hurt during the war because important breakthroughs were not made.Pakistan And Its Three Wars by Vice Adm (Retd.) Iqbal F Quadir {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110927135201weblink |date=27 September 2011 }} â€“ Defence Journal, Pakistan The military's ill-founded belief that their “martial race” of soldiers could defeat “Hindu India” in the conflict was criticized by several Pakistani writers.Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat Richard H. Shultz, Andrea Dew: "The Martial Races Theory had firm adherents in Pakistan and this factor played a major role in the under-estimation of the Indian Army by Pakistani soldiers as well as civilian decision makers in 1965."An Analysis The Sepoy Rebellion of 1857–59 by AH Amin {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170616083206weblink |date=16 June 2017 }} The army officers of that period were convinced that they were a martial race and the Hindus of Indian Army were cowards. This myth was largely disproved in 1965 Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wroteBOOK ,  â€“The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defenses in an intense violent military campaign fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that Pakistan “lost terribly in the 1965 war”.NEWS,weblink Pakistan Lost Terribly in 1965 War With India: Pak Historian, 2015, NDTV, 26 September 2018, 26 September 2018,weblink live, The Pakistani air force, on the other hand, racked up considerable acclaim and esteem among the military and international warfare critics for its triumphant defense of Lahore and other crucial parts of the country and its hefty retaliation against India the day afterward. The air force's vigilance was also influenced by the fact that some pilots were frantically re-enlisted six times in a single hour when they detected Indian air raids. In Pakistan, the air force and army are honored on Defence Day and Air Force Day. These days are on September 6 and 7, respectively."Pakistan's Air Power", Flight International, issue published 5 May 1984 (page 1208). Can be viewed at FlightGlobal.com archives {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120112205213weblink |date=12 January 2012 }} Retrieved: 22 October 2009BOOK, Fricker, John, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965,weblink 1979, I. Allan, 978-0-7110-0929-5, Furthermore, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the conflict, and, perhaps even more crucial, it had failed to secure Kashmir. Many people consider this outcome to be a setback for Pakistan.The faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar was criticized by senior Pakistani officials and military experts, which ultimately led to the conflict. The Tashkent declaration was also criticized in Pakistan, even though few people were aware of the seriousness of the situation at the end of the conflict. Political leaders were also subjected to criticism. Ayub Khan had espoused high expectations among the Pakistani populace regarding the superiority,  if not invincibility,  of its armed forces,WEB,weblinkweblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20041214203044weblink">weblink dead, Dr. Ahmad Faruqui, 14 December 2004, in accordance with the guidance of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the foreign minister of Pakistan. Nonetheless, the failure of Pakistan to attain its military objectives during the conflict resulted in a political liability for Ayub.BOOK, Hassan Abbas, Pakistan's Drift Into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America's War on Terror, M.E. Sharpe, 2004, 978-0-7656-1497-1, 52,weblink After the defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions, an increasingly vocal opposition challenged the army's invincibility.Ali, Mahmud. (24 December 2003) South Asia | The rise of Pakistan's army {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061219112104weblink |date=19 December 2006 }}. BBC News. Retrieved on 14 April 2011.The economic contraction in Pakistan was one of the most significant outcomes of the conflict.WEB,weblinkweblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20060516020823weblink">weblink dead, Embassy of Pakistan, 16 May 2006, Second opinion: The insidious logic of war Khaled Ahmed's Urdu Press Review {{Webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120723144800weblink |date=23 July 2012 }} Daily Times 3 June 2002 Pakistan had experienced impressive economic growth since the early 1960s, but the war ended that. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defense spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting a tremendous strain on its economy. In 1970–71, the expenditure on defense accounted for a staggering 32% or 55.66% of the total government expenditure.BOOK , According to veterans of the war, the war greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily. Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military force, and Pakistan's own position in the international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China saw improvements. Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Zhou Enlai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow, not to push India hard, and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'." General Majid maintained in Eating Grass that the "sane, philosophical and political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war.BOOK, Khan, Feroz Hassan, Eating grass : the making of the Pakistani bomb, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 978-0-8047-7601-1, 45–48 [48],weblink 21 February 2013, The Reluctant Phase, 7 November 2012, 7 February 2023,weblink live, Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support from the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan (and India);{{citation needed|date=February 2023}} an action that the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal.Richard N. Haass "Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy", 1998, Council on Foreign Relations, {{ISBN|0-87609-212-1}} pp172 After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.Another negative consequence of the war was growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir.Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age By Peter Paret, 1986, Oxford University Press, {{ISBN|0-19-820097-8}} pp802 Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir.BOOK, Rounaq Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration, Columbia University Press, 1972, 978-0-231-03625-2, Rounaq Jahan, Pg 166–167 In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20180911044625weblink">Reflections on two military presidents By M.P. Bhandara 25 December 2005, Dawn although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrengthed infantry division (14th Division), sixteen planes and no tanks.The Pakistan Army From 1965 to 1971 Yahya Khan as Army Chief-1966-1971 {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090307232548weblink |date=7 March 2009 }} by Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, an action that ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.Pakistan celebrates Defence Day every year to commemorate 6 September 1965 to pay tribute to the soldiers killed in the war.September 6: A day to remember the sacrifices of Pakistan's martyrs {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190906025139weblink |date=6 September 2019 }}, Dawn, 6 September 2018 However, Pakistani journalists, including Taha SiddiquiTaha Siddiqui Dear Pakistanis, this Defence Day, please stop celebrating hate {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191226163558weblink |date=26 December 2019 }}, Al Jazeera, 6 September 2018 and Haseeb AsifIt's Defence Day In Pakistan, But I Don't Know What We're Celebrating {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180907071109weblink |date=7 September 2018 }}, Huffington Post, 6 September 2018. have criticized the celebration of Defence Day.

Awards

National awards

• Santu Jouharmal Shahaney, an IOFS officer, served as the first Indian Director General Ordnance Factories (DGOF). He was awarded Padma Bhushan, by the Government of India, in the Civil Service category.WEB,weblink Extraordinary Gazette of India, 1965-10-27, Extra Ordinary, 27 October 1965,
• K. C. Banerjee, an IOFS officer. Received Padma Shri in 1967, for his contributions during the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, as the General Manager of Rifle Factory Ishapore,WEB, MINISTRY OF HOME AFFAIRS (Public Section) Padma Awards Directory (1954–2017) Year-Wise List,weblink live, 11 July 2021, www.mha.gov.in, 14 January 2021,weblink that developed and manufactured the 7.62 Self-Loading Automatic Rifle, that played decisive role in India's victory in the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965.NEWS,weblink The rifle that won the war in 1965 &124; India News – Times of India, The Times of India, 12 October 2015, 24 December 2021, 24 December 2021,weblink live, NEWS,weblink At India's 200-year-old ordnance factories, anxiety, and anticipation &124; India News – Times of India, The Times of India, 16 October 2019, 24 December 2021, 24 December 2021,weblink live, WEB,weblink Important Milestones, Rfi.nic.in, 26 February 2022, 6 March 2019,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20190306111810weblink">weblink dead, WEB,weblink Our History &124; RIFLE FACTORY ISHAPORE &124; Government of India, 24 December 2021, 22 February 2020,weblink dead,
• Joginder Singh Dhillon, Lt. Gen, awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1966 by the Government of India for his role in the 1965 war,NEWS,weblink Last salute to the lion of 1965, Patwant, Singh, 19 December 2003, The Indian Express, 12 October 2018, 7 February 2023,weblink live, becoming the first Indian Army officer to receive the award.WEB,weblink Unique Achievements, Bengal Sappers Officers Association,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20080915115708weblink">weblink 15 September 2008,

Gallantry awards

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:

India

• Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid{{citation|first1=Major General Ian (retd.)|last1=Cardozo|title=Param Vir: Our Heroes in Battle|year=2003|publisher=Roli Books|location=New Delhi|isbn=978-81-7436-262-9|language=en|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=D9ymBAAAQBAJ|pages=101–103|access-date=16 August 2019|archive-date=7 February 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173034weblink|url-status=live}} (Posthumous)
• Lieutenant-Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore (Posthumous)

Pakistan

• Major Raja Aziz Bhatti ShaheedWEB, Major Raja Aziz Bhatti,weblink Nishan-i-Haider recipients, Pakistan Army, 25 September 2013,weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20131003034727weblink">weblink 3 October 2013, dead, (Posthumous)

Battle honours

After the war, a total of 16 battle honours and three theatre honours were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable among which are:BOOK, Battle Honours of the Indian Army 1757–1971, Singh, Sarbans, 1993, Vision Books, New Delhi, 978-81-7094-115-6, 242–256,weblink 3 November 2011, 6 February 2023,weblink live, {{col-begin}}{{col-3}}(File:Prime Minister Narendra Modi visits Shauryanjali, a commemorative exhibition on the 1965 war.jpg|thumb|Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and other politicians visit Shauryanjali, a commemorative exhibition on the 1965 war, 17 September 2015)

• Jammu and Kashmir, 1965 (theatre honour)
• Punjab 1965 (theatre honour)
• Rajasthan 1965 (theatre honour)
• Assal Uttar
• Burki
• Dograi
• Hajipir
• Hussainiwala
• Kalidhar
• OP Hill
• Phillora

{{col-end}}

See also

• Indo-Pakistani war of 1971
• Post–World War II air-to-air combat losses

Notes

{{notelist}}

References

{{reflist|30em}}

Bibliography

• First & Further reflections on the second Kashmir War (South Asia series) â€“ 2 books by Louis Dupree.

• BOOK, Asghar Khan, Mohammed, The first round: Indo-Pakistan War, 1965,weblink 1979, Islamic Information Services, 978-0-906041-11-6, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• BOOK, Ayub, Muhammad, An army, its role and rule: a history of the Pakistan Army from Independence to Kargil, 1967–1999,weblink 2005, RoseDog Books, 978-0-8059-9594-7, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• {{citation |last=Bajwa |first=Farooq |title=From Kutch to Tashkent: The Indo-Pakistan War of 1965 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=5a0NAQAAQBAJ |date=2013 |publisher=C. Hurst & Co |location=London |isbn=978-1-84904-230-7 }}
• BOOK, Berindranath, Dewan, The war with Pakistan: A pictorial narration of the fifty days which rocked the sub-continent,weblink 1966, Asia Press, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• {{citation |last=Bisht |first=Rachna |title=1965: Stories from the Second Indo-Pakistan War |date=15 August 2015 |publisher=Penguin UK |isbn=978-93-5214-129-6 |page=60 |ref={{sfnref |Rachna Bisht |2015}}}}
• {{citation |last=Brines |first=Russell |title=The Indo-Pakistani Conflict |url=https://archive.org/details/TheIndoPakistaniConflict |year=1968 |publisher=Pall Mall P. |isbn=978-0-269-16232-9 |via=archive.org }}

• BOOK, Faruquii, Ahmad, Rethinking the national security of Pakistan: the price of strategic myopia,weblink 2003, Ashgate Publishing, 978-0-7546-1497-5,
• BOOK, Fricker, John, Battle for Pakistan: the air war of 1965,weblink 1979, Ian Allan, 978-0-7110-0929-5,

• BOOK, Gupta, Hari Ram, India-Pakistan war, 1965,weblink 1967, Hariyana Prakashan, B0006FFBK8, 1, 1, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• BOOK, Haqqani, Hussain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military,weblink 2005, United Book Press, 978-0-87003-214-1, 12 November 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• {{citation |last=Higgins |first=David R. |title=M48 Patton vs Centurion: Indo-Pakistan War 1965 |date=20 January 2016 |publisher=Osprey Publishing |isbn=978-1-4728-1094-6 |page=103 |ref={{sfnref |David R. Higgins |2016}}}}
• BOOK, Ismail Siddiqui, Muhammad, Die to live: A selection of short stories based on the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war,weblink 1983, Wajidalis, B0006EL2OI, 1, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• {{citation |last=Jamal |first=Arif |title=Shadow War: The Untold Story of Jihad in Kashmir |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TNO5MAAACAAJ |year=2009 |publisher=Melville House |isbn=978-1-933633-59-6 |ref={{sfnref|Jamal, Shadow War|2009}} |access-date=31 January 2017 |archive-date=7 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173111weblink |url-status=live }}

• BOOK, McGarr, Paul, The Cold War in South Asia: Britain, the United States and the Indian Subcontinent, 1945–1965, 2013, Cambridge University Press, 978-1-139-02207-1,
• BOOK, Mohan, Jagan, Chopra, Samir, The India Pakistan Air War of 1965,weblink 2005, 2005, Manohar Publishers, 1, 978-81-7304-641-4, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,

• {{citation |last=Paul |first=T. V. |title=Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers |date=10 March 1994 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-0-521-46621-9 |ref={{sfnref |T. V. Paul |1994}}}}
• {{citation |last=Praagh |first=David Van |title=The Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=kCI4492cHTEC |year=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP |isbn=978-0-7735-2639-6 |access-date=22 September 2018 |archive-date=7 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230207173107weblink |url-status=live }}
• BOOK, R. D., Pradhan, 1965 War, the Inside Story: Defence Minister Y.B. Chavan's Diary of India-Pakistan War,weblink 1 January 2007, Atlantic Publishers & Dist, 978-81-269-0762-5,
• BOOK, Praval, Maj K C, Indian Army after Independence,weblink 2009, Lancer InterConsult, Inc, 978-1-935501-10-7, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,

• BOOK, Singh, Bhupinder, 1965 war, role of tanks in India-Pakistan war,weblink 1982, B.C. Publishers, B0000CQ9GQ, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• BOOK, Singh, Lt. Gen. Harbaksh, War despatches: Indo-Pak Conflict, 1965,weblink 1991, Lancer InterConsult, Inc, 978-81-7062-117-1, 25 August 2020, 7 February 2023,weblink live,
• Tarapore, Arzan. 2019. "Defence without deterrence: India’s strategy in the 1965 war." Security Studies.Defence without deterrence: India’s strategy in the 1965 war {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200616135137weblink |date=16 June 2020 }}

External links

• Records of the United Nations India-Pakistan Observation Mission (UNIPOM) (1965–1966) at the United Nations Archives
• weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20101127234125weblink">IAF Combat Kills â€“ 1965 war,(Center for Indian Military History)
• BOOK, Mohammed Muhammad Musa, My Version: India-Pakistan War 1965, Wajidalis, 1983,
• United States Library of Congress Country Studies â€“ India
• weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20051217085236weblink">Official History of the Indian Armed Forces in the 1965 War with Pakistan
• weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20120805182043weblink">Grand Slam â€“ A Battle of lost Opportunities, Maj (Retd) Agha Humayun Amin â€“ very detailed roll of events and analysis
• The India-Pakistan War, 1965: 40 Years On â€“ From Rediff.com
• weblink" title="web.archive.org/web/20130119073542weblink">Lessons of the 1965 War from Daily Times (Pakistan)
• Spirit of '65 & the parallels with today â€“ Ayaz Amir

{{clear}}{{Indo-Pakistani War of 1965|state=expanded}}{{Kashmir conflict}}{{Military of India}}{{Military history of Pakistan}}{{Authority control}}